Contemporary Sports Issues – Page 72

Sponsorship Management: A Status Report

Submitted by: Norm O’Reilly

ABSTRACT

Based on the experiences and knowledge of a sport marketing university professor and the CEO of a sport marketing firm, this paper provides a hands-on status report on sponsorship management. It provides a contemporary view of sponsorship theory and practice in an effort to provide readers with a view on sponsorship as it functions both in terms of its use by practitioners and its significance in management theory.

Introduction to Sponsorship

Sponsorship, a relatively recent promotional tactic is where a “corporation [or other investor] creates a link with an outside issue or event, hoping to influence the audience by the connection” (Rifon, Choi, Trimble & Li, 2004). This ‘link’ or ‘association’ with a specific property (known as the ‘sponsee’) is the key in differentiating sponsorship from other promotional strategies, as it enables the investor (known as the ‘sponsor’) to not only receive the related promotional benefits (TV/print exposure, branding opportunity, etc.) but to be associated, in the minds of consumers, with the sponsee. For example, Lachowetz & Irwin (2003), in their survey of 500 spectators at the 2000 FedEx St. Jude Classic golf tournament, found evidence suggesting that spectator response to the sponsor (FedEx) is influenced by their affinity for the cause which the tournament benefits (St. Jude’s Children’s Research Hospital).

In terms of industry size, global investment in sponsorship has progressed from approximately US$500 million in 1982 (Kuzma & Shanklin, 1994) to US$24.4 billion in 2002 (Kolah, 2003) to an estimated US$28 billion in 2004 (IEG, 2004). This torrid and recent growth is forecasted to continue into the future (Kolah, 2003). In terms of its contribution to promotional spending, sponsorship has increased in importance from 2.5% in 1987 to an estimated 5.8% in 2001 (IEG, 2000) suggesting that sponsorship has become an integral part of the promotional mix. A number of academic studies (i.e. Cunningham and Taylor, 1995; Meenaghan, 1991) support this

In a similar fashion to the American Marketing Association’s recent update of its widely-accepted definition of marketing to focus on relationships, sponsorship is viewed in current management thinking as a relationship. Akin to other promotional strategies, sponsorship also enables a sponsor to efficiently reach its target market (e.g. Rodgers, 2003), making sponsorship important to sponsors, sponsees and affiliated entities such as a benefiting charity, a sponsorship sales agent, an event manager or a facility provider. Its importance stems from a few major factors. First, a major challenge in developing advertising strategies involves navigating the increasingly cluttered advertising space that exists today (Arthur, 1998). Faced with the challenge of this clutter, it is no longer enough for many organizations to promote themselves through advertising alone and sponsorship may provide an efficient way by which to differentiate a sponsor from its competitors (Fahy et al., 2004; Amis, Slack & Berrett, 1999). Second, evidence of the attractiveness of sponsorship relative to other promotional tools is demonstrated by sponsors who have supported their initial sponsorship investment with additional funds to leverage that investment. Leveraging, used in this context, refers to strategies that the sponsor funds and implements to increase the effectiveness of the sponsorship. These techniques are varied and include such things as the title sponsor of a televised event developing commercials and paying for their diffusion leading up to, during, and following the event. Reebok, for example, recently increased its annual budget to leverage its sponsorship investments to US$12.6 million (Kolah, 2003), which means that the organization spends over $12 million annually to leverage its sponsorship investments.

Mandate

The objective of this paper is to position and support sponsorship as a promotional activity from the planning stages through to its activation. It will be shown to be distinct from other promotional strategies (e.g. advertising, public relations, and sales promotions) and to be distinct from philanthropy including capital campaigns (major gifts). Philanthropy refers here to any fund-raising effort that seeks donations (i.e. a gift of a contribution where the donor requires nothing in return). Further, the need for both sponsors and sponsees to incorporate sponsorship-specific initiatives and resources into their promotional budgets will be demonstrated. In order to accomplish this mandate, the authors will draw on their own experiences, knowledge and research.

It is the authors’ hope that this paper will demonstrate to the decision-makers in organizations (both sponsors and sponsees) that sponsorship is not a form of corporate donation but a two-way marketing relationship where cash or in-kind resources are exchanged for promotional value. For the sponsorship relationship to be successful, the sponsorship must be properly leveraged by the sponsor and serviced by the sponsee, with an accompanying leveraging program. By means of contrast, major gifts are not recognized as providing promotional value as evidenced in the reasons in the elements of attraction of gift giving (Martinis, 2005), inferring that they are not sponsorship.

The white paper is organized in four sub-sections. First, a brief description of sponsorship and its nuances is described, with particular emphasis on current sponsorship practice. Second, a brief review of current management theory will be presented to support sponsorship’s position in management practice. Included in this section will be a short review of the sponsorship industry. Third, supporting evidence from the authors’ professional experiences will be provided. Finally, a summary paragraph will present the authors’ concluding policy statement.

Sponsorship Practice

In contemporary business practice, corporations invest in sponsorship; they no longer have the excess marketing funds or open leeway to simply undertake goodwill gestures. This evolution and maturation of sponsorship into a key strategic element of the marketing mix has led to a high level of practitioner need for cost-effective, accurate and reliable sponsorship evaluation methodologies as the greatest challenge facing practitioners is clearly the demonstration of sponsorship effectiveness. In response to this need, researchers are working to fill that gap.

As corporations (sponsors) and their agencies spend more time analyzing and assessing the business performance of their sponsorship investments and related leveraging activities, the properties (sponsees) they work with must be prepared to respond by effectively servicing the sponsorship. This response is being demanded in terms of increased media value, stronger integration of the sponsor’s brands with the property, and via more highly leveraged activation programs. It has become clear that, in order to insure the long-term success of the overall sponsorship, the sponsee must properly service the current needs of the sponsor by ensuring that its internal sponsorship management resources are appropriately structured. Such structure needs to include units within the organization that specialize in sponsorship sales, sponsorship activation and sponsor servicing. If the sponsee is to continue to generate the resources (cash and/or in-kind products/services) and brand association that comes with successful long-term sponsorship relationships, all three of these units must be in place.

The demands placed on a property’s sponsorship sales department are driving them to become even more integrated with the other functions in the organization. This has become even more pronounced as sponsors move from simply buying an affiliation or media spots through a property and are now interested in creating brand activations. The concept of brand activation is defined as consumer connectivity, and therefore the sponsorship program needs to be integrated with the departments that most touch the consumer.

Global Sponsorship Values (Source: IEG, 2003)

Territory	Predictions for sponsorship in 2003 (US$ billions)	Percentage growth (over 2002)
North America	$10.5	9.1%
Central and South America	$2.2	4.8%
Europe	$7.4	4.2%
Pacific Rim	$4.7	9.3%
Other	$1.4	7.6%

Of specific note within these stats is sponsorship’s contribution to global promotional spending, which has increased in importance from 2.5% in 1987 to an estimated 5.8% in 2001 (IEG, 2000). This suggests that sponsorship has become an integral part of the promotional mix and is supported by a number of studies (e.g. Meenaghan, 1991). In practice, sponsorship has clearly become an important revenue source for sponsees and a valuable promotional strategy to sponsors in many industries. The literature now positions sponsorship to be completely different that other promotional strategies given three main points of difference: (i) that sponsors are believed by consumers to be ‘part of the program’ [due to the association effect], (ii) that sponsorship and advertising function differently [i.e. the process by which the promotion is communicated], and (iii) that sponsorship is believed by consumers to benefit a broader audience.

Examples from Practice

The authors deal on a professional basis across Canada with a wide range of properties (sponsees) in terms of program type, scale, and mandate. These properties include:

National Capital Commission (NCC) – The NCC is a crown corporation of the Government of Canada founded to act as the steward of various lands and buildings owned by the Government of Canada in the National Capital Region (Ottawa, Ontario). A variety of sporting events are held on NCC property.

Toronto Parks & Recreation (TPR) – TPR is the branch of the City of Toronto responsible for all the parks and recreation activities in Canada’s largest city. A variety of sporting events and activities take place on TPR property.

Tennis Canada (Montreal & Toronto) – Tennis Canada is the National Sport Organization responsible for the sport of tennis in Canada.

Halifax Dartmouth Canada Day Committee – This Committee is responsible for all Canada Day celebrations and activities, including several sporting events, that take place on Canada Day (July 1 st) in the Nova Scotia’s largest city.

Canadian Football League (CFL) – The CFL is Canada’s NFL. It is a professional football league with 9 teams who play a full season each fall leading to the awarding of the Grey Cup.

Telus Ski & Snowboard Festival (Whistler) – This Festival is an annual event that draws skiers and snowboarders to Whistler, BC for a variety of related events and activities.

Each of these properties work with many of the largest and most powerful sponsoring corporations in the country and all are seeing substantial growth in their sponsorship portfolios. At the same time, these properties are coming under increased pressure to provide ROI for their sponsors. This strongly supports the mandate of this article.

In our dealings with these organizations we are seeing three notable shifts in their approach to sponsorship management, where organizations involved in sponsorship are expressing the following.

They are emphasizing the selling of sponsorship inventory on a more consultative packaging approach. A consultative packaging approach here refers to the fact that the sponsorship exchange is becoming more sophisticated and both sponsors and sponsees are providing and demanding more than just cash/product or promotional value in the relationship. They are interested in brand, associations and long-term effects.

They are exhibiting significant advancements in their in-house sponsorship expertise and the professionalism and specific-skill-sets of the personnel in their sponsorship departments.

They are providing more opportunities to both their agents and their sponsees to integrate the sponsor’s activation with event programming and marketing (i.e. additional leveraging activities).

SUMMERY

Both management theory and the authors’ professional experiences point to the need for sponsee’s to be properly structured in order to deal with corporate sponsors who view their investment as a marketing relationship not a donation. Being structured as such, will allow the sponsee to fulfil the needs of their sponsor and work towards developing successful long-term relationships with sponsors that will provide the resources they need, as well as improve their brand via the association.

REFERENCES

Amis, J., Slack, T. and Berrett, T. (1999). “Sport sponsorship as a distinctive competence”, European Journal of Marketing, 33(3/4), 250-272.
Arthur, D., Scott, D., Woods, T., and Booker, R. (1998). “Sport Sponsorship Should… A Process Model for the Effective Implementation and Management of Sport Sponsorship Programs”, Sport Marketing Quarterly, 7(4), 49-60.
Cunningham, W.H. and Taylor, S.F. (1995). “Event Marketing: State of the industry and research agenda”, Festival Management & Event Tourism, 2, 123-137.
Fahy, J., Farrelly, F. and Quester, P. (2004). “Competitive advantage through sponsorship: A conceptual model and research propositions”, European Journal of Marketing, 38 (8), 1013-1030.
Kolah, A. (2003). Maximizing the Value of Sponsorship. Sport Business Group Limited Publication.
Kuzma, J. R. & Shanklin, W. L. (1994). Corporate sponsorship: An application for analysis. In Graham, P. J. (Ed.), Sport business, operational and theoretical aspects. Madison, Wisconsin: Brown and Benchmark.
Lachowetz, Tony and Richard Irwin (2002), “FedEx and the St. Jude Classic: An Application of a Cause-Related Marketing Program (CRMP)”, Sport Marketing Quarterly, 11(2), 114-118.
Martinis, Robert. “How Do I Pinpoint the Major Gift Key Element of Attraction?”, www.nonprofit.org; downloaded February 2005
Meenaghan, T. (1991). “Sponsorship – Legitimising the medium”, European journal of marketing, 25(11), 5 – 10.
Rifon, N.J., Choi, S.M., Trimble, C.S., and Li, H. (2004). “Congruence Effects in Sponsorship”, Journal of Advertising, 33(1), 29-42.
Rodgers, Shelly (2003), “The Effects of Sponsor Relevance on Consumer Reactions to Internet Sponsorships,” Journal of Advertising, 32 (4), 66-76.
6 The American Marketing Association’s new definition is “marketing is an organizational function and a set of processes for creating, communicating and delivering value to customers and for managing customer relationships in ways that benefit the organization and its stakeholders” (AMA, 2004).
Only a sample of the authors’ knowledge base is presented. For further supporting case studies and empirical research, email mark.harrison@trojanone.com or noreilly@ryerson.ca.

U.S. Sports Academy2015-03-24T10:51:16-05:00September 7th, 2005|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Facilities, Sports Management|Comments Off

Playing with the Percentages When Trailing by Two Touchdowns

Submitted by: J. Denbigh Starkey

Abstract

It is relatively common for football teams to find themselves down by two touchdowns late in the game. If they score a first touchdown then coaching folklore says that the team should go for the extra point at that time. In this paper I will show that this strategy, which appears to be universally used in both the NFL and the NCAA, is incorrect, and that going for the two-point conversion after the first touchdown is nearly always significantly better. I will also show that going for the extra point after the first touchdown is only correct if either the coaches believe that they have about a two thirds chance of winning in overtime (which seems rash after a tied game when the result of the coin toss is still obviously not known) or if they believe that their chances of making a two-point conversion are far below national averages.

Introduction

On September 10 th, 2005, the University of Michigan football team was trailing by 14 points when they scored a touchdown with 3:47 left in their game against Notre Dame. Their coach decided to kick an extra point to get within seven points. Even though this strategy is followed in the NCAA and the NFL almost without exception, it is, in general, incorrect. In this paper I will show that the correct strategy in this situation is to immediately attempt the two-point conversion.

When their team is down by 14 points late in the game, NCAA and NFL coaches must base their strategy on the assumption that they will score two touchdowns while holding their opponents scoreless. When they score the touchdowns they have three choices of strategy that they can use:

Go for two first: Under this strategy the team attempts a two-point conversion when they score the first touchdown. If it succeeds then they go for the extra point after the second touchdown in an attempt to win the game. If the first one fails, which happens on average about 57% of the time, then they attempt another two-point conversion after the second field goal in an attempt to go into overtime. Although this strategy is apparently never used in professional or college games, and isn’t intuitively very good, I will show that it is clearly the best approach to take, based on well known probabilities for extra point and two-point conversion success rates.

Go for one both times: The commonly used strategy is to attempt the extra point after both of the touchdowns, playing to go into overtime. If the first extra point misses, which happens on average about 6% of the time, then the backup plan is to go for the two-point conversion after the second touchdown. Although this strategy is almost uniformly used, I will show that it is very inferior to the “go for two first” strategy.

Go for one then two: Under this strategy the team attempts the extra point after the first touchdown and then a two-point conversion after the second. This strategy is sometimes used when the coaching staff believes that their team is unlikely to win in the overtime and so they should go for the win now. As an example of this (Mallory & Nehlan, 2004) discuss, without criticism, a game where Bowling Green used this strategy to beat Northwestern in 2001. However I will show that it can never be as good as the “go for two first” strategy, and so it should never be used.

A fourth possible strategy, “go for two both times,” makes no sense logically or mathematically, unless the team’s extra point special team is so terrible that its chance for success is less than the chance for making a two-point conversion, and so I will ignore it here.

In summary, I will show that the “go for two first” strategy is considerably better than the commonly used “go for one both times” strategy, and that the “go for one then two” strategy should never be used.

Assumptions

The NCAA and the NFL have similar statistics for the success rate of two-point conversions and extra points. In the NFL the figures are 43% for the two-point conversion and 94% for the extra point, while in the NCAA the figures are 43.5% and 93.8% (Mallory & Nehlan, 2004). I’ll use the 43% and 94% figures for most examples in this paper, and will also develop the general formulas to show when the “go for two first” strategy is best. I’ll assume initially that the two sides have equal chances of winning the overtime, and will then extend the analysis to consider the more general case of what to do if, for example, the coaching staff believes that they have a higher or lower chance of winning in the overtime.

Mathematical Justification for the “Go for Two First” Strategy

I’ll assume a minimal level of probability knowledge for the rest of this paper. In particular I will assume that if there are two independent events like attempting a two-point conversion after one touchdown and then an extra point after another touchdown then the probability of both succeeding is the product of their probabilities. E.g., if the two-point conversion has a 43% chance of succeeding, and the extra point has 94%, then these will be assigned probabilities of 0.43 and 0.94, respectively, and the probability of both succeeding is 0.43 × 0.94, which is 0.4042, which using percentages is 40.42%.

The Average Case

Initially I’ll just look at the average case where the percentages for the two-point conversion and the extra point are 43% and 94%, respectively, (and so the percentages for failing on the two-point conversion and missing the extra point are 57% and 6%, respectively), and where the teams are equally likely to win if the game goes into overtime. Then I’ll generalize the mathematics to other percentages.

Under the “go for two first” strategy the team will score three additional points (i.e. in addition to the twelve points for the two touchdowns) if they get the two-point conversion and the subsequent extra point, two additional points when either they miss the first two-point attempt and hit the second or when they make the two-point attempt but miss the extra point, or no additional points if they miss both two point attempts. One additional point cannot occur under this strategy. The probability of three additional points, which will win the game, is 0.43 × 0.94 (making the two-point and then the conversion), which is 0.4042. The probability of two additional points (making the two-point and missing the extra point or missing the first two-point but getting the second) is 0.43 × 0.06 + 0.57 × 0.43, which is 0.0258 + 0.2451, which is 0.2709, which will send the game into overtime. The probability of zero additional points, which will lead to a loss, comes from missing both two-point attempts, which is 0.57 X 0.57, which is 0.3249. So there is a 0.4042 chance of winning outright plus a 50% chance of winning the overtime, which adds half of .2709, for a total winning percentage of 0.540.

The “go for one both times” strategy requires hitting both extra points, which has a probability of 0.94 × 0.94, which is 0.8836, or missing the first one and then attempting the two-point conversion which has a probability of 0.06 × 0.43 for an additional 0.0258, and then assuming a 50% chance of winning the overtime gives this strategy a winning probability of half of 0.9094, for a winning percentage of 0.455.

The “go for one then two” strategy is the worst. It succeeds and wins the game when both succeed with probability 0.43 × 0.94, which is 0.4042, and ties and goes into overtime if the extra point is missed but the two-point conversion succeeds, which will add half of 0.06 × 0.43, for another 0.0129 and for a total winning probability of 0.417.

In summary, the chances of winning under the three strategies, assuming an even chance in an overtime, 43% for two-point conversions, and 94% for extra points (the NFL average statistics), and assuming that you get two touchdowns without the opponents scoring, are shown in the table below:

Strategy	Percentage of winningin average case
Go for two first	54.0%
Go for one both times	45.5%
Go for one then two	41.7%

Clearly the proposed strategy, even though it is not commonly used, is by far the best strategy to take in this average case.

The General Case

Let’s assume that for your team you estimate that you have a probability x of making a two-point conversion, y of making an extra point, and in this game you believe that you have a probability of z of winning if the game goes into overtime. In the average case example above x = 0.43, y = 0.94, and z = 0.5. The probabilities now become

Strategy	Probability of winning
Go for two first	xy + x(1-y)z + (1-x)xz
Go for one both times	yyz + (1-y)xz
Go for one then two	yx + (1-y)xz

Interpreting these equations, the “go for two first” strategy wins if either the two-point conversion and subsequent extra point both succeed (probability xy), or the two-point conversion succeeds and the extra point fails but you win in overtime (x(1-y)z), or the first two-point conversion fails, the second one succeeds, and you win the overtime

((1-x)xz). The “go for one both times” strategy wins if either both extra points succeed and you win the overtime (yyz) or the first one misses but the backup two-point conversion succeeds, and again you win in overtime ((1-y)xz). Finally the “go for one then two” strategy wins if the extra point and the subsequent two-point conversion both succeed (yx) or the extra point fails and the subsequent two-point conversion succeeds and you win in overtime ((1-y)xz).

At this point we can completely reject any further consideration of the “go for one then two” strategy because the “go for two first” strategy always has (1-x)xz better probability and this quantity can’t be negative. (In most practical cases it will be about a 0.12 higher probability, or a 12% higher percentage.) The problem with the “go for one then two” strategy is that if the two-point conversion fails then the game is lost, while with the “go for two first” strategy if the two-point conversion fails then the team can attempt a second two-point conversion, going for the tie, after the second touchdown.

Assuming 50% Overtimes

In most games the probability of winning in overtime is dominated by the coin flip and luck, and so it is very close to 50% when evaluated in advance of that flip. Even if a fairer system were developed that took away the 60% advantage of the coin flip, like the pizza splitting system (Smith, n.d.), the success rate in overtime is likely to be very close to 50% for most teams over a reasonable number of overtimes. Given the assumption that z = 0.5, the probability table for the two reasonable strategies becomes:

Strategy	Probability of winning
Go for two first	xy + ½x(1-y) + ½(1-x)x
Go for one both times	½yy + ½(1-y)x

Given a particular value for y, your probability that you’ll make an extra point, we can compare these two formulas to determine how confident you need to be in your two-point conversion before you decide to use the “go for two first” strategy. As we’ll see, if you believe that you will make at least 38.2% of your two-point conversions (which is significantly below the national average) then you should always use the “go for two first” strategy, even if you know that you’ll never miss an extra point. As you reduce your confidence in your extra point special team, your required confidence in your two-point conversion team can drop even further and still mandate the use of the “go for two first” strategy. So, for example, if you have a poor kicking team and only expect to make 90% of your extra point kicks then you should use the “go for two first” strategy if you expect to make at least 32.8% of your two-point conversions.

To justify these numbers I just need to ensure that xy + ½x(1-y) + ½(1-x)x is greater than ½y 2 + ½(1-y)x, cancel out the common term, and solve the equation for x. This gives

xy + ½(1-x)x > ½y 2 which is –x 2 + x(2y+1) – y 2 > 0, which can be solved with the standard quadratic equation formula to get the equation that one should use the “go for two first” strategy whenever:

This looks complicated, but it is easy to apply. E.g., if y = 1.0, and so you believe that your team will never miss an extra point, then substitution shows that if your team can make at least 38.2% of their two-point attempts then the “go for two first strategy” is best. Break points for different expected field goal percentages are shown below:

Extra point percentage	Required two-point percentageto select “go for two first” when 50% chance in overtime
100%	38.2%
94% (NFL)	34.9%
93.8% (NCAA)	34.8%
90%	32.8%
80%	27.5%
70%	22.5%

So, for example, if your kicking team only succeeds 90% of the time with extra points, then if you estimate that you will make a two-point conversion at least one third of the time then you should adopt the “go for two first” strategy. A normal kicking team in either the NCAA or NFL should use the “go for two now” strategy if they can expect to make at least 35% of their two-point conversion attempts.

Assuming Other Overtime Percentages

While most teams will, when they are being honest with themselves, decide that their chances of winning if the game goes into overtime are close to 50%, there might be times when they are more or less confident than that. For example most analysts believe that a team with a much stronger field goal team has an advantage in overtime under either NFL or NCAA rules. In this section I’ll look at how this changes the odds. For any particular expectation of winning or losing in the overtime one can substitute the value in for z in the general equations and solve them using the quadratic equation as I did for the z = 0.5 situation, above. In general this gives the break point on whether or not to use the “go for two first” at

I’ll rebuild the table that I had above for two situations; when the coaching staff aren’t very confident going into overtime, and estimate their chances at 45%, and when they are confident and estimate their chances at 55%.

Extra point percentage	Required two-point percentageto select “go for two first” when 45% chance in overtime
100%	34.8%
94% (NFL)	31.9%
93.8% (NCAA)	31.8%
90%	30.0%
80%	25.4%
70%	20.9%

Extra point percentage	Required two-point percentageto select “go for two first” when 55% chance in overtime
100%	41.6%
94% (NFL)	37.9%
93.8% (NCAA)	37.8%
90%	35.5%
80%	29.7%
70%	24.1%

These figures show that even if you are fairly confident that you will win in overtime (55% confident) then you should still use the “go for two first” strategy unless you think that your chances of making a two-point conversion are way below the 43% average, and that if you believe that your chances are not good in an overtime (45%) then you should use the “go for two first” strategy unless your two-point conversion team is really awful.

They also give rise to one final question: How confident do you need to be in your ability to win in overtime before you reject the “go for two first” strategy and use the “go for one both times” strategy? Some math will provide that information. We know that we should use the “go for one both times” strategy when:

This surprisingly simple condition says that you should only use the “go for one both times” strategy whenever . Assuming the standard NFL values for x and y, 0.43 and 0.96, respectively, then this is , which is 0.633 or 63.3%. So the traditional “go for one both times” strategy should only be used if you believe that your team is nearly twice as likely to win as the opponents in overtime, which seems a wildly optimistic assumption after tying in regular time.

Discussion

I have shown that under nearly all circumstances the “go for two first” strategy is significantly better than the “go for one both times” strategy when trailing by two touchdowns late in the game, and than also the “go for one then two” strategy should never be used.

The only times when the “go for one both times” strategy should be used is when either the coaches believe that they are nearly twice as likely to win as the opponents are (which seems overly optimistic after a tied game unless there are external factors like late injuries to some of the opponent’s important players) or when they believe that their team is far below average at making two-point conversions.

Since the correct strategy never appears to be used, an interesting question is why coaches have always got it so wrong. They have probably been led astray by the expected value of going for two point conversions vs. extra points. The expected value is the expected long term return from taking a particular action. In the case of a two-point conversion it is, for a typical team, (2 points)x0.43, which is 0.86 points each time that you try it. For an extra point it is (1 point)x0.94, which is 0.94 points. So for most of the game kicking extra points after touchdowns is slightly better than going for two-point conversions. When trailing at the end of the game the expected value of the points is no longer relevant, since all that matters is whether you are more or less likely to win. Looking at it differently, if the coaches use the “go for two first” strategy then, as we saw earlier, there is a 0.4042 of winning outright, a 0.3249 of losing outright, and the rest of the time (0.2709) you’ll go into overtime. So you are more likely to win than lose. Using the “go for one both times” strategy there is no chance of an outright win, a 0.9094 of going into overtime, and the rest of the time (0.0906) you will lose outright. So with this strategy you are more likely to lose than win. One reason expected values don’t help here is that if you lose outright with the “go for two first” strategy it will be by two points, but with the “go for one both times” strategy it will sometimes be by only one point, but a loss is a loss, so this isn’t relevant.

In this paper I haven’t discussed how to handle other situations like trailing by seven points (attempt the extra point) or by 21 points (go for two first). I also haven’t discussed high school football because two-point conversion attempt and extra point percentages vary so spectacularly across high school teams. However once high school coaches have some estimates for their team’s percentages in these two areas they can use the formulas in this paper to determine their best approach. It appears that for all practical cases the “go for two first” strategy will also be best for them.

References

Mallory, W. & Nehlan, D. (eds.) (2004). Complete Guide to Special Teams, American Football Coaches Association, ISBN 0736052917.
Smith, M. (n.d.) Splitting the Overtime Pizza, Football Outsiders Web Page, Retrieved September 19, 2005, from http://www.footballoutsiders.com/ramblings_print.php?p=87&cat=1.

U.S. Sports Academy2018-10-25T10:22:13-05:00September 6th, 2005|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Coaching, Sports Management, Sports Studies and Sports Psychology|Comments Off

Investigating Demographic and Attitude Characteristics of Recreational Skiers: An Application of Behavioral Segmentation

Submitted by: Dr Charilaos Kouthouris

Abstract

The objective of this study was to investigate the most important constraints facing recreational skiers, and profile recreational skiers according to their levels of participation and demographic characteristics. The sample of the study consisted of two hundred and sixty eight (N=268) recreational skiers from a skiing resort in Greece. The results indicated that the most important constraints against participation in winter skiing were related to economic and lack of time problems. Participants were then categorised according to their level of participation (infrequent, moderate, and frequent participants). Comparisons in terms of demographic characteristics indicated that younger and single people participated more in skiing activities than older and married ones. Furthermore, males participated more than females. Comparisons in terms of the perception of constraints indicated several differences with the most striking on the item reading ‘skiing is not among my priorities’. The managerial implications of the results are discussed.

Introduction

Market segmentation is the process of dividing a market into groups of consumers who share similar characteristics. Segmentation is a widely used marketing strategy by marketers today. Four main bases for market segmentation have been suggested: demographic, geographic, psycho graphic and behavioural. Demographic segmentation involves the division of consumers into groups based on variables such as gender, age, family size, income, occupation and religion, while geographic segmentation includes variables such as nation, counties, states etc. Demographic and geographic segmentation are the most widely and easily most applied strategies by marketers and practitioners. Psychographic segmentation includes the division of consumers into groups based on social class, lifestyle, and personality characteristics, while in behavioural segmentation consumers are divided to form groups based on knowledge, attitudes, uses or responses to services. The value of benefit segmentation has been indicated by Hendricks (2004) who applied it in recreation participants. Involvement profiles have been used as a way of behavioural segmentation by Dimanche, Havitz & Howard (1993) in a tourism context, while Havitz, Dimanche & Bogle (1994) applied it in a fitness context. It is clear from all these studies that not all participants are the same with respect to their interests, attitudes and needs.

In the present study we used a combination of behavioural and psychographic segmentation in order to classify recreational skiers. We originally classified consumers into groups according to the frequency of doing ski (behavioural segmentation), and we then profiled each group by examining a) demographic characteristic and b) perceived constraints on skiing participation in terms of different frequency of skiing participation.

Theoretical Background

Leisure Constraints

Leisure constraint research has been a very popular topic in the leisure literature the last two decades. This is due to the theoretical developments made by key papers such as those written by Crawford & Godbey’s (1987) Crawford, Jackson & Godbey’s (1991) Jackson & Rucks (1993) and they great applicability of constraint research data (Alexandris & Carroll, 1999). A variety of studies have successfully indicated how leisure constraint data can help practitioners and policy -makers to more effectively design and promote sport and leisure services (Kay & Jackson, 1991).

Constraints have been defined as “factors that are assumed by researchers and perceived or experienced by individuals to limit the formation of leisure preferences and to inhibit or prohibit participation in leisure activities” (Jackson, 1991, p. 276). It is widely accepted today that constraints are classified into intrapersonal, interpersonal and structural. This categorization was introduced by Crawford and Godbey (1987) and adopted by the majority of researchers in this area. Intrapersonal are internal constraints related to individual psychological states and attributes. Examples of intrapersonal constraints include perceived skill levels, perceived fitness levels, perceived confidence, stress and anxiety. Interpersonal constraints are related to lack of social interaction and social isolation. Examples of interpersonal constraints include inability to find partners to participate with, social isolation, and social disapproval. Finally, structural constraints are external ones. They are related to unavailability or resources to participate in leisure activities. Examples of structural constraints include lack of money, problems related to facilities and services and accessibility issues.

Studies on leisure constraints have been conducted in a variety of leisure, recreation and sport setting, as well as different countries and populations. In the area of sport tourism, leisure constraints research is growing but it is still limited. Constraints have been investigated among nature-based tourists (Nyaupane, Morais & Graefe, 2004), skiers (Williams & Fidgeon, 2000), fans of soccer teams who travel to other countries (Kim & Chalip, 2004), tourists with physical disability problems (Daniels, Drogin-Rodgers & Wiggins, 2005) and destination tourists (Dellaert, Ettema & Lindh, 1998).

Objectives of the Study

The objectives of this study were: a) to investigate the most important constraints facing recreational skiers; b) profile recreational skiers according to their levels of participation, demographic characteristics and perception of constraints.

Methodology

Participants and Procedures

Data were collected by means of a site survey, conducted in a skiing resort, which was located at the biggest ski centre in South Greece. Recreational skiers were approached and asked to fill the questionnaires while relaxing in the cafeteria of the resort after skiing. Two hundred and sixty eight skiers were approached, and two hundred and twenty (N=268) of them accepted to fill the questionnaires, achieving a response rate of 88%.

Three demographic variables were included as follows: gender (males and females), the age of the respondents, which was coded in three categories (18-25, 26-35, 36-65), and level of education (primary education, secondary education and university graduates). The demographic characteristics of the sample are presented in Table 1.

Skiers were also categorized according to their level or participation: infrequent, moderate, and frequent participants.

Research Instruments

Constraints Scale

An adjusted version of the leisure constraints questionnaire (Alexandris & Carroll, 1997a, 1997b) was used in order to investigate the perception of constraints on skiing participation. This was a twenty six item instrument, with was developed and standardized by the Greek population (Alexandris & Carroll, 1997a). It was reported by Alexandris and Carroll (1977b) to have good psychometric properties (Cronbach’s alpha for the whole scale = .85, all items with factor loadings >.40, and Cronbach’s’ alpha >.60 in each factor). Furthermore, it was tested against demographic groups, and showed adequate discriminatory power. This scale was adapted to recreational skiing constraints after conducting interviews with six experienced skiers and five ski instructors. This procedure led to the addition of one more constraint reading ‘problems related to weather conditions’. Respondents were asked to evaluate the importance of each of the twenty three statements as limiting or prohibiting factors for their participation in skiing, using a seven point Likert scale ranking from very important (7) to not important (1). The internal reliability of the whole ski constraints scale was successfully (Cronbach’s alpha = .88).

Results

The demographic characteristics of the sample are presented in Table 1.

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See Table1 on Page 2

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The top-ten constraints for the whole population

The ten top highest scored constraints were: the three financial related constraints C19/M=4.6, C20/M3.6, and C21/M=3.4), the three lack of time related constraints (lack of time because of work / studies, family or social obligations, C1/M=4.8, C2/M=2.9, and C3/M=3.1), the two lack of partner related constraints (C22/M=3.2, C23/M=3.0), problems related to the weather conditions (C16/M=3.3), and the lacks of skills problems (‘no effective ski technique’, C8/M=4.6). These results are presented in Table 2.

Levels of skiing participation.

In order to examine the frequency of skiing participation, the proportions of participants who fell into the three categories (infrequent, moderate, and frequent participation) were calculated. The results indicated that there was a certain group of individuals (32.5%) who were shown to be only ‘infrequently’ participants in winter skiing (one to four times per winter season). The second subgroup (54.5%) participated ‘moderately’ in skiing (five to 9 times per year). Finally 13.3% of the respondents stated that they participated ‘frequently’ (more than 10 times per winter season).

The top-ten constraints by the level of participation

Generally speaking the lack of time related constraints were cited as the most important ones for all the three participation groups. Among the few differences, the item reading “skiing is not among my priorities” was included only in the top-ten list of the ‘infrequently’ participation group, and the constraints reading ‘I don’t like the ski resort environment” and “I do not feel safe” were included only within the ‘frequently’ level top ten list.

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See Table2 on Page 2

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Constraints and levels of participation.

Univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed significant differences in thirteen constraints among the three different participation levels. The most significant difference was found in constraint C12 ‘skiing is not on my priorities’, F (2,235) = 29.4, p< .001), followed by the C8 constraint ‘no effective ski technique’, F (2,230) = 18.3, p< .001), and the C25 constraint ‘my family doesn’t like skiing’, F (2,234) = 13.2, p< .001). Each of the significant ANOVAs was followed by Scheffe’s post-hoc comparisons to determine between which groups the differences were statistically significant. The ANOVA’s results are presented in detail in Table 3.

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See Table3 on Page 2

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Skiing Participation by Age, Gender and Marital status (% of the population).

Age and frequency of participation

A cross-tabulation of the age groups against the levels of participation (infrequently, moderately, and frequently) revealed statistical significant differences (see Table 4). The level of participation was negatively correlated with ascending age group levels (x 2=12, p<.01). Age 1 group achieved the highest rate (40.2 %) in ‘infrequently’ participation level and the lowest rate in ‘frequently’ level. In contrast, the older participant group (age 3) achieved the highest rate (52.9 %) in ‘frequently’ participation level and the lowest in ‘infrequently’ level.

Gender and frequency of participation

An association also found between participation and gender (x 2=5.7, p<.05), with male recreational skiers having higher participation rates than females. Contrary, younger female ski groups participated in skiing more ‘infrequently’ (45.5%) than the older female groups in ‘frequently’ participation levels (21. 2%).

Marital status and frequency of participation

Non significant relationship (x 2= 4, p< n. s.) revealed between participation levels and participants marital status. There was only a trend for the single individuals to participate more ‘frequently’ in skiing that the married ones.

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See Table4 on Page 2

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Discussion

Lack of time related constraints were revealed by all studies that investigated constraints on recreation participation. (Alexandris & Carroll, 1997a; 1997b; Kay & Jackson, 1991 ). Skiing is an even more time consuming activity since it required traveling to the skiing resorts, which usually are far away from the urban places. Resorts managers have almost no influence on removing these constraints. The results also indicated that financial problems were reported as important ones by the majority of participants. This finding is once again related to the specific requirements of the activity in question (skiing). Skiing is still considered as an expensive sport for the majority of the population. While lowering prices is not obviously a realistic suggestion for resort managers, efforts should be made towards promoting skiing packages for families (family packages) and specific groups of the population (e.g., students) that are facing financial problems, if these groups are to be targeted.

The high mean score of the item reading “skiing is not among my priorities” for the lowest participation level group (infrequently) explains in a degree their unwillingness to participate more frequently. While this is obviously an intrapersonal constraint related to preferences and personal interest, it could be argued that this constraint could in a way be removed by providing outdoor education and making winter skiing in Greece a more “mass” sport.

The high statistical differences that revealed on the constraints “I do not have good skiing skills”, “I do not have self-confidence”, and I do not know how to skiing” are also important findings, since they indicated that intrapersonal constraints are in a degree responsible for the low participation rates of some individuals. This finding is in line with previous research that conducted in other leisure and recreation settings (e.g., Alexandris & Carroll, 1997). As previously discussed, intrapersonal are internal constraints that are related to individual psychological states and attributes. The removal of intrapersonal constraints is not an easy task since they are not beyond the control of the organization (Alexandris & Carroll, 1999). In the case of skiing, however, it is clear that there are a certain groups of individuals who do not feel confident about their skills and abilities, and this limits their participation levels. Once again efforts should be made towards the promotion of skiing. Having free teaching classes could help towards this direction. It is important that beginners should get as much support as possible by the repost teachers and staff.

In terms of profiling recreational skiers that results indicated that the most frequent skiers are young, single and male individuals. This once again suggests that there is space for better promotion on the side of resort marketers. There should be promotional strategies targeting females, families and older individuals ( Havitz et al, 1994; Dimanche et al, 1993) . Different promotional strategies are obviously required as well as different design of the main product. Examples could be offering skiing opportunities for the whole family, offering light programs for old individuals, improving the whole experience by emphasising on the physical environment.

References

Alexandris, K., & Stodolska, M. (2004). The influence of perceived constraints on the attitudes towards recreational sport participation. Leisure and Society, 27, 197-217.
Alexandris, K., & Carroll, B. (1999). Constraints on Recreational Sport Participation in Adults in Greece: Implications for Providing and Managing Sport Services. Journal of Sport Management, 13, 317-332.
Alexandris, K. (1998a). Patterns of recreational sport participation among the adult population in Greece. Cyber Journal of Sport Marketing, 2(2), 1-9.
Alexandris, K., & Carroll, B. (1997a). An analysis of leisure constraints based on different recreational sport participation levels: Results from a study in Greece. Leisure
Sciences, 19, 1-15.
Alexandris, K., & Carroll, B. (1997b). Motives for recreational sport participation in Greece: Implications for planning and provision of sport services. European Physical Education Review, 3(2), 129-143.
Crawford, D., Jackson, E., & Godbey, G. (1991). A hierarchical model of leisure constraints. Leisure Sciences, 13, 309-320.
Crawford, D., & Godbey, G. (1987). Reconceptualizing barriers to family leisure. Leisure Sciences, 9, 119-127.
Daniels, M., Drogin Rodgers, E., & Wiggins, B., (2005). ‘‘Travel Tales’’: an interpretive analysis of constraints and negotiations to pleasure travel as experienced by persons with physical disabilities. Tourism Management, ??, ???,???
Dellaert, B. Ettema, D., & Ch., Lindh, (1998). Multi-faceted tourist travel decisions: a constraint-based conceptual framework to describe tourists’ sequential choices of travel components. Tourism Management, 19, No 4, 313-320.
Dimanche, F., Havitz, M. E., & Howard, D. R. (1993). Segmenting recreationists and tourists using involvement profiles. Journal of Travel and Tourism Marketing, 1 (4), 33-52.
Havitz, M. E., & Dimanche, F., & Bogle, T. (1994). Segmenting the adult fitness market using involvement profiles. Journal of Park and Recreation Administration. 12 (3), 35-56.
Hendricks, W. W. (2004). Extending Importance-Performance Analysis with Benefit-Based Segmentation. Journal of Park and Recreation Administration, 22, 1. 53-74.
Jackson, E. (1991). Special issue, introduction. Leisure constraints/constrained leisure, Leisure Sciences, 13, 273-8.
Jackson, E. (1993). Recognizing patterns of leisure constraints: Results from alternative analyses. Journal of Leisure Research, 25, 129-149.
Jackson, E., & Rucks, V. (1993). Reasons for ceasing participation and barriers to participation: Further examination of constrained leisure as an internally homogeneous concept. Leisure Sciences, 15, 217-230.
Kay, T., & Jackson, G., (1991). Leisure despite constraint: The impact of leisure constraint on leisure participation. Journal of Leisure Research, 23, 301-313.
Kim, N., & Chalip, L., (2004). Why travel to the FIFA World Cup? Effects of motives bachground. Tourism Management, 25, 695-707
McIntyre, N., & Pigram, J.J. (1992). Recreation specialization re-examined: The case of vehicle-based campers. Leisure Sciences, 14 (1), 36-40.
Nyaupane, G., Morais, D., & Graefe, A., (2004). Nature tourism constraints. A cross activity comparison. Annals of Tourism Research, 31, No 3, 540-555.
Williams, P., & Fidgeon, P., (2000). Addressing participation constraint: a case study of potential skiers. Tourism Management, 21, 379-393.

Table 1. Demographic Characteristics of the Sample

Gender	Age of groups	Education level	Marital Status
Males 63%Females 37%	18<25 36.3%	Primary level 35%	Single 79,4%
26<32 35.5%	Secondary level 42%	Married 20,6%
36<65 23,2%	University level 23,9%

Table 2 The most significance constraints according to the frequency of participation

*a/a*	*The most significant constraints for recreation skiing*
1	<p”> C1	Time: work/studies
2	<p”> C2	Time: family
3	<p”> C3	Time: social commitments
4	<p”> C8	No effective ski technique
5	<p”> C12	Skiing is not on my priorities
6	<p”> C15	Don’t like ski resort environment
7	<p”> C16	Difficult weather conditions
8	<p”> C18	Don’t feel safe
9	<p”> C19	Cannot afford
10	<p”> C20	Accessibility is a problem
11	<p”> C21	Difficulty to find money
12	<p”> C22	Have no always friends to participate with
13	<p”> C23	Friends don’t like participation
	*The Top 10* *for all* *Participants*	*The Top 10* *for Occasional Participants*	*The Top 10* *for Often* *Participants*	*The Top 10* *for Systematic Participants*
1	C1 , M=4.8, SD=1.8	C19 , M=4.9,SD=1.7	C1 , M=4.9,SD=1.8	C19 , M=4.3,SD=2.1
2	C19 ,M=4.6, SD=1.8	C1 , M=4.8,SD=1.9	C19 , M=4.5,SD=1.8	C1 , M=3.9,SD=2.0
3	C20 ,M=3.6, SD=1.8	C20 , M=4.4,SD=1.9	C16 , M=3.4,SD=1.7	C20 , M=3.2,SD=2.0
4	C21 ,M=3.6, SD=1.8	C21 , M=4.2,SD=1.8	C20 , M=3.2,SD=1.8	C16 , M=3.0,SD=1.4
5	C16 ,M=3.4, SD=1.8	C22 , M=4.1,SD=1.9	C21 , M=3.2,SD=1.9	C15 , M=2.8,SD=1.9
6	C22 ,M=3.3, SD=1.9	C12 , M=3.9,SD=1.9	C3 , M=3.0,SD=1.8	C2 , M=2.5,SD=1.3
7	C3 , M=3.2, SD=1.8	C8 , M=3.8,SD=1.9	C22 , M=2.9,SD=2.0	C18 , M=2.4,SD=1.9
8	C23 ,M=3.1, SD=1.8	C23 , M=3.5,SD=1.8	C23 , M=2.8,SD=1.7	C3 , M=2.4,SD=1.8
9	C8 , M=3.0, SD=1.9	C3 , M=3.5,SD=1.8	C2 , M=2.8,SD=1.8	C22 , M=2.3,SD=1.5
10	C2 , M=2.9, SD=1.8	C16 , M=3.4,SD=2.0	C8 , M=2.6,SD=1.7	C23 , M=2.3,SD=1.6

Table 3. Anova’s between constraints and different frequency of participation

Constraints	F change & probability	Differences between groups
C12, Skiing is not on my priorities	F (2,235) = 29.4, p<.001	1-2, 1-3
C8 , No effective ski technique	F (2,230) = 18.3, p<.001	1-2, 1-3
C25, My family doesn’t like skiing	F (2,234) = 13.2, p<.001	1-2, 1-3
C22, Have no fiends to participate with	F (2,234) = 11.7, p<.001	1-2, 1-3
C21, Difficulty to find money	F (2,234) = 11.2, p<.001	1-2, 1-3
C10, I don’t have self confidence	F (2,235) = 8.3, p<.001	1-2, 1-3
C11, I don’t know why to skiing	F (2,233) = 6.8, p<.001	1-2, 1-3
C20, Accessibility is a problem	F (2,240) = 6.5, p<.01	1-2*
C23, My friends don’t like skiing	F (2,232) = 6.1, p<.01	1-3*
C14, I don’t like very much skiing	F (2,235) = 5.2, p<.01	1-2, 1-3
C3, Time: Social commitments	F (2,236) = 4.0, p<.05	1-3*
C1, Time: Work/studies	F (2,247) = 3.7, p<.05	2-3*
C2, Time: Family	F (2,234) = 3.1, p<.05	1-3*

<p”>** p<.oo1, *p<.05

Table 4. Ski Participation by Age, Gender and Marital status (% of the population).

DemoVariables	*Different frequency of annual participation*
Occasionally	Often	Systematic
*Age* *x 2= 12,* *p< .01*	Age 140.2%	Age 229.3%	Age 330.5%	Age 128.1%	Age 230.2%	Age 341.7%	Age 18.8%	Age 238.2%	Age 352.9%
*Gender* *x 2= 5.7,* *p< .05*	Male54.5%	Female45.5%	Male59.8%	Female40.2%	Male78.8%	Female21.2%
*Marital Status* *x 2= 4,* *p= n.s.*	Single84.2%	Married15.8%	Single78%	Married22.7%	Single65.6%	Married34.4%

U.S. Sports Academy2015-03-24T10:34:53-05:00September 5th, 2005|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Studies and Sports Psychology|Comments Off

Intercollegiate Athletic Corporate Sponsorships and the First Amendment

Submitted by: Eric Bentley

Intercollegiate Athletic Corporate Sponsorships and the First Amendment:

In response to the recent escalation of head coaches’ salaries in intercollegiate athletics, and the constant pressure for athletic directors to adhere to shrinking budgets, many athletic directors are turning to corporate sponsorships to increase revenue. Athletic departments can raise money from corporate sponsors in a variety of methods ranging from selling advertising on the outfield fence of the baseball stadium to allowing corporate sponsors to set up an information booth and distribute advertisements on the concourse in the basketball arena. While an athletic director may be eager to welcome with open arms corporate sponsors with open checkbooks, an athletic director may at times be placed in a situation where he or she does not want to allow a corporate sponsorship to a company or organization that could portray a negative image on the athletic department or the university. For example, an athletic director may decide to decline an offer from Hooters, or a local “gentlemen’s club” to become a corporate sponsor for fear that it will negatively impact the family atmosphere and image the athletic department would like to portray. However, an Athletic Director at a state institution must be aware that providing sponsorship opportunities to certain companies while refusing sponsorship opportunities to others could implicate the right to free speech under the First Amendment. This article will attempt to provide an Athletic Director with information regarding lawful distinctions between corporate sponsors in order to avoid infringing on the First Amendment rights of the members of a corporation who are seeking to become a corporate sponsor for a state institution’s athletic department.

From the outset, it must be noted that this article only applies to state institutions because the First Amendment is not implicated with regard to private institutions. Thus, if a private religious university such as Brigham Young University refuses to allow Budweiser or Coors to become corporate sponsors (since alcohol consumption is contrary to the religious beliefs supported by B.Y.U.), it can lawfully decline such a corporate sponsor without any possible First Amendment implications.

The first step in analyzing a freedom of speech problem such as whether the athletics department can constitutionally deny a corporate sponsor an opportunity to engage in athletic department promotions is to determine the type of forum in which the intended speech is to take place. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985). The 9 th Circuit in Diloreto noted that “where the government acts in a proprietary capacity to raise money or to facilitate the conduct of its internal business, the Supreme Court generally has found a nonpublic forum, subject only to the requirements of reasonableness and viewpoint neutrality.” Diloreto v. Downey Unified School Dist. Bd. of Educ , 196 F.3d 958 (9 th Circuit, 1999), citing Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303-304 (1974). The Diloreto court held that where a high school offered advertising opportunities to businesses allowing the business to post an advertisement on a sign at the high school baseball field, and where the intent of the school in opening the baseball field to advertising was to raise funds, not to create a forum for unlimited public expression, the forum was a nonpublic forum open for a limited purpose. Id. at 966.

When an athletic department offers corporate sponsorships, it is clearly doing so to raise funds for the athletics department, not to create a forum for unlimited public expression. Thus, when an athletic department solicits and receives a corporate sponsorship such as for the signage at the athletic field or arena, the forum that has been created will likely be found to be a nonpublic forum open for a limited purpose.
In a nonpublic forum open for a limited purpose, restrictions on access “can be based on subject matter…so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum” and as long as the restrictions discriminate on the basis of content rather than viewpoint. See Id.; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (1995); Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 392-93 (1993); Cornelius at 806. Thus, before denying an opportunity to a corporate sponsor, an athletic director must ensure that the he or she is making a reasonable distinction based on the purpose of the sponsorship opportunities it is offering, as well as ensuring that he or she is not making a distinction between two corporate sponsors on the basis of a corporation’s viewpoint.

Making a Reasonable Distinction

In Lehman, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether it was reasonable for a city transit system to decide which type of advertising may be displayed in its buses; an issue that arose when a political candidate was not allowed to advertise on the city buses. Lehman at 298. The Lehman court held that the city’s decision to exclude political advertising from bus signs was reasonable given the city’s desire to generate revenue and the potential for “ lurking doubts about favoritism, and sticky administrative problems [that] might arise in parceling out limited space to eager politicians.” Id. at 304.
An athletic director’s reason to decline offers from corporate sponsors such as Hooters or a local “gentlemen’s club” may be to keep a family oriented atmosphere at its games, and maintain an environment that is suitable for children. It is likely that making a distinction between a corporate sponsor such as Hooters and a corporate sponsor such as Ford or Coke based on the atmosphere that the corporate sponsor may create would be seen as a reasonable distinction.

Viewpoint Versus Content Discrimination

However, even assuming that an athletics department’s reason to deny a sponsorship opportunity to a certain corporation is reasonable, it may still violate the First Amendment if doing so discriminates on the basis of viewpoint, rather than content. Diloreto at 969, citing Cornelius at 811.

The U.S. Supreme Court noted that the distinction between viewpoint discrimination and content discrimination is not a precise one. Rosenberger at 831. The Diloreto court attempted to explain the distinction when it stated, “ Permissible content-based restrictions exclude speech based on topic, such as politics or religion, regardless of the particular stand the speaker takes on the topic.” Diloreto at 969, citing Children of the Rosary, 154 F.3d at 981. The Diloreto court further stated, “In contrast, impermissible viewpoint discrimination is a form of content discrimination in which the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject.” Id. citingRosenberger at 829.
In Diloreto, a businessman was not allowed to buy advertising space at the high school baseball field because his proposed sign listed the text of the Ten Commandments, which was against the school’s policy of not allowing religious advertising. Id. at 962. The school district refused to post the sign “based on (1) concern about running afoul of the Establishment Clause; and (2) disruption, controversy and expensive litigation that might arise from community members seeking to remove the sign or from religious or political statements that others might wish to post.” Id. at 963. The Diloreto court stated, “We conclude that the District’s decision not to post Mr. DiLoreto’s sign was pursuant to a permissible, content-based limitation on the forum, and not viewpoint discrimination.”
If an athletic director allows corporate sponsors that promote a family environment to engage in sponsorships, while he or she refuses to allow corporate sponsors that promote an adult oriented environment to engage in the same sponsorships, the athletic director would likely be seen to be engaging in permissible content discrimination rather than viewpoint discrimination. By way of example, the athletics department would not be allowed to refuse to allow Hooters to be a corporate sponsor, while at the same time allow another adult oriented business such as a local “gentlemen’s club” to be a corporate sponsor because doing so would be deciphering between two different businesses that are adult oriented, which would likely be seen as viewpoint discrimination because the decision to exclude Hooters instead of the local “gentlemen’s club” would appear to be based on the particular views or specific stance Hooters takes. Similarly, an athletic director could not allow certain religious organizations such as the local Baptist Church to become a corporate sponsor while refusing to allow other organizations such as an atheist group to become a corporate sponsor because doing so would likely be seen as impermissible viewpoint discrimination.

However, the Diloreto case offers support for an athletic director to refuse to allow a religious organization or an adult oriented business to become corporate sponsors so long as the athletic director refuses to allow all religious organizations and adult oriented businesses to become corporate sponsors because doing so would likely be viewed as permissible content discrimination rather than impermissible viewpoint discrimination.

Conclusion

Therefore, since an athletic department, through its corporate sponsorships has likely created a nonpublic forum open for a limited purpose, if the distinction the athletic director is making between different corporations is a reasonable distinction that does not amount to viewpoint discrimination, it is likely that the athletic director’s actions of refusing to allow such a corporation to be one of its corporate sponsors would be found to be constitutional.

U.S. Sports Academy2015-03-24T10:33:18-05:00September 4th, 2005|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Coaching, Sports Management, Sports Studies and Sports Psychology|Comments Off

Price and Non-price Promotions in Minor League Baseball and the Watering Down Effect

Submitted by: Thomas Kim Hixson

Abstract

Game promotions are believed necessary to help increase attendance in minor league baseball. As such, many game promotions are presented. In major league baseball as well as for many other products, a watering down effect exists when sales promotions are offered too frequently. As minor league baseball offers more promotions than major league baseball, it is reasonable to expect to find a similar condition. Attendance and promotion data were collected from 31 randomly selected minor league teams over the course of an entire season. Regression analysis showed that a watering down effect was present only for price game promotions. For non-price game promotions and for game promotions overall, there was no watering down effect.

Price and Non-price Promotions in Minor League Baseball and the Watering Down Effect

Game promotions in minor league baseball are held mainly to increase attendance to games. Indeed, pundits believe fans of minor league baseball have come to expect the added value of a special event or giveaway when attending a minor league game. Minor league ball clubs are cognizant of this expectation. Most of them on a regular basis provide fans with more than just a baseball game. They offer them entertainment activities, free souvenirs, or ticket and concession discounts.

Can there be too much of a good thing? Have minor league baseball fans become less appreciative and perhaps less motivated to attend games because what was once an added bonus to their price of admission has now become an expected part of the minor league game experience? Is there a “watering down” effect on attendance to games with a promotion? Specifically, do minor league ball clubs with an increased number of promotions see a reduced return on their promotional investment in the form of a smaller increase in attendance for games with promotions?

In major league baseball, there is a slight “watering down” effect for ball clubs with an increased number of promotions (McDonald & Rascher, 2000). In the minor leagues, where almost all ball clubs have a greater number of promotions than major league ball teams, it can be assumed that this same effect would occur, perhaps to an even greater extent.

A major objective in marketing professional sports is to increase attendance to games and matches. In minor league baseball, this objective is particularly important (McDonald & Rascher, 2000). Both price and non-price sales promotions have long been used to increase attendance and market product in the minor leagues. Attendance to minor league baseball is currently just below 40 million (in 2004) after being approximately 39 million for each of the three previous seasons (Minor League Baseball, 2005).

A long held belief by pundits in professional team sports is that a winning team is essential to increase attendance. Research has found, however, that a winning team has little to no effect on attendance in minor league baseball (Branvold, Pan, & Gabert, 1997). Other methods must be used, minor league baseball executives have learned, to draw spectators to the ballpark.Promotions, whether through special events or in-game, are believed necessary to provide spectators with the added entertainment value needed to help attract them to the games.Like many other entities in the leisure services industry, minor league baseball provides it customers with both price and non-price promotions (Wakefield & Bush, 1998).

In this study, we are concerned with “game promotions,” those promotions that are the main promotion or special event for each game a ball club has with such a promotional activity. Game promotions are often coupled, so that more than one is offered on a single date. Often, more than one price or one non-price promotion is offered together and sometimes a combination of price and non-price promotions is provided.

Literature Review

Baseball Promotions and Attendance

Little scholarly activity has been generated on promotions in minor league baseball. Minor league baseball executives believe, however, that games promotions are a powerful incentive to attract spectators and fans to games (Baade & Tiehen, 1990). As such¸ games promotions are often heavily advertised and promoted (Bernthal & Graham, 2003). In major league baseball promotions increase attendance by 14% (McDonald & Rascher, 2000). We can assume the effect is greater in minor league baseball.

Major league baseball attendance has been explained by a model using attendance data from two baseball seasons and accounted for .69 of the variance of attendance (Noll, 1974). The model was later altered to include 18 seasons and accounted for .84 of the variance (Baade & Tiehen, 1990). However, the researchers suggested that promotional activity might explain the attendance unaccounted for in their model (1990).

Overall, game promotions may not be a strong enough motivator to increase attendance than most minor league executives believe (Bernthal & Graham, 2003). These promotions might merely shift the attending from one game to another for some spectators (McDonald & Rascher, 2000; Baade & Tiehen, 1990). If so, there would no effect on increasing the season attendance level. However, the more fans at a game, the more excitement that is generated and the more likely these fans will attend other games and create buzz about the experience (1990).

Professional sports teams are finding it necessary to promote with greater intensity and frequency due to increasing competition from other sports and from the entertainment industry (McDonald & Rascher, 2000). It may be this frequency of promotion has led to the watering down effect on attendance to major league games (2000). Again, this same effect seems probable in minor league baseball as most ball clubs have many more game promotions than teams in the major leagues.

Sales promotions in marketing

Several studies have investigated the impact of promotional frequency and promotional discount levels (Blattberg, Briesch and Fox, 1995). Brands that are heavily promoted have reduced levels of brand equity with a resulting reduction in the consumer reference price (1995). Raju noted an over saturation effect in promotional discounts and posited that higher sales increases are more likely to occur when deep discounts are offered less frequently (1992). These price promotions have been found to be more effective for utilitarian products than hedonic products (Chandon, Wansink & Laurent, 2000). In minor league baseball, those attracted to price promotions are spectators who are price conscious and who attend infrequently (Wakefield & Bush, 1998). Over-promotion of a product can occur causing consumers to buy less of a product at its regular price (Blattberg, et al, 1995).

The long-term effect of promotions on a brand is debatable, however, with some studies finding a negative effect (Dodson, Tybout & Sternthal, 1978; Shoemaker & Shoaf, 1977), and some finding no negative effect (Neslin & Shoemaker, 1989; Totten & Block, 1987). A more recent study found both negative and positive results for the long-term impact of promotions (Boulding, Lee & Staelin, 1994). Still, a generalization that is most akin to the watering down effect is “The greater the frequency of deals, the lower the height of the deal spike.” This generalization results most probably from consumers coming to expect frequent promotions and from an alteration of the consumer’s reference price (Blattberg, et al, 1995).

The most effective sales promotions are those that provide benefits that are similar or complement the benefit inherent in the product. Non-price promotions complement the benefit and are more effective when matched with hedonic products (such as minor league baseball) while price promotions are more effective for utilitarian products (Chandon, Wansink & Laurent, 2000). Not surprisingly, in an entertainment setting, such as minor league baseball, non-price promotions add entertainment value rather than reducing the price (Wakefield & Bush, 1998).

Research Question and Hypotheses

As a watering down effect on promotions exists for major league baseball, and with many more games in minor league baseball than in the majors having a game promotion, it could be assumed that watering down effect occurs in minor league baseball. However, because such an emphasis is placed on promotions as a method of attracting spectators to minor league baseball games, team executives must believe there is no watering down effect. Therefore, the research question guiding this study is: Does a watering down effect exist with promotions in minor league baseball?

We will assume that team executives know their product well and that is the reason for them having as many games with game promotions as they do. We also note that leisure services promotions in an entertainment setting are geared toward adding entertainment value. Therefore, we hypothesize that:

H1: As the number of games with game promotions is increased, attendance
will not decrease. (No watering down effect).

Likewise, we can assume that because spectators attend a minor league baseball game to be entertained, they will welcome the opportunity to be entertained beyond the benefit of watching the ballgame by a non-price promotion, many of which provide added entertainment. Therefore we hypothesize that:

H2: As the number of games with non-price game promotions is increased, attendance will not decrease. (No watering down effect).

Price promotions are more beneficial to marketers when a utilitarian product is sold than when a hedonic product like minor league baseball is sold. Coupled with the finding that those attracted to price promotions are spectators who are price conscious and who are most likely to attend infrequently (Wakefield & Bush, 1998), we hypothesize that there will be a watering down effect with price promotions:

H3: As the number of games with price game promotions is increased, attendance will decrease.

Finally, because consumers evaluate promotions based on the dominant benefit the promotion provides (Chandon, Wansink & Laurent, 2000), and because minor league baseball is a hedonic product, spectators will put more emphasis on the non-price promotion than on the price promotion when these types of promotions are coupled for one game. Therefore, we hypothesize that a watering down effect will not be present in the combination of non-price and price promotions:

H4: As the number of games with a combination of price and non-price game promotions is increased, attendance will not decrease.

Method

Attendance data coupled with the game promotions were gathered from 31 randomly selected minor league baseball teams over the course of the 2002 season. These ball clubs included teams from each level of minor league baseball: AAA, AA, Advanced A, A, Short-season A, and Rookie. Attendance data for each game were collected from on-line box scores or through E-mail from the teams.

Game promotion data, the date and type, were found on ball clubs’ websites and pocket schedules. Game promotions were coded as consisting of price, non-price, or a combination of price and non-price promotions. Price promotions are those that provide a price discount, usually on tickets or concessions. Non-price promotions are those that contain comedy or musical acts, celebrity appearances, giveaways, sweepstakes, contests, audience participation, tributes, community events and the ever-popular fireworks presentation. Attendance was then matched to the game promotion. Like McDonald and Rascher’s study of major league baseball attendance (2000), a regression analysis was completed with attendance as the dependent variable.

Results

Over the course of the season, the 31 ball clubs generated 1231 observations of attendance and game promotions. This large number of observations should negate the effects of other variables that might have an effect on attendance.

The number of home openings (n=1905) for each ball club ranged from 32 to 72 with a mean of 68. The percentage of openings with at least one game promotion for each ball club ranged from 23% to 94% with a mean of 65%. The attendance for the openings with game promotions ranged from 128 to 15,983 with a mean of 4,157. The impact of these game promotions on attendance for each team (the difference between the promotion attendance mean and the mean of attendance for games with no game promotion) ranged from –421 to 5087 (Table 1).

For an overall view of the effects of game promotions on attendance comparisons of means were used. First, the mean promotion attendance (4,157) was compared to the mean attendance of all openings (3,824). This comparison provided an increase of attendance at games with promotions of 333 and was significant at the .001 level. This figure represents an increase of only about 9% in attendance and does not provide a true picture of the impact of game promotions. For many minor league ball clubs, there are few games that do not include a game promotion. In this sample 65% of home openings included a game promotion. Therefore, the differences are less than one might expect and other comparisons need to be made for a more complete statistical picture.

A comparison of the mean (4,157) of promotion attendance (n =1,231) to the mean (2,969) of no promotion attendance (n = 674) shows a difference of +1,177 representing a significant (t = 14.23, p < .001) increase of 40% in attendance.

As some teams have more game promotions than other teams, several questions of interest are raised. Is there a watering down effect on teams that have a greater number of promotions? Does a greater number of promotions result in less of an impact on attendance? To answer these questions regression was used to analyze the impact of the number of promotions on attendance. Analysis was completed for the effect on all game promotions and the effect on price, non-price, and a combination of price and non-price promotions. If a decrease in attendance was found from increasing the number of promotions, the regression coefficient (Beta) would be negative. Overall, for all teams the regression model showed a positive effect (F (1, 1903) = 218.98, R 2 = .10, β = .321, p < .001). Only three of the thirty-one teams had a negative coefficient (Table 2). As the majority of teams and the overall effect show an increase in attendance when the number of promotions is increased, Hypothesis one is supported. There is no watering down effect overall.

When only non-price game promotions are included in the regression model, a significant positive effect between attendance and the promotion is found (F (1, 1529) = 193.45, R 2 = .11, β = .335, p < .001). Individually, about two out of every three teams (21) had a significant positive effect (Table 3). Comparing the mean attendance of non-price promotion games (4,792) with the mean attendance of no promotion games(2,969) for all teams produces a significant (t =17.96, p < .001) increase in attendance of 61%. Hypothesis two is supported. Attendance does not decrease when the number of non-price promotions is increased. There is no watering down effect.

When only price game promotions are included in the regression model, a significant negative but weak effect between attendance and the promotion is found (F(1, 926) = 31.87, R 2 = .03, β = -.182, p < .001). Individually, 10 teams had a significant negative effect. Ten other teams, perhaps knowledgeable of this effect offered zero or only one price promotion (Table 4). Comparing the mean attendance of price promotions (2,157) with the mean attendance of no promotion (2,969) for all teams reveals a significant (t = -6.76, p < .001) decrease in attendance of 20%. Hypothesis three is supported; there is a watering down effect on price game promotions.

When a combination of non-price and price game promotions are included, a significant positive but weak effect is found (F(1, 793) = 14.32, R 2 = .02, β = .133, p < .001). For the individual teams, 11 of them had a significant positive effect. Twelve teams had zero or only one game with this combination of promotions (Table 5). Comparing the mean attendance of these combination of promotions games (3,556) with the mean attendance of no promotion (2,969) for all teams produces a significant (t = 2.54, p < .024) increase in attendance of 20%. Generally, Attendance does not decrease when the number of games with a combination of price and non-price promotions is increased. Hypothesis four is supported. There is no watering down effect.

Discussion and Implications

For the most part, game promotions do increase attendance to games. Unlike in major league baseball where a watering down effect has been found (McDonald & Rascher, 2000), in minor league baseball the more games with game promotions that are held, the more attendance will be generated for each game. However, there is a difference in attendance impact generated by different types of promotions.

There is no watering down effect for non-price promotions. When the number of games with non-price promotions is increased, there is an increase in attendance for almost all teams. Teams that do not see a significant increase should examine their operation to understand why they do not attract more spectators for non-price promotion games. Perhaps it is due to not advertising those games enough or it could be due to some other situation. For example, one ball club that did not see a significant increase is the Hudson Valley Renegades. Upon examination of their attendance figures it is learned that they always operate near capacity of their 4,494 seat ball park, whether they have a promotion or not. Therefore, the size of their ballpark appears to be the problem.

With game promotions that are price promotions, there is a watering down effect. Increasing the number of games with price promotions does not significantly increase attendance for almost all teams. In fact, for many teams there is a significant decrease in attendance when having a higher number of price game promotions. This suggests that spectators do not place much importance on, or see little value in, lower prices for the baseball product. These findings are consistent with the findings (see Wakefield & Bush, 1998) that leisure services customers find more value in promotions that have hedonic benefits such as increased entertainment.

When combining price and non-price game promotions for a single game, there is not a watering down effect for most teams. However, the effect on an increase in attendance is weak. The non-price game promotion dominates the price promotion but is seriously weakened by the effect of the price promotion, and therefore, does not produce a strong impact on attendance.

This study is limited in that it did not examine the attitudes of spectators towards the types of game promotions. It did, however, use attendance as somewhat of a proxy for favorable and unfavorable attitudes towards the game promotions. This study also is limited by the fact that it did not consider the advertising weight or effort that was made toward making spectators aware of an upcoming promotion. Obviously, this effort should have an effect on the impact on attendance from each game promotion.

Future studies into baseball and sports promotions should examine the overall season effect of promotions on attendance. Do spectators “cherry pick” games with specific promotions to attend? That is, do fans merely shift attending one game to attending another game because the later game has a promotion? If so, seasonal attendance impact would vary little with or without promotions. Because of the wide variance of impact on attendance from team-to-team in this study, research may be pertinent on the amount of advertising that is done to promote the game promotions. How many fans are aware of the promotion before coming to the ballpark? Does increased communication about game promotions affect the impact on attendance of those promotions? Is one form of advertising game promotions more effective than other forms? Furthermore, examining the promotion-proneness of spectators may provide insights into which game promotions are most salient for those who are most promotion-prone.

As minor league baseball executives search for new and different promotions to bring spectators to their ballparks, they would not be amiss to concentrate on non-price promotions for an increased impact on attendance. They should limit the number of price game promotions to only a very few per season, and they should evaluate the potential return on investment when they couple non-price and price promotions.

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