Abstract

The notion of paying college football players has been an ongoing debate since the early 1900’s. With current television revenue resulting from NCAA football bowl games and March Madness in basketball, there is now a clamoring for compensating both football and basketball players beyond that of an athletic scholarship. This article takes a point/counterpoint approach to the topic of paying athletes and may have potential implications/consequences for college administrators, athletes, and coaches. Dr. John Acquaviva defends the current system in which colleges provide an athletic scholarship that provides a “free college education” in return for playing on the university team. Dr. Dennis Johnson follows with a counterpoint making the case that athletes in these sports should receive compensation beyond that of a college scholarship and forwards five proposals to pay the athletes.

Key words: pay for play, athletic scholarships

Introduction: History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)

The idea of paying college athletes to compete dates back to what is considered to be the first intercollegiate competition. In a regatta between Harvard and Yale Universities, Harvard used a coxswain who was not even a student enrolled at the Ivy League school (5). Much like today’s universities whose appetites for appearances in corporate-sponsored “big money” football bowl events; Harvard may have used the non-student to please regatta sponsor Elkins Railroad (23).

In the late 1800’s, football played by college teams was a brutal sport but enjoyed by many fans. However, from 1900 to 1905, there were 45 players who died playing the sport (22). This prompted President Theodore Roosevelt to summon the presidents of Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, and threaten them with a ban unless the sport was modified. As a result of that meeting, a group of 62 university presidents convened to form the Intercollegiate Athletic Association in 1906. This group evolved into the NCAA in 1910, but as a group it only possessed supervisory power (22).

College football became even more popular in the period of 1920-1940. This was a time when commercialism in the educational system was being questioned on a variety of levels. One such fundamental question was posed in 1929 by Howard Savage, a staff member of the Carnegie Foundation. He raised a question in an article entitled Athletics in American College (originally published in 1930 but reprinted in 1999) “whether an institution in the social order whose primary purpose is the development of the intellectual life can at the same time serve an agency to promote business, industry, journalism, and organized athletics on an extensive commercial basis? More importantly, the report asked “can it (the university) concentrate its attention on securing teams that win, without impairing the sincerity and vigor of its intellectual purpose” (9, p.495)? Savage also states that “alumni devices for recruiting winning teams constitutes the most disgraceful phase of recent intercollegiate athletics” (9, p. 495). In sum, the original 1929 report claimed that “big time” college sports were not educational, but were entirely financial and commercial.

Athletes during the early and mid-1900’s were routinely recruited and paid to play; and there were several instances where individuals representing the schools were not enrolled as students. For example, there is one report of a Midwestern university using seven members of its team that included the town blacksmith, a lawyer, a livery man, and four railroad employees (5). Other athletes at colleges were given high paying jobs for which they did little or no work. In 1948, the NCAA adopted a “Sanity Code” that limited financial aid for athletes to tuition and fees, and required that aid otherwise be given based on need (5). In the early 1950’s, with the threat of several southern schools bolting from the NCAA, the code was revised to allow athletic scholarships to cover tuition, fees, and a living stipend.

However, by the mid-1950’s many schools were still struggling with the issue of offering athletic scholarships. Some university presidents ultimately decided to maintain the principles of amateurism and further serve the mission of higher education. Those were presidents of universities that today make up the Ivy League. They concluded that it was not in the best interest of their universities to award athletic scholarships, and have remained steadfast even today.

After passing Title IX in the mid 1970’s, the NCAA absorbed the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW) and began to govern women’s sport at the collegiate level. Over the past 50 years, the NCAA has also expanded into three divisions with a multitude of championship events on a yearly basis (20). There are more than 1,300 member institutions that represent an estimated 400,000 student athletes who participate in sport (21). The result of this growth and development are enormous increases in revenue. NCAA President Mark Emmert reports the NCAA revenues for the 2010-11 fiscal year is projected at $757 million, of which $452.2 million will go to Division I members (14).

While seemingly operating in a purely capitalistic/professional atmosphere, the NCAA continues to endorse an amateurism concept in college athletics. These competing, and often contradictory, values lead some college athletes in big time football and basketball programs to question the status quo of the present system through their words and actions. For example, many athletes are still attempting to get their “piece of the pie,” albeit under the table. And so it leads to our point-counterpoint.

Point: College Athletes Should Not Be Paid

The intensity of the argument to pay college athletes has escalated in the past few years. Perhaps it’s because of the current economic climate and everyone, including amateur athletes is looking for ways to make money? Or maybe it’s because many higher learning institutions have given the public access to their annual budget and readers focus on the profit of select athletic programs? Or maybe it is due to the absurd coaches’ salaries and the money that colleges make from football bowl games and basketball tournaments? Regardless, this has magnified the fact that the athletes see none of these profits and thus begs the simple question: “Where’s my share?” Perhaps a fair question, but to understand this argument better, a healthy debate is needed. So, here are some points to consider.

Point #1: Education is Money

Colleges and universities provide an invaluable and vital service to our communities: education. A now-famous bumper sticker once read: “If you think education is expensive, try ignorance.” To address that very slogan, the U.S. census bureau, as reported by Cheesman-Day and Newberger (7), expressed this best when they reported that the lifetime earnings for those with a college degree are over $1 million dollars more than non-graduates. Despite such a statistic, essays and op-ed columns continue to pour in from those who favor paying student-athletes while simultaneously refusing to acknowledge or accept the value of a college education. Is a college education priceless or not?

A sports-journalist in a recent national radio interview proposed that any argument against paying college athletes based on the sole reason that education is the prize is “antiquated”. But what seems antiquated and even shortsighted is the belief that paying a college athlete some (or even a lot of) money will solve all or even some of student’s long-term issues. The fear of the NCAA, as it should be, is that the mere notion of paying college athletes undermines the university’s primary purpose – education, something far more valuable than a modest annual stipend proposed by many. If it currently appears that the universities “don’t really care” about the athlete, paying them would intensify that belief, not dissolve it.

The irony in this dispute is that student-athletes do cost the university a substantial amount of money each year. For example, a full scholarship over four years can range between $30,000 and $200,000 depending if the institution is public or private (29). But let’s address this main point head on: There is an obvious lack of appreciation of a college degree from those in favor of paying athletes, and until a genuine gratitude for this concept develops, this argument will probably continue to linger.

Point #2: There Are Problems with Payment

Despite the well-documented scandals and corruption in college athletics (30), many would probably agree that paying athletes would exponentially increase the need for intense NCAA oversight – an enormous task by all accounts. Plus, there are the practical issues to consider. For example, how much should the athletes get paid and will payments be based on performance? What if the athlete gets hurt? What if the athlete is a bust and despite remaining on the team, doesn’t start or even play at all? – Issues that seem to raise far more questions than answers. But perhaps most important – What will happen to the non-revenue sports at the colleges who lose money from all of their sports programs – including football and basketball? It has been shown that only a fraction of Division I football and men’s basketball programs turn a profit (24, 20). The other Division I football and basketball programs as well as sports such as baseball, softball, golf, hockey, women’s basketball (minus a couple of notable programs), and just about all Division II sports not only fail to make money, but actually drain their athletic budgets. The outcome here would be inevitable: Forcing athletic departments to pay its football and basketball players would result in the eventual elimination of most, if not all, of the non-revenue sports. Is that what we want?

We cannot afford to be myopic on this issue. That is, there are only a limited number of programs that make big money, but yet there are hundreds of schools who absorb big losses at the cost of providing athletes a place to compete and earn a degree. The purpose of the NCAA, along with Amateur Athletic Union (AAU), Little League, and dozens of other organized forms of amateur sport is to provide a venue to play these sports – something we should not take for granted. The problem is that some have shifted in thinking that playing an organized sport is a right, whereas it still stands as a privilege.

Point #3: The University Offers More Than an Education

Concerts, lecture series by prominent people, on-stage productions, movies, intramural sports, fitness facilities, and a variety of clubs are all part of the typical university experience. Most students agree that colleges are self-contained acres of learning and socializing, all which takes place in a safe environment. It’s common for schools to subsidize the above-mentioned on-campus activities by adding fees to the tuition – which means that it’s free to a full-scholarship athlete. Other benefits to the athlete include the regular use of pristine gyms, well-manicured fields, athlete-only (and often team-only) workout facilities, sports medicine care, the opportunity to travel via away games, specialized meal plans and free foot gear and athletic attire. In addition, athletes are improving their trade from the best coaching minds in the sport; not to mention having access to some of the best nutrition and strength/conditioning personnel. And perhaps the most overlooked benefits are that the school provides the player with high-profile name recognition, a dedicated fan base, media exposure, and a competitive atmosphere with proven rivals, all of which took decades, effort and money for each institution to establish.

Point #4: The Athletic Department Has Its Role

Keep in mind that student-athletes are not employees of the university, rather they are students first and athletes second. The university can indeed make money from the sports programs; however, for those that do, the money simply goes back into the athletic program to fund the non-revenue sports (24). In fact, every year the NCAA sponsors over 80 national championships in three divisions, demonstrating the range and depth of their organization (20). While it is true that the champion in football and men’s basketball (and most other sports for that matter) seem to come from a relatively small pool of universities, it might be safe to assume that paying athletes would create an even bigger disparity since so few universities actually make money. Let’s face it, we are an underdog-loving country, and paying athletes would all but ensure that teams like Butler University, who made it to the Final Four in consecutive tournaments (2010 and 2011), will never do it again.

Point #5: Athletes Know the Deal

From the moment the full-scholarship papers are signed, each participant’s role is very clear: Schools accept the responsibility of the student’s tuition, meal plan, and boarding, while the athlete is provided with the opportunity to earn a degree, engage in college life and play their favorite sport in a well-organized, and often high profile fashion. The document signed by each student-athlete describes this agreement in an unmistakable manner. Although wordy and at times complex – a necessity due to the nature of the agreement – there’s no vagueness in the general arrangement or a hidden agenda from either party (10). A failure to honor the basic premise of any such contract would cause all forms of business – big or small – to crumble. If for some reason the university could be held liable for entrapment or some other form of dishonesty, then their athlete’s argument would stand on firmer ground. But frankly, the details of this agreement are well known by all involved, and rather strangely, no one seems to mind when signing them.

In conclusion, it should be noted that any NCAA improprieties or blatant corruption may have a carry-over effect into empathizing with the position given here. While corruption and other related-concerns are legitimate and need investigation, paying college athletes still remains a separate debate. It is vital to this process to view each NCAA issue independently and avoid making judgments on them as a whole. The position here is that, like many organizations, the NCAA should not be dismissed or discredited on one issue due to the mishandling of others. Further, if the contention is that many student athletes enter college unprepared or that athletics takes up too much time to excel (or even earn a degree), those are separate, but much needed arguments, and are not related to the issue of paying athletes.

Now more than ever, we live in an era of entitlement. At one time our country viewed the chance at higher education as a priceless commodity. However, it now seems that a college education is not held in the same esteem and worse yet, some see it as simply an opportunity to earn money. Although it is now evident that there has been a failure to convince much of the public of the true value of an education, keeping college athletes as pure amateurs remains the right thing to do.

Counter Point: Athletes in “Big-Time” Sports Should Be Paid

Introduction

The argument that a college athletic scholarship is an equal quid pro quo for a college education has been utilized since athletic scholarships were approved by the NCAA in 1950’s. My colleague makes one point that is totally accurate – a college graduate can in fact make a great deal more money over a lifetime when compared to non-graduates. However, the remainder of the author’s points are half-truths and in reality just plain falsehoods. For instance, a “full athletic scholarships” do not provide a “free” education (as it does not cover all costs incurred from matriculation to graduation. In many cases, the university does not live up to its end of the bargain of providing an education; as evidenced by the dismal number in the graduation rates, especially among African Americans. Furthermore, the athletic scholarship is only a one-year (renewable) agreement that can be terminated by the coach or university in any given year for any reason.

In debating the pay-for-play issue in college athletics, the history of the governing body (i.e., currently the NCAA), their mission and view of amateurism, the past history of college athletes benefitting financially, and the degree to which athletes benefit from the university experience must all be examined. The counter point section of this paper addresses each point made by my colleague. Using the Eitzen (12) analogy comparing the NCAA and big-time athletic programs to the old southern plantation system will be the underpinning wellspring for the subject of athlete exploitation and the financial benefits enjoyed by the university derived from that plantation-like exploitation. An economic viewpoint will be presented to demonstrate the cartel-like atmosphere held by the NCAA while maintaining the illusion of amateurism.

Finally, five proposals that outline means to promote pay-for-play in NCAA Division I football and men’s basketball will be presented. The arguments that follow are specifically tailored for those two sports at schools who receive bonus money from the NCAA, as those universities and their coaches enjoy considerable revenue from TV contracts and sponsorships generated by bowl games and “March Madness” appearances.

Point #1: Athletic Scholarships Provide a “Free Education” is not correct

As mentioned, in the 1950’s the NCAA approved adding living stipends to athletic scholarships that previously included only tuition and fees. Today, the “full ride” scholarship can only include tuition, fees, room, board, and books. And as mentioned in the previous section, in some cases, depending on the school attended, that scholarship can be worth anywhere from $30,000 to $200,000, although the figures $20,000 to $100,000 over a four year period might be more accurate. In any case, that still does not cover the full cost of attending college.

The Collegiate Athletes Coalition (CAC) estimates that NCAA scholarships are worth about $2000 less than the cost of attending a university, as it does not account for expenses such as travel and sundries. Former Nebraska head football coach and United States Congressman, Tom Osborne (R-NE), calculates the gap between scholarship funding and the actual cost of attendance to be closer to $3,000. Even former NCAA President, Myles Brand, indicated that he favored increasing scholarship limits: “Ideally, the value of an athletically related scholarship would be increased to cover the full-cost of attendance, calculated at between $2,000 to $3000 more per year than is currently provided, I favor this approach of providing the full cost of attendance” (23, p.232).

So yes, the scholarship can be seen as pay for play, or at the very least, a quid pro quo for services rendered during a four year period. However, even with a full scholarship, an athlete will have to pay somewhere between $8,000 and $12,000 out of pocket to bridge the cost-of-living gap. Therefore, the full athletic scholarship does not provide a “free” education. Thus question remains: is the full scholarship a fair and equitable deal for the athlete?

Athlete Exploitation-The Plantation System

Eitzen (12) among others (27) makes the analogy that the NCAA operates like the “plantation system” of the old south. The coaches are the overseers who get work from the laborers (players) who provide riches for the masters (universities) while receiving little for their efforts. Perhaps slightly over-stated (obviously the athlete is not a slave, but maybe an indentured servant), the student–athlete is dominated, managed, and controlled, and they don’t receive a wage commensurate to their contribution as expressed in dollars earned by the university. Eitzen notes that athletes are sometimes mistreated physically and mentally and are often denied the rights and freedoms of other citizens. Ultimately, they have no real democratic recourse in an unjust system.

There are other similarities to the plantation analogy. Slaves were not free to leave the plantation much like an athlete cannot get out of a letter of intent (without penalty) and/or transfer without the penalty of sitting out a year. Much like the slaves who had no right to privacy, athletes are subject to mandatory drug testing (even though their coaches/masters are not tested), room checks, and limits on where they can and cannot go in the community. The athletes can be prohibited from political protests and the right to assemble. And finally, they can be subjected to mental cruelty and physical abuse (e.g., early morning torture sessions), all in order to create obedient slaves; student athletes.

Furthermore, collegiate athletics is often the only game in town for many of these athletes. For instance, football players must be in their third year of college or over the age of 21 to enter the National Football League (NFL). Basketball players, on the other hand, must attend college for one year or ultimately sit out a year before they can enter the National Basketball Association (NBA). Thus, the college game has become a “feeder system” similar to a minor professional league and it is in reality, “the only game in town.”

Point #2: Athletes Don’t Know the “Real” Deal

My colleague is partially correct in that most student athletes know that they are getting a scholarship that will allow them to go to school and play a sport. However, many don’t know the “real deal” as they generally have very little understanding they are about to enter a “plantation-like” system in which their scholarship in not guaranteed (i.e., renewable yearly) and can be terminated at any time. Student-athletes are also a led to believe that they will play and receive a college degree while possibly picking up a few fringe benefits along the way.

Take, for example, the recent stories regarding players like Reggie Bush, Cam Newton, or the players at Ohio State who received money and/or other benefits as a result of playing football. Even though student athletes know they will not get directly paid for playing, many desire and even expect some form of compensation. Slack (25) surveyed 3,500 current and retired football players in 1989 only to find that 31% had received under the table money during their college careers and 48% knew of others who had received payments. This seems to imply that while many recruits may indeed know “the deal”, they display their discontent by accepting payments or other benefits not currently allowed by the NCAA.

In reality, the statement “athletes know the deal” with regard to academic achievement and degree completion seems to lack substance. Dr. Nathan Tublitz, co-chair of the Coalition on Intercollegiate Athletes, an organization of 51 faculty senates whose purpose is to remind college presidents, athletic directors, and coaches that student athletes are students first. He points out that:

“…schools aren’t doing these kids any favors by admitting them when it’s unlikely that they will succeed academically. We bring 17 year-old kids, some of them from the inner city and we wine and dine them. They have female chaperones. We put them up in fancy hotels. They come here and see an incredibly fancy locker room with individual TV screens, air conditioning and videogames. They go in and see the new football stadium and the new $200 million basketball arena. They see a medical training facility that is stunningly beautiful with waterfalls, treadmill pools, and the sate-of-the-art medical and dental equipment. They come here and are treated like royalty. Until they break a leg or get put on the second string and they get set aside. Many don’t earn a degree. They don’t have the training or the skills to be independent after they leave the university. They’re lost (28, p.D10).”

When the scholarship is signed, the athlete and his family have reasonable expectations which include efforts by the coaching staff and university administration to meet all obligations of the contract. Additionally, my colleague notes, “that failure to honor the basic premise of any such contract would cause all forms of business – big or small – to crumble.” If the NCAA and athletic departments in higher education are a business, why are they allowed to act in a cartel-like fashion? And finally, do student athletes really know the “deal” when they penned their name on national signing day? It appears they don’t.

Point #3: The University Offers More than Education-It’s Possible-But Not Probable

Academic Detachment. My colleague also makes the claim that the university offers more than an education (e.g., concerts, lectures, intramurals, and clubs) in settings that enrich the college experience. Due to the plantation effect, however, many athletes are not able to take advantage of those events. For instance, few if any of the scholarship athletes would be allowed to play in an intramural contest for the coach’s fear of injury. Student athletes are also over-scheduled with study halls, practices, weight training sessions, film study, individual workouts, more practice, travel, and competition; all in an attempt to help athletes maintain focus on their sport.

Adler and Adler (1) spent five years recording systematic information regarding the athletes’ lives in a big-time college basketball program. After observing, interviewing, and traveling with them, they concluded that big-time basketball and being seriously engaged in academics were not compatible. They also found that freshmen had a period of optimism regarding academics when they first arrived on campus, but after about two semesters they found that the social isolation combined with the fatigue of training kept them from becoming involved in academic life.

Positive feedback these basketball players earned was always athletic-related and not academic. They soon learned what they had to do to stay eligible. Coaches made sure they scheduled classes that did not interfere with practices. Ultimately, the researchers realized that academic detachment was encouraged by the peer culture, and because of their social status (e.g., big man on campus), it became difficult for them to focus on academics.

Coakley (8) reported that not all of the athletes in the Adler & Adler (1) study experienced academic detachment. Those who entered college well-prepared with appropriate high school courses, strong parental support and an ability to develop relationships outside of sport were able to succeed in the classroom. It’s important to note that too many minority athletes from low socioeconomic environments struggle in academics – an issue that is often perpetuated by the coaches. For instance, Robert Smith, former running back for Minnesota Vikings and pre-med student while at Ohio State, needed two afternoon labs in the same semester. Since the labs conflicted with practice, coaches suggested that he drop them because of the commitment he made to play football. Against the wishes of the coaching staff, Smith took the classes but was forced to sit out the season as red shirt athlete; a further example of the plantation effect.

Benson (3) noted that one perspective was missing from the literature included a full expression from the black athletes point of view. Benson conducted a qualitative interview study of 12 African American students at a DI football program where the graduation rate was 31-40% for black football players compared to 60-70% of white football players. The results in this instance cannot be generalized due to the small sample size (N=12), but it does provide a snapshot of the thoughts regarding education and athletics of this group. Further, they reflect the results obtained by Adler & Adler (1).

Another major finding of the Benson (3) study was that the marginal academic performance was created by a series of interrelated practices engaged in by all significant members of the academic setting, including peers, coaches, advisors, teachers, and the student athletes themselves. It began in the recruitment, and continued through the first year. Black student athletes received the message that school was not important, and that as time passed, they had no real control over their destiny in the classroom. It was simply a matter of survival to keep the grade point average (GPA) to a point to be eligible. They all felt like the coaches did not “walk the talk” in terms of academics. They would just talk the academic game in public but then in reality they would have “fits” if classes ever interfered with the program. Simply put, student athletes learned it was a matter of survival and a basic expectation to maintain a GPA just high enough to remain eligible to compete (3).

“The Black Dumb Jock”. Harry Edwards (13) discussed the creation of the “black dumb jock” image prior to studies completed by Alder and Alder (1), Benson (3), and Coakley (8). He (i.e., Edwards) theorized that they were not born, but rather systematically created. The previous mentioned studies serve as evidence to support his statement (1, 3, 8). The exploitation of athletes is not solely an NCAA issue but a societal one. For example, Fred Butler was passed on through elementary, middle, and high school because he was a good football player. He graduated from high school reading at a second grade level and went to El Camino Junior College. There he took a number of physical activity classes while hoping to be drafted into the NFL. When no offer came, he played at California State University-Los Angeles for a year and a half. When again no offer came and his eligibility expired, he failed out of school within months with no degree, no offers to play pro ball, and no skills to use for employment. And he still could not read! (18). Similarly, Former NFL player Dexter Manley testified before a Senate Committee that he played four years at Oklahoma State University, only to leave the school illiterate. And the sad feature is that academic detachment from the university athletic department perspective doesn’t seem to be an issue because there are always more impoverished (and usually minority) kids waiting to come in and play.

Thus, student athletes in many cases cannot take advantage of the many extras offered by a college education. Why do athletes accept a diluted academic experience or the corruption of doctored transcripts, phantom courses, surrogate test takers, and tutors writing papers? Perhaps it is because they are disenfranchised under the current system, and will lose scholarships, starting roles, and eligibility if they complain. George Will argued that “College football and basketball are, for many players, vocations, not avocations, and academics are unsubstantiated rumors” (12, p.5). So do full scholarship athletes get a chance to take advantage of all the extras of the university experience? More than likely it is not the case especially when they can’t even hope for a meaningful degree.

NCAA as a Cartel. Kahn (16) examined the operation of the college football and basketball systems of the NCAA and offers lessons about the determinants and effects of supply and demand. Specifically he utilizes economic principles to calculate the value of college football player to a university. He notes that total ticket revenues for football and men’s basketball were $757 million in 1999, total value that exceeded the total ticket sales for all of professional baseball, football, and hockey that year. A figure indicating that the NCAA is a very successful business entity engaged in capitalism.

According to the cartel theory, the NCAA has “enforced collusive restrictions on payments for factors of production, including player compensation, recruiting expenses, and assistant coaches salaries; it has restricted output; and it has defeated potential rival groups (16, p. 211).” He notes, along with others (11, 15, 16, 30), that the NCAA can impose sanctions that range from scholarship reductions, elimination from post-season play to program death penalties (e.g., Southern Methodist football); and possibly even threaten a school’s academic accreditation. However, restriction of pay to players is the main way in which the organization acts to restrict competition.

Economists who have studied the NCAA “view it as a cartel that attempts to produce rents, both by limiting payments for inputs such as player compensation and by limiting output” (16, p.210). When looking at the rent values based on college football or men’s basketball players’ performances, they are paid below a competitive level of compensation based on estimates of marginal revenue product produced of these players (6). Their analysis considered the total revenue for a school and the number of players that were eventually drafted by a major professional league. Utilizing this framework they concluded that in 2005 dollars a draft-ready football player returned $495,000 to the university, while a draft-ready basketball player was worth $1.422 million for men’s basketball. And all of this compared to the approximately $40,000 paid in scholarship worth. This indicates that the NCAA does indeed use cartel power to pay top athletes less than the athlete’s market value.

Based on a workload of 1000 hours per year and an average scholarship value, economist Richard Sheehan (16) calculated the basic hourly wage of a college basketball player at $6.82 and a football player at $7.69. Coaches’ hourly wages, on the other hand, ranged from $250-$647 per hour (depending on salary). Again, using the Eitzen metaphor, the masters accumulate wealth at the slave’s expense, even though the athlete/slave’s health is jeopardized by participation (12).

Parent (23) notes the hypocrisy of the amateurism construct when looking at these capitalism issues. He notes that the former president of the University of Washington, William Gerberding, said, “As one contemplates the obvious fact that so many of the most gifted athletes are economically and educationally disadvantaged blacks, this becomes less and less defensible. I have become increasingly uncomfortable about having a largely white establishment maintaining an elaborate system of rules that deprives student-athletes, many of whom are non-white, of adequate financial support in the name of the ideals of amateurism” (p.236).

So, why do athletes tolerate this system? They do mainly because they are disenfranchised and fear losing their scholarships and eligibility if they complain. In essence, this pay-for-play discussion revolves around amateurism, as advertised by the NCAA, and its competing capitalistic drive for income. According to Tulsa Law School professor Ray Yasser, the best option for athletes to change the system for their benefit is to unite and “file an antitrust suit…against the NCAA and their universities, with the claim being that the NCAA and their universities are colluding to create a monopoly over the athlete’s ability to share in the profits generated from college athletics” (23, p.236).

While the points for maintaining the status quo were stated previously, there has been sufficient evidence presented in this section to stimulate discussion of paying players. The “play for a diploma” agreement is not happening in many cases, as the athlete failure rate indicates. Another example is national champion Connecticut men’s basketball program losing two scholarships for the upcoming season as a result of a poor Academic Performance Rating (APR) from the NCAA (11). Thus, the following pay for play proposals are being submitted for consideration.

Pay Proposals

It would appear that NCAA should get out of the commercial business of football and basketball and follow the Ivy League example of providing an environment that is truly amateur where student athletes actually are students first. That move would certainly place the student first in the student athlete term. However, it doesn’t seem pragmatic that either the NCAA or any of the major universities are in any hurry to turn away millions of dollars per year in profits. Therefore, it is time to consider some pay-for-pay proposals. California and Nebraska have already passed state legislation that would enable colleges to compensate athletes; however they are blocked by the NCAA from doing so (23). Therefore, I submit five proposals that could possibly be implemented:

1. Big Ten Plan and/or Work Study Proposal: At the very least, the NCAA should follow former NCAA President Miles Brand’s suggestion and allocate athletes include a $2,000-$3,000 cost of living increase to full scholarships. Since athletes are supposedly only allowed to spend 20 hours per week involved with sport-related activities, this might actually be paid as 20 hours of work study or as a monthly living stipend. This would provide the athletes with the needed income for clothes, laundry, sundries, travel, and other small item expenses.
   Officials from the Big Ten are currently discussing a similar proposal that would help their athletes meet expenses not covered in an athletic scholarship. Big Ten commissioner Jim Delany reports league athletic directors and university officials have seriously discussed using some of their growing TV revenue to pay athletes more. This proposal which would give athletes a $2,000-$5,000 per year living stipend also has the support of current NCAA president Mark Emmert (2).

1. SEC Game Pay Proposal: The Southeastern Conference, another of the big time football conferences recently entered into the pay for play discussion. University of South Carolina coach Steve Spurrier put forth a proposal at the recent conference meetings to pay players $300 per game. The proposal was supported by several other coaches.
   This type of a proposal could pay athletes anywhere from $300-$1000 per game based on time played per game. Since most players do not play more than 30 minutes a game, a player could be paid on a per-minute of competition basis. At a rate of $20 per minute a player could net $600 for a game and approximately $6000-$7,000 per season.

1. Professional League Proposal: Ron Woods (27) puts forth a proposal submitted by Peter Plagensa, visiting professor at Middlebury College, regarding the pay-for-play issue. He appears to agree with the likes of Stanley Eitzen that the current practice of colleges and the NCAA do in fact “amount to a little more than a plantation system” (27, p. 67). He suggests that the big time college football and basketball maintain the million-dollar industry by making them an age 23 and under professional league. This proposal would allow universities to hire players as college staff (much like the cafeteria or groundskeepers) at moderate salaries plus room and board. Universities could also grant the athletes free academic classes until they earn a degree (even after playing days are over).

1. Revenue Sharing Proposal from TV/NCAA Proceeds:
   

   “College basketball players watch the coach roaming the sidelines in his $1,500 custom-make suit. They read about his $500.000 salary and $250,000 perk from a sneaker deal. They watch the schools sell jerseys (and T-shirts) with the player’s numbers on them. They see the athletic director and NCAA officials getting rich and you wonder why they might ask; hey where’s my share? What am I, a pack mule” (17, p.46)

   Tim Tebow related on the Daily Show (26) that he joked with his college coach prior to a national championship game about getting a cut of his bonus money to ensure a victory. This brings another revenue sharing possibility to the surface: coaches sharing their bonuses and other performance incentives with the players.
   Most coaches in big time programs are paid huge bonuses based on team record and ranking, all a result of player performance. For instance, according to 2009 IRS income tax reports, Mike Krzyewski received $2,222,543 in bonuses and incentives (4). Coaches under this proposal would be required to share 25-50% of their bonuses with the players. Isn’t it reasonable to expect the athletes to get a cut of the bonus money? After all, they (i.e., the players) are the ones who put the coaches in a position to earn those bonuses.

My colleague has argued in point #2 that paying athletes raise a myriad of other issues, such as how much should they receive, what happens if an athlete gets hurt, and so on. That is a discussion for another time. First, we must agree that it is fair to compensate NCAA Division I football and basketball athletes beyond that of an athletic scholarship; then and only then may payout details be chronicled. Note: a reminder that we are only discussing compensation for the NCAA Division I-A football and basketball players; not the athletes in the AAU, Little League or other truly amateur venues of organized sport.

Summary

Throughout the history of the NCAA, college athletes have routinely received compensation beyond that of a full college scholarship (e.g., room and board, tuition, books). While such compensation is illegal, athletes like Reggie Bush and others receive under-the-table benefits as evidenced in the Slack survey (25).

Additionally, many athletes in “big time” programs do not receive a degree for their efforts in the athletic arena. Universities routinely admit students based on their athletic skills that are academically ill-prepared for success. As seen in the research (1, 3), many athletes that aspire to be academically successful soon lose hope with the over-scheduling and pressures of sport preparation. As a result, many college athletes, a majority of which are minorities, fail out of school once coaches have utilized their eligibility.

The NCAA functions like a cartel, keeping cost down while increasing profits. Rents for a draft-ready athlete earn the university somewhere between $500,000 for football and $1.422 million for men’s basketball (16), leading to a pseudo-plantation system where the coaches oversee the athletes demanding work and controlling their schedules on and off the field. This unbalanced system allows athletes to earn the equivalent of $6.80-$7.69 an hour (12) while coaches like Nick Saban of Alabama or Mack Brown of Texas earn over five million dollars a year (4).

If the NCAA continues as a corporate entity and acting in a cartel-like fashion making millions of dollars a year, implementing a plan to pay student athletes for playing must be considered. Otherwise, America’s institutions of higher learning should follow the Ivy League schools’ example and eliminate athletic scholarships, get out of the big time sport business, and get on with providing students with a complete educational experience.

Applications in Sport

Few discussions within sport are more common or controversial than the debate to pay college athletes. Some arguments are well thought and articulated, while others lack insight and are simply driven by passion. The purpose of this article is to provide the reader with a new perspective and some historical insight – all supported by the literature – regardless of their stance on this issue. Moreover, readers who may actually be heard by the NCAA may offer a position that has yet to be considered. The concession here is that despite any decision by the NCAA in the near future, we can be assured that college administrators, coaches, and athletes will continue this debate. However, their arguments may now be seen as relevant and more reasoned.

POSTSCRIPT: According to Michelle B. Hosick at the NCAA.org, the NCAA board of directors has moved on two issues discussed in this article since its submission. In April (2012), the board moved to implement a $2,000 allowance to an athlete’s full scholarship. They also voted to grant multi-year scholarships. However, both measures have been put on hold with the threat of an override vote by member institutions. On January 14, 2012 at the NCAA convention the board delayed implementation of the $2,000 supplement and sent it back to committee for revision at its April meeting. The multi-year scholarship issue will continue to be implemented on a conference-by-conference basis. And so the pay-for-play discussion continues.

References

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3. Benson, K. F. (2000) Constructing academic inadequacy: African American athletes’ stories of schooling. Journal of Higher Education, 71, 223- 46.
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10. Cozzillio, M. J. (1989). The athletic scholarship and the college national letter of intent: A contract by any other name. Wayne Law Review, 35, 1275-1379.
11. Eaton-Robb, P. (2011, May 20). UConn loses 2 men’s basketball scholarships. Norwich Bulletin. Retrieved from http://www.norwichbulletin.com/newsnow/x31866796/UConn-mens-hoops-loses-2-scholarships#axzz1NCVV1385.
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20. National Collegiate Athletic Association (2011). Why student-athletes are not paid to play. Retrieved from www.ncaa.org.
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Abstract

The purpose of this study was to explore the current scenario of interscholastic athletics in terms of the existence and enforcement of risk management plans within high school athletic departments. Another purpose was to identify the common practices related to risk management currently utilized. The present study had a response rate of 16.7%. The results showed that 76.2 % of the respondents (N=816) conduct interscholastic activities with the support of risk management plans, but there are still 23.8% of those interscholastic athletic departments where risk management plans are nonexistent. In addition, from those who indicated having a risk management plan, 28% do not enforce it. A majority of respondents seem to be employing risk management best practices consistently, but there is an indication of a less than desired level of adoption of some practices (i.e., informed consent forms, pre-season sport specific meetings, ADA compliance, coach evaluation and written criteria, safety training, accessibility of AED’s, and warning signs). The results of our study showed a statistically significant relationship between the athletic directors’ years of experience and the adoption of certain risk management practices (i.e. coach evaluation, evaluation criteria, risk management enforcement, and hazard abatement), but (surprisingly) not to the adoption of other similarly important practices. This study provides high school athletic administrators and principals with relevant information that can be used to support their decision to adopt and enforce risk management plans for interscholastic athletic activities.

Key words: Risk Management Practices, Risk Management Plan, Interscholastic Athletics, Athletic Directors.

Introduction

In college athletics, risk management plans exist in order to reduce medical costs, prevent liability and to help schools afford insurance (Anderson, 2006). What about high school? Today, suing the schools, their coaches and officials for any reason is very common. Thus, high schools have to be prepared to defend themselves against legal claims, especially those related to interscholastic sports. Millions of teenagers participate in organized school-sponsored interscholastic sports programs each year. Competitive sports are an integral part of the lives of high school students and have the potential to offer them many benefits. Increased participation and rapid body changes make the risk of injuries for high school students engaging in interscholastic athletics a real threat (Ballard, 1996). In addition to the well-known mental, physical, economic, and spectator benefits provided by high school sports, the possible costs or hazards of interscholastic athletic participation are always present (Lipsey, 2006). Supporting that idea, an epidemiologic study commissioned by the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System showed that 55.5% of American high school students participated on at least one sports team, and 21.9% of those students reported seeking medical treatment as a result of their activities (Eaton, Kann, Kinchen, et al., 2007). These data justify the need for increased efforts in developing and implementing strategies to identify and treat potential risks related to interscholastic participation. With that in mind, it is important for interscholastic athletic administrators to become familiar with commonly utilized best practices related to risk management in high school sports.

Gray (1995) studied risk management at physical education and athletic programs at the high school level in the state of Iowa. He investigated high school principals’ perceptions of a 20 item list of best practices related to risk management and principals’ supervision of programs. The author found that these administrators perform most of the risk management behaviors within the survey in a consistent basis. He also found that the size of the school had little influence on the behavior among the surveyed principals.

A similar study conducted by Bezdicek (2009), examined 463 high school athletic directors in Minnesota. The study was conducted to determine to what extent do athletic directors develop, implement, and manage a risk management plan for their athletic department, and the levels of familiarity that athletic directors have with risk management standards. The study revealed that the majority (56%) of athletic directors in Minnesota did not have a written risk management plan. In addition, the reasons for not having a risk management plan, as expressed by the respondents, were: lack of time (26.3%), lack of expertise (20.8%), and no need for a plan (19.7%).

Mulrooney and Green (1997) determined that the following characteristics must be present for a risk management plan to be considered bonafide and functioning: (1) a staff member is the risk manager, (2) a written risk management plan should outline policies and procedures in detail (including audit checklists), (3) periodic risk audits are conducted by staff, (4) periodic staff training programs related to risk management should be in place, and (5) the risk management plan is created with legal counsel.

Doleschal (2006) points out that: “ongoing risk management programs, the preparation of written material to be disseminated to coaches, participants, and parents or guardians, signed informed consent forms, inspection of equipment, etc., are examples of proactive steps that can be taken by school districts and their athletic programs” (p.295). He argues that unfortunately “many schools either do not have/use a risk management plan or do not follow good risk management practices” (p. 295). To assist interscholastic athletic departments in developing efficient risk management plans, Doleschal (2006) recommends 14 duties of care (proper planning, proper supervision, eligibility assessment, safe playing conditions, equipment maintenance, proper instruction, proper matching of athletes, proper conditioning, risk warning, proper insurance, emergency care and response plan, safe transportation, and proper selection, training and supervision of coaches) which schools should incorporate in their plans as preventive steps to minimize possible liability for the school or coaches.

Due to the nature of interscholastic athletic activities, coaches and schools constantly deal with the risk of litigation. Thus, it is important that they understand following the steps laid out in a risk management plan is instrumental to minimizing risks and reducing loss. The choice of either not having or not enforcing a risk management plan puts schools and their staff at risk of experiencing the anguish and pain involved in the time consuming process of defending a lawsuit (Doleschal, 2006). A good risk management plan is not an absolute guarantee that litigation will be avoided. However, good risk management practices can be effective aids in developing not only safer programs, but also act as an effective defense, should litigation occur (Doleschal, 2006).

With a good risk management plan in place, the identification and treatment of risks becomes much more effective. According to Stier et al. (2008), “risk management implies the assessment of risks associated with one or more activities or events and planning for the worst-case scenario”. (p. 32). Cotton (1993) points out that there are four essential elements to any risk management plan: identification of real and potential risks, assessment of the identified risks in terms of their causes, determination of appropriate courses of action to take in dealing with these risks if they occur, and establishment of effective and efficient risk prevention measures.

Finally, it is important to emphasize the athletic administrators’ role in the implementation and management of a risk management plan. A significant number of lawsuits are negligence claims taking place after the accident and the initial injury of an individual. Thus, the administrators’ ultimate goals must be to provide the safest environment possible for everyone involved, and to be prepared to deal with accidents and injuries if and when they do occur (Stier et al, 2008). Despite the fact that “no plan can be completely effective in preventing all injuries or accidents” (p.32), administrators are still responsible for enforcing and maintaining a meaningful risk management plan (Stier et al, 2008).

For high school athletic administrators, the challenge becomes providing sport programs which take safety seriously. In other words, the task is to effectively manage the many risks to which students-athletes are exposed. To do so, schools should rely on risk management plans and best practices to ensure that all school employees involved with athletics are fully prepared to prevent losses and to deal with losses when they occur (Appenzeller, 2005). However, is that really the case? Do high schools across the country actually have a risk management plan and truly enforce it? What are the most common practices related to risk management currently utilized by athletic departments at the high school level?

The purpose of this study was to explore the current scenario of interscholastic athletics in terms of the existence and enforcement of risk management plans within high school athletic departments. Another purpose was to identify the common practices related to risk management currently utilized. This study provides high school athletic administrators and principals with relevant information that can be used to support their decision to adopt and enforce risk management plans applied to interscholastic athletic activities.

To achieve such purposes, the following questions must be answered:

1. How frequently high schools have and enforce risk management plans which are tailored to their athletic programs?
2. What are the best practices used by high school athletic departments to address the inherent risks to the athletic activities they provide?
3. Is there any relationship between athletic directors’ years of experience and existence/enforcement of specific risk management plan practices?

Methods

An online survey instrument was developed and distributed to high school athletic administrators for the purposes of examining risk management practices for high school athletics.

Subjects

The subjects were high school athletic directors belonging to the National Interscholastic Athletic Administrators Association (NIAAA). The NIAAA granted permission to the researchers to conduct the study. At the time of the survey, the NIAAA membership totaled 5,758 (while there were few email delivery failures, the amount was negligible). The first page of the online survey presented the participants information about the study and an informed consent form. Continuing to take the survey served as the respondents’ consent. The survey was available to the participants for six consecutive weeks, starting late Fall 2010.

Instrument

The survey instrument consisted of twenty-four questions related to risk management policy and practices as well as eight demographic questions. Questions were broken down into three categories: policy and procedure, supervision and personnel evaluation, and safety. The policy and procedure category consisted of questions related to Title IX, athletic association rules, insurance, informed consent, preseason meetings and ADA compliance. The supervision and personnel evaluation category consisted of questions related to coach certification and evaluation, supervision of events, and policy enforcement. Lastly, the safety category focused on emergency training, equipment and procedures, hazard inspection, game equipment, venue signage, and security and team transportation. The questions were a combination of Likert-type and open-ended. Directions for the survey were imbedded within the survey itself. Directions were placed for each section and coincided with any question format changes. Content for the questions was developed using previous literature related to risk management policies and procedures. Content validity was established using a panel of individuals chosen for their expertise and experience in risk management policy and procedures. The instrument was also tested for issues of readability using student focus groups.

Data Collection and Analysis

Using a modified Dillman (2007) method, the final version of the survey was sent to the NIAAA membership which totaled 5,758 at the time of the survey. The instrument was sent by email with a letter explaining the purpose of the study and informing them that participation was voluntary. Participants were assured of their anonymity as respondents, and also were given electronically generated respondent ID numbers by the survey program. There were 5,758 surveys sent out with 962 surveys returned for a 16 .7% response rate. Of the 962 surveys returned there were 816 fully completed and useable surveys. The researchers agree that 16% response rate seems low. However, it is important to point out that this is an exploratory study reaching out to a very large population. The group of respondents represents diverse geographic regions and a variety of school sizes. In addition, the complex and high-demand nature of the job performed by those athletic directors is a very reasonable justification for their low response rate.

Descriptive analysis was used to explore demographic information related to the administrators, and the frequency of legal action related to injuries and adoption of risk management best practices. Chi-square tests were performed to investigate the existence of relationships between the risk management practices and administrators experience.

Results

The athletic administrators surveyed represented schools ranging in size from 41 students to over 8,000. The mean enrollment of schools represented in the survey was 1,182. These schools fielded an average of 18 different athletic programs.

The administrators themselves were a majority male (83.9%). From all responding administrators, 2.6% held a doctorate, 74.6% held a master’s degree, 18.2 % held a bachelor degree, and 2 % represented other levels of education (associate or high school degree). These administrators had an average of 11.7 years of total experience with an average of 8.0 years being employed at their current school.

Policy Provision and Injury

In terms of injuries and risk, these schools have seen very little legal action related to injury (less than 1%), with (on average) three catastrophic injuries over the last five years requiring hospitalization. In light of this finding it is important to note that during this time, approximately one quarter of the sample either did not have a risk management policy (17.3%) or didn’t know if one existed at their school (6.5%). Of the schools possessing a risk management policy, 28 % said the policies were not enforced.

Risk Management Practices

To examine risk management practices, a series of questions were asked related to standard practices involving risk minimization for athletic program participation. In all categories (policy and procedure, supervision and personnel evaluation, and safety) 78% or more of respondents answered that they engaged in the practice often or always, with the exception of the item inquiring about the presence of visible risk warning signs at venues (46.9%) (Table 1). In the policy and procedure category, 10.5% of the respondents rarely, if ever, required consent forms for athletic participation. Also, only 86.4% conducted sport-specific pre-season meetings for athletes and parents. Lastly, 11.3% indicated that ADA guidelines were seldom met.

Within the supervision and personnel evaluation category, the results showed that less than 83% of the respondents evaluate their coaches on a regular basis. To compound this issue, only 85% had written criteria with which to evaluate those coaches. In addition, only 81.9% respondents indicated that their athletic department had someone responsible for enforcing the risk management plan.

The safety category results presented the largest concerns: 20.6% of the respondents indicated that emergency safety training is not provided to coaches and staff on a regular basis, and only 78.6% have AEDs within easy access at athletic activities. Having proper signage at sport venues with visible risk warning signs was also lacking, with less than half (46.9%) of administrators indicating adequate signage.

Risk Management Practices and Administrators’ Experience

A series of chi-square tests were performed to look at relationships between the risk management practices and administrators’ experience (Table 2). For the purposes of this analysis, administrators were categorized into two groups: those with fewer than eleven years of experience and those with eleven or more years. Significant associations were found between experience and the risk management practice variables of coach evaluation, evaluation criteria, risk management enforcement, and hazard abatement.

There was a significant (χ2 (1) = 12.75, p<.001) albeit weak (Phi = .126, p<.001) association between the level of administrator experience and whether the coaches were evaluated on a regular basis. Based on the odds ratio, the odds of administrators with 11 or more years of experience evaluating coaches on a regular basis was twice that of administrators with ten years or less experience.

The association between level of administrator experience and written evaluation criteria was also significant (χ2 (1) = 5.37, p<.05) and weak (Phi = .08, p<.05). The calculation of the odds ratio indicated the odds of administrators with 11 or more years of experience having written evaluation criteria were 1.6 times that of administrators with ten years or less experience.

Administrator experience and whether the athletic department had someone responsible for enforcing a risk management plan showed a significant (χ2 (1) = 5.30, p<.05) and weak (Phi = .08, p<.05) association. The odds ratio indicated the odds of administrators with 11 or more years of experience having a dedicated person responsible for risk management plan enforcement was 1.5 that of administrators with ten years or less experience.

Lastly, there was a significant (χ2 (1) = 5.15, p<.05) and weak (Phi = .08, p<.05) association between the level of administrator experience and whether identified hazards were repaired correctly and timely. Based on the odds ratio, the odds of administrators with 11 or more years of experience repairing hazards timely and correctly was twice that of administrators with ten years or less experience.

Discussion

The first goal of this study was to determine the frequency with which high schools in America have and enforce risk management plans applied to their athletic programs. Regarding the existence of a risk management plan, the results showed that 23.8% of the respondents either did not have a risk management policy or didn’t know if one existed at their school. In addition, among the schools possessing a risk management plan, 28 % said the plan policies were not enforced.

These figures are unexpected and very concerning. The concern is based on interscholastic athletic stakeholders’ expectation that schools and programs to be fully committed to the safety of athletes and fans, through the presence and enforcement of a solid risk management plan as the utmost symbol of that commitment. As such, it would be only reasonable to expect a much higher percentage of existence and enforcement of risk management plans. However, despite the increase in participation and the litigious character of our society, it seems that a significant number of interscholastic athletic administrators (or, in some cases, the local school board) choose to put their students and their schools at constant risk of major loss and liability (Bezdicek, 2009; Eaton et al., 2007; Gray, 1995; Lipsey, 2006; Stier et al, 2008). It is also surprising that, despite so many interscholastic athletic departments reporting absence of either a risk management plan or the enforcement of one, less than 1% of the respondents had legal action related to injury requiring hospitalization over the last five years. Perhaps, this could be a possible explanation for the less than desired level of adoption and enforcement of risk management plans among the respondents.

The administrators who have and enforce risk management plans will continue to reap the benefits of loss prevention and reduction (Bezdicek, 2009; Eaton et al., 2007; Gray, 1995; Lipsey, 2006; Stier et al, 2008). The same cannot be said for to the administrators who either do not have or do not enforce risk management plans. One can only hope that, by becoming acquainted with the information provided here, they may adopt practices that will certainly lead them to risk and liability reduction (Appenzeller, 2005; Bezdicek; Cotton & Wolohan, 2007; Eaton et al.; Gray; Lipsey; Stier et al).

The second goal of this study was to identify the best and most frequently used practices to address the inherent risks to interscholastic athletic activities. As expected, the survey results showed that most administrators followed these standards of risk management the vast majority of the time. However, the results presented a few points of concern, which could be another possible explanation for the low percentage of schools with risk management plans.

Initially, the fact that 10.5% of the respondents rarely required informed consent forms may place these schools in a defenseless position if facing negligence claims related to injuries occurring during participation in schools’ interscholastic activities (Appenzeller, 2005; Cotton, 1993; Doleschal, 2006). Dealing with the same liability category, 13.6% do not conduct sport specific pre-season meetings for athletes and parents. According to Doleschal (2006), “parents/guardians and athletes have a right to information regarding the possibility of injury, paralysis, and death that is inherent in all sports” (p.318).The provision of such information is a duty the institutions legally owe to the families. The lack of signed informed consent and sport specific pre-season meetings prevent participants (and their families) from being fully educated on the risks involved in the specific sport in which they desire to participate, and make the defense against a negligence claim very difficult (Appenzeller; Cotton & Wolohan, 2007; Doleschal).

ADA compliance at interscholastic venues is also an issue. 11.3% of the respondents indicated that ADA guidelines were seldom met. This lack of compliance not only prevents the access and participation of people with disabilities at those venues, but also provides strong legal claims to those affected by such lack of compliance to the law (Appenzeller, 2005; Cotton & Wolohan, 2007). One can only hope that such lack of compliance is due to the fact that those venues were built before ADA legislation was enacted (Appenzeller, 2005; Cotton & Wolohan, 2007). Despite being able to receive tax breaks for making the necessary corrections to be compliant with the law (Appenzeller; Cotton & Wolohan, 2007), it appears that the schools choose to hide behind the age of their venues rather than to take action and become compliant with the law.

Other concerning issues identified were the lack of written criteria with which to evaluate coaches (17.2%) and actual evaluation of those educators (15%). Combined, these two issues expose high schools to potential negligence and contract liability (Appenzeller, 2005; Cotton & Wolohan, 2007; Doleschal, 2006). On one hand, coaches’ various negligent actions may cause major injury and loss to all stakeholders. Such losses can be prevented if coaches’ evaluation and training are truly executed and based on written criteria (Doleschal, 2006). On another hand, the lack of written coaches’ evaluation criteria and an evaluation process following such standards may also place schools in violation of contract laws, specifically when coaches’ have to be disciplined or terminated (Appenzeller, 2005; Cotton & Wolohan, 2007; Doleschal, 2006).

Safety training, AED accessibility, and warning signs were also identified as concerning issues. Lack of safety training for coaches and staff on a regular basis (20.6% of the respondents) may expose students and spectators to a wide range of risks of injury and loss (ranging from failure to warn and equipment malfunction, to poor response to catastrophic injuries) that could be easily prevented with appropriate training (Doleschal, 2006). The absence of easily accessible AED equipment (reported by 21.4% of the respondents) adds to the major liability claims that certainly will come as a consequence of poor response to catastrophic injuries (Appenzeller, 2005). Lack of proper signage (reported by more than 50% of the respondents) may also expose students and fans to unnecessary risks and generate costly lawsuits against the schools. It is the schools’ duty to warn spectators and participants of potential risks involved in the activity through all means possible (i.e., verbal warnings, signage, and public announcement system) (Blumenthal, 2009; Girvan & Girvan, 1993; Lee, Farley & Kwon, 2010). Under any of these circumstances above, schools may be held liable.

The third goal of this study was to identify if there is any relationship between athletic directors’ experience and existence/enforcement of risk management plan practices. No significant relationship was found between experience and the existence of risk management plans. Such a result was expected, considering that the existence of a risk management is too important in preventing injury and loss at any institution to depend on the athletic director’s experience (Appenzeller, 2005; Cotton & Wolohan, 2007; Doleschal, 2006). However, significant associations were found between experience and the adoption of risk management practice variables. More experienced administrators (11 or more years) had higher odds of conducting coach evaluations, having evaluation criteria, risk management enforcement, and hazard abatement among their adopted risk management practices than administrators with less experience. The existence of such associations is not surprising. It is reasonable to expect that the experiences acquired through years on the job would lead administrators to the adoption of these best practices.

The use of written evaluation criteria and coaches’ evaluations may be a result of years of experience dealing with (either by themselves or by learning from others’ struggles) injuries, property loss, and financial loss suffered due to the lack of written evaluation criteria, and coaches’ evaluations. The existence of an enforced risk management plan and timely hazard abatement seem to be related to experience as well. By assigning the enforcement of the plan to a staff member, the administrator not only promotes injury and loss reduction, but also ensures that the plan is updated as venues and policies related to the athletic department change (Appenzeller, 2005). Regarding hazard abatement, experienced administrators know their facilities very well, including their maintenance history. Such knowledge should allow those administrators to treat hazards even before they appear, contingent to budget availability (Appenzeller, 2005).

As mentioned above, the fact that significant associations were found between experience and four of the risk management practice variables (coach evaluation, evaluation criteria, risk management enforcement, and hazard abatement) is not surprising. Intriguing is the fact that the other risk management practices did not present a similar relationship. One possible explanation is perhaps experience is less of a factor in adopting the practices that did not show a significant relationship. Another possible explanation is less experienced administrators may feel either uncomfortable or unprepared to conduct coaches’ evaluations, develop evaluation criteria, enforce a risk management, and/or deal with hazard abatement.

Recommendations for Future Research

The results of this study revealed that a significant percentage of high school athletic departments surveyed either do not have or do not enforce a risk management plan. It would be interesting to conduct a qualitative study among various state high school associations to learn their perspective on the situation and their perceived reasons for such lack of risk management plan existence and enforcement. To complement the study, athletic directors could be surveyed on their perceptions of the reasons suggested by the state high school associations’ leadership. After comparing the results from both groups, a list of potential actions to help increase risk management development, implementation and enforcement could be composed.

Conclusions

The present study demonstrated that interscholastic activities could be conducted with the support of risk management plans in a larger number of high schools. There is a significant amount of interscholastic athletic departments where risk management plans are either nonexistent or unenforced. A large majority of respondents seem to be employing risk management best practices consistently, but there is an indication of a less than desired level of adoption of some practices (i.e., informed consent forms, pre-season sport specific meetings, ADA compliance, coach evaluation and written criteria, safety training, AED’s accessibility, and warning signs). It also appears that the athletic directors’ years of experience plays a role in the adoption of certain risk management practices (coach evaluation, evaluation criteria, risk management enforcement, and hazard abatement), but (surprisingly) not to the adoption of other similarly important practices. It is the researchers’ hope that the evidence presented here opens the athletic directors’ minds to the importance of the adoption of a risk management plan as possibly the only reliable way to minimize loss to athletes, spectators, and institutions.

Applications in Sport

The results presented in this study are valuable to those in leadership positions at any high school in the United States. High school principals and athletic directors armed with this information would be able to (1) adopt and enforce a risk management plan, if they do not have/enforce one; and (2) review their policies and practices related to risk management and adjust them to industry standards. Other benefits to institutional leaders include the ability to provide athletes and spectators with a safer experience, and to reduce the risk of athletes’ injuries. These benefits will consequently help minimizing legal claims against high schools and their officials.

Tables with Captions

Table 1

Percent of Administrators Engaging in Risk Management Practices on a Regular Basis

Table 2

Chi-square analysis of Administrator Experience (>11 years vs. 11 or more years) and Risk Management Practices

* Significant relationship

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Corresponding Author

Mauro Palmero Ph.D.
Sport Management Graduate Coordinator
East Tennessee State University
Department of Kinesiology Leisure and Sport Sciences
P.O. Box 70654
Johnson City, TN 37614
palmero@etsu.edu
423-439-4382