Point/Counterpoint: Paying College Athletes

Abstract

The notion of paying college football players has been an ongoing debate since the early 1900’s. With current television revenue resulting from NCAA football bowl games and March Madness in basketball, there is now a clamoring for compensating both football and basketball players beyond that of an athletic scholarship. This article takes a point/counterpoint approach to the topic of paying athletes and may have potential implications/consequences for college administrators, athletes, and coaches. Dr. John Acquaviva defends the current system in which colleges provide an athletic scholarship that provides a “free college education” in return for playing on the university team. Dr. Dennis Johnson follows with a counterpoint making the case that athletes in these sports should receive compensation beyond that of a college scholarship and forwards five proposals to pay the athletes.

Key words: pay for play, athletic scholarships

Introduction: History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)

The idea of paying college athletes to compete dates back to what is considered to be the first intercollegiate competition. In a regatta between Harvard and Yale Universities, Harvard used a coxswain who was not even a student enrolled at the Ivy League school (5). Much like today’s universities whose appetites for appearances in corporate-sponsored “big money” football bowl events; Harvard may have used the non-student to please regatta sponsor Elkins Railroad (23).

In the late 1800’s, football played by college teams was a brutal sport but enjoyed by many fans. However, from 1900 to 1905, there were 45 players who died playing the sport (22). This prompted President Theodore Roosevelt to summon the presidents of Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, and threaten them with a ban unless the sport was modified. As a result of that meeting, a group of 62 university presidents convened to form the Intercollegiate Athletic Association in 1906. This group evolved into the NCAA in 1910, but as a group it only possessed supervisory power (22).

College football became even more popular in the period of 1920-1940. This was a time when commercialism in the educational system was being questioned on a variety of levels. One such fundamental question was posed in 1929 by Howard Savage, a staff member of the Carnegie Foundation. He raised a question in an article entitled Athletics in American College (originally published in 1930 but reprinted in 1999) “whether an institution in the social order whose primary purpose is the development of the intellectual life can at the same time serve an agency to promote business, industry, journalism, and organized athletics on an extensive commercial basis? More importantly, the report asked “can it (the university) concentrate its attention on securing teams that win, without impairing the sincerity and vigor of its intellectual purpose” (9, p.495)? Savage also states that “alumni devices for recruiting winning teams constitutes the most disgraceful phase of recent intercollegiate athletics” (9, p. 495). In sum, the original 1929 report claimed that “big time” college sports were not educational, but were entirely financial and commercial.

Athletes during the early and mid-1900’s were routinely recruited and paid to play; and there were several instances where individuals representing the schools were not enrolled as students. For example, there is one report of a Midwestern university using seven members of its team that included the town blacksmith, a lawyer, a livery man, and four railroad employees (5). Other athletes at colleges were given high paying jobs for which they did little or no work. In 1948, the NCAA adopted a “Sanity Code” that limited financial aid for athletes to tuition and fees, and required that aid otherwise be given based on need (5). In the early 1950’s, with the threat of several southern schools bolting from the NCAA, the code was revised to allow athletic scholarships to cover tuition, fees, and a living stipend.

However, by the mid-1950’s many schools were still struggling with the issue of offering athletic scholarships. Some university presidents ultimately decided to maintain the principles of amateurism and further serve the mission of higher education. Those were presidents of universities that today make up the Ivy League. They concluded that it was not in the best interest of their universities to award athletic scholarships, and have remained steadfast even today.

After passing Title IX in the mid 1970’s, the NCAA absorbed the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW) and began to govern women’s sport at the collegiate level. Over the past 50 years, the NCAA has also expanded into three divisions with a multitude of championship events on a yearly basis (20). There are more than 1,300 member institutions that represent an estimated 400,000 student athletes who participate in sport (21). The result of this growth and development are enormous increases in revenue. NCAA President Mark Emmert reports the NCAA revenues for the 2010-11 fiscal year is projected at $757 million, of which $452.2 million will go to Division I members (14).

While seemingly operating in a purely capitalistic/professional atmosphere, the NCAA continues to endorse an amateurism concept in college athletics. These competing, and often contradictory, values lead some college athletes in big time football and basketball programs to question the status quo of the present system through their words and actions. For example, many athletes are still attempting to get their “piece of the pie,” albeit under the table. And so it leads to our point-counterpoint.

Point: College Athletes Should Not Be Paid

The intensity of the argument to pay college athletes has escalated in the past few years. Perhaps it’s because of the current economic climate and everyone, including amateur athletes is looking for ways to make money? Or maybe it’s because many higher learning institutions have given the public access to their annual budget and readers focus on the profit of select athletic programs? Or maybe it is due to the absurd coaches’ salaries and the money that colleges make from football bowl games and basketball tournaments? Regardless, this has magnified the fact that the athletes see none of these profits and thus begs the simple question: “Where’s my share?” Perhaps a fair question, but to understand this argument better, a healthy debate is needed. So, here are some points to consider.

Point #1: Education is Money

Colleges and universities provide an invaluable and vital service to our communities: education. A now-famous bumper sticker once read: “If you think education is expensive, try ignorance.” To address that very slogan, the U.S. census bureau, as reported by Cheesman-Day and Newberger (7), expressed this best when they reported that the lifetime earnings for those with a college degree are over $1 million dollars more than non-graduates. Despite such a statistic, essays and op-ed columns continue to pour in from those who favor paying student-athletes while simultaneously refusing to acknowledge or accept the value of a college education. Is a college education priceless or not?

A sports-journalist in a recent national radio interview proposed that any argument against paying college athletes based on the sole reason that education is the prize is “antiquated”. But what seems antiquated and even shortsighted is the belief that paying a college athlete some (or even a lot of) money will solve all or even some of student’s long-term issues. The fear of the NCAA, as it should be, is that the mere notion of paying college athletes undermines the university’s primary purpose – education, something far more valuable than a modest annual stipend proposed by many. If it currently appears that the universities “don’t really care” about the athlete, paying them would intensify that belief, not dissolve it.

The irony in this dispute is that student-athletes do cost the university a substantial amount of money each year. For example, a full scholarship over four years can range between $30,000 and $200,000 depending if the institution is public or private (29). But let’s address this main point head on: There is an obvious lack of appreciation of a college degree from those in favor of paying athletes, and until a genuine gratitude for this concept develops, this argument will probably continue to linger.

Point #2: There Are Problems with Payment

Despite the well-documented scandals and corruption in college athletics (30), many would probably agree that paying athletes would exponentially increase the need for intense NCAA oversight – an enormous task by all accounts. Plus, there are the practical issues to consider. For example, how much should the athletes get paid and will payments be based on performance? What if the athlete gets hurt? What if the athlete is a bust and despite remaining on the team, doesn’t start or even play at all? – Issues that seem to raise far more questions than answers. But perhaps most important – What will happen to the non-revenue sports at the colleges who lose money from all of their sports programs – including football and basketball? It has been shown that only a fraction of Division I football and men’s basketball programs turn a profit (24, 20). The other Division I football and basketball programs as well as sports such as baseball, softball, golf, hockey, women’s basketball (minus a couple of notable programs), and just about all Division II sports not only fail to make money, but actually drain their athletic budgets. The outcome here would be inevitable: Forcing athletic departments to pay its football and basketball players would result in the eventual elimination of most, if not all, of the non-revenue sports. Is that what we want?

We cannot afford to be myopic on this issue. That is, there are only a limited number of programs that make big money, but yet there are hundreds of schools who absorb big losses at the cost of providing athletes a place to compete and earn a degree. The purpose of the NCAA, along with Amateur Athletic Union (AAU), Little League, and dozens of other organized forms of amateur sport is to provide a venue to play these sports – something we should not take for granted. The problem is that some have shifted in thinking that playing an organized sport is a right, whereas it still stands as a privilege.

Point #3: The University Offers More Than an Education

Concerts, lecture series by prominent people, on-stage productions, movies, intramural sports, fitness facilities, and a variety of clubs are all part of the typical university experience. Most students agree that colleges are self-contained acres of learning and socializing, all which takes place in a safe environment. It’s common for schools to subsidize the above-mentioned on-campus activities by adding fees to the tuition – which means that it’s free to a full-scholarship athlete. Other benefits to the athlete include the regular use of pristine gyms, well-manicured fields, athlete-only (and often team-only) workout facilities, sports medicine care, the opportunity to travel via away games, specialized meal plans and free foot gear and athletic attire. In addition, athletes are improving their trade from the best coaching minds in the sport; not to mention having access to some of the best nutrition and strength/conditioning personnel. And perhaps the most overlooked benefits are that the school provides the player with high-profile name recognition, a dedicated fan base, media exposure, and a competitive atmosphere with proven rivals, all of which took decades, effort and money for each institution to establish.

Point #4: The Athletic Department Has Its Role

Keep in mind that student-athletes are not employees of the university, rather they are students first and athletes second. The university can indeed make money from the sports programs; however, for those that do, the money simply goes back into the athletic program to fund the non-revenue sports (24). In fact, every year the NCAA sponsors over 80 national championships in three divisions, demonstrating the range and depth of their organization (20). While it is true that the champion in football and men’s basketball (and most other sports for that matter) seem to come from a relatively small pool of universities, it might be safe to assume that paying athletes would create an even bigger disparity since so few universities actually make money. Let’s face it, we are an underdog-loving country, and paying athletes would all but ensure that teams like Butler University, who made it to the Final Four in consecutive tournaments (2010 and 2011), will never do it again.

Point #5: Athletes Know the Deal

From the moment the full-scholarship papers are signed, each participant’s role is very clear: Schools accept the responsibility of the student’s tuition, meal plan, and boarding, while the athlete is provided with the opportunity to earn a degree, engage in college life and play their favorite sport in a well-organized, and often high profile fashion. The document signed by each student-athlete describes this agreement in an unmistakable manner. Although wordy and at times complex – a necessity due to the nature of the agreement – there’s no vagueness in the general arrangement or a hidden agenda from either party (10). A failure to honor the basic premise of any such contract would cause all forms of business – big or small – to crumble. If for some reason the university could be held liable for entrapment or some other form of dishonesty, then their athlete’s argument would stand on firmer ground. But frankly, the details of this agreement are well known by all involved, and rather strangely, no one seems to mind when signing them.

In conclusion, it should be noted that any NCAA improprieties or blatant corruption may have a carry-over effect into empathizing with the position given here. While corruption and other related-concerns are legitimate and need investigation, paying college athletes still remains a separate debate. It is vital to this process to view each NCAA issue independently and avoid making judgments on them as a whole. The position here is that, like many organizations, the NCAA should not be dismissed or discredited on one issue due to the mishandling of others. Further, if the contention is that many student athletes enter college unprepared or that athletics takes up too much time to excel (or even earn a degree), those are separate, but much needed arguments, and are not related to the issue of paying athletes.

Now more than ever, we live in an era of entitlement. At one time our country viewed the chance at higher education as a priceless commodity. However, it now seems that a college education is not held in the same esteem and worse yet, some see it as simply an opportunity to earn money. Although it is now evident that there has been a failure to convince much of the public of the true value of an education, keeping college athletes as pure amateurs remains the right thing to do.

Counter Point: Athletes in “Big-Time” Sports Should Be Paid

Introduction

The argument that a college athletic scholarship is an equal quid pro quo for a college education has been utilized since athletic scholarships were approved by the NCAA in 1950’s. My colleague makes one point that is totally accurate – a college graduate can in fact make a great deal more money over a lifetime when compared to non-graduates. However, the remainder of the author’s points are half-truths and in reality just plain falsehoods. For instance, a “full athletic scholarships” do not provide a “free” education (as it does not cover all costs incurred from matriculation to graduation. In many cases, the university does not live up to its end of the bargain of providing an education; as evidenced by the dismal number in the graduation rates, especially among African Americans. Furthermore, the athletic scholarship is only a one-year (renewable) agreement that can be terminated by the coach or university in any given year for any reason.

In debating the pay-for-play issue in college athletics, the history of the governing body (i.e., currently the NCAA), their mission and view of amateurism, the past history of college athletes benefitting financially, and the degree to which athletes benefit from the university experience must all be examined. The counter point section of this paper addresses each point made by my colleague. Using the Eitzen (12) analogy comparing the NCAA and big-time athletic programs to the old southern plantation system will be the underpinning wellspring for the subject of athlete exploitation and the financial benefits enjoyed by the university derived from that plantation-like exploitation. An economic viewpoint will be presented to demonstrate the cartel-like atmosphere held by the NCAA while maintaining the illusion of amateurism.

Finally, five proposals that outline means to promote pay-for-play in NCAA Division I football and men’s basketball will be presented. The arguments that follow are specifically tailored for those two sports at schools who receive bonus money from the NCAA, as those universities and their coaches enjoy considerable revenue from TV contracts and sponsorships generated by bowl games and “March Madness” appearances.

Point #1: Athletic Scholarships Provide a “Free Education” is not correct

As mentioned, in the 1950’s the NCAA approved adding living stipends to athletic scholarships that previously included only tuition and fees. Today, the “full ride” scholarship can only include tuition, fees, room, board, and books. And as mentioned in the previous section, in some cases, depending on the school attended, that scholarship can be worth anywhere from $30,000 to $200,000, although the figures $20,000 to $100,000 over a four year period might be more accurate. In any case, that still does not cover the full cost of attending college.

The Collegiate Athletes Coalition (CAC) estimates that NCAA scholarships are worth about $2000 less than the cost of attending a university, as it does not account for expenses such as travel and sundries. Former Nebraska head football coach and United States Congressman, Tom Osborne (R-NE), calculates the gap between scholarship funding and the actual cost of attendance to be closer to $3,000. Even former NCAA President, Myles Brand, indicated that he favored increasing scholarship limits: “Ideally, the value of an athletically related scholarship would be increased to cover the full-cost of attendance, calculated at between $2,000 to $3000 more per year than is currently provided, I favor this approach of providing the full cost of attendance” (23, p.232).

So yes, the scholarship can be seen as pay for play, or at the very least, a quid pro quo for services rendered during a four year period. However, even with a full scholarship, an athlete will have to pay somewhere between $8,000 and $12,000 out of pocket to bridge the cost-of-living gap. Therefore, the full athletic scholarship does not provide a “free” education. Thus question remains: is the full scholarship a fair and equitable deal for the athlete?

Athlete Exploitation-The Plantation System

Eitzen (12) among others (27) makes the analogy that the NCAA operates like the “plantation system” of the old south. The coaches are the overseers who get work from the laborers (players) who provide riches for the masters (universities) while receiving little for their efforts. Perhaps slightly over-stated (obviously the athlete is not a slave, but maybe an indentured servant), the student–athlete is dominated, managed, and controlled, and they don’t receive a wage commensurate to their contribution as expressed in dollars earned by the university. Eitzen notes that athletes are sometimes mistreated physically and mentally and are often denied the rights and freedoms of other citizens. Ultimately, they have no real democratic recourse in an unjust system.

There are other similarities to the plantation analogy. Slaves were not free to leave the plantation much like an athlete cannot get out of a letter of intent (without penalty) and/or transfer without the penalty of sitting out a year. Much like the slaves who had no right to privacy, athletes are subject to mandatory drug testing (even though their coaches/masters are not tested), room checks, and limits on where they can and cannot go in the community. The athletes can be prohibited from political protests and the right to assemble. And finally, they can be subjected to mental cruelty and physical abuse (e.g., early morning torture sessions), all in order to create obedient slaves; student athletes.

Furthermore, collegiate athletics is often the only game in town for many of these athletes. For instance, football players must be in their third year of college or over the age of 21 to enter the National Football League (NFL). Basketball players, on the other hand, must attend college for one year or ultimately sit out a year before they can enter the National Basketball Association (NBA). Thus, the college game has become a “feeder system” similar to a minor professional league and it is in reality, “the only game in town.”

Point #2: Athletes Don’t Know the “Real” Deal

My colleague is partially correct in that most student athletes know that they are getting a scholarship that will allow them to go to school and play a sport. However, many don’t know the “real deal” as they generally have very little understanding they are about to enter a “plantation-like” system in which their scholarship in not guaranteed (i.e., renewable yearly) and can be terminated at any time. Student-athletes are also a led to believe that they will play and receive a college degree while possibly picking up a few fringe benefits along the way.

Take, for example, the recent stories regarding players like Reggie Bush, Cam Newton, or the players at Ohio State who received money and/or other benefits as a result of playing football. Even though student athletes know they will not get directly paid for playing, many desire and even expect some form of compensation. Slack (25) surveyed 3,500 current and retired football players in 1989 only to find that 31% had received under the table money during their college careers and 48% knew of others who had received payments. This seems to imply that while many recruits may indeed know “the deal”, they display their discontent by accepting payments or other benefits not currently allowed by the NCAA.

In reality, the statement “athletes know the deal” with regard to academic achievement and degree completion seems to lack substance. Dr. Nathan Tublitz, co-chair of the Coalition on Intercollegiate Athletes, an organization of 51 faculty senates whose purpose is to remind college presidents, athletic directors, and coaches that student athletes are students first. He points out that:

“…schools aren’t doing these kids any favors by admitting them when it’s unlikely that they will succeed academically. We bring 17 year-old kids, some of them from the inner city and we wine and dine them. They have female chaperones. We put them up in fancy hotels. They come here and see an incredibly fancy locker room with individual TV screens, air conditioning and videogames. They go in and see the new football stadium and the new $200 million basketball arena. They see a medical training facility that is stunningly beautiful with waterfalls, treadmill pools, and the sate-of-the-art medical and dental equipment. They come here and are treated like royalty. Until they break a leg or get put on the second string and they get set aside. Many don’t earn a degree. They don’t have the training or the skills to be independent after they leave the university. They’re lost (28, p.D10).”

When the scholarship is signed, the athlete and his family have reasonable expectations which include efforts by the coaching staff and university administration to meet all obligations of the contract. Additionally, my colleague notes, “that failure to honor the basic premise of any such contract would cause all forms of business – big or small – to crumble.” If the NCAA and athletic departments in higher education are a business, why are they allowed to act in a cartel-like fashion? And finally, do student athletes really know the “deal” when they penned their name on national signing day? It appears they don’t.

Point #3: The University Offers More than Education-It’s Possible-But Not Probable

Academic Detachment. My colleague also makes the claim that the university offers more than an education (e.g., concerts, lectures, intramurals, and clubs) in settings that enrich the college experience. Due to the plantation effect, however, many athletes are not able to take advantage of those events. For instance, few if any of the scholarship athletes would be allowed to play in an intramural contest for the coach’s fear of injury. Student athletes are also over-scheduled with study halls, practices, weight training sessions, film study, individual workouts, more practice, travel, and competition; all in an attempt to help athletes maintain focus on their sport.

Adler and Adler (1) spent five years recording systematic information regarding the athletes’ lives in a big-time college basketball program. After observing, interviewing, and traveling with them, they concluded that big-time basketball and being seriously engaged in academics were not compatible. They also found that freshmen had a period of optimism regarding academics when they first arrived on campus, but after about two semesters they found that the social isolation combined with the fatigue of training kept them from becoming involved in academic life.

Positive feedback these basketball players earned was always athletic-related and not academic. They soon learned what they had to do to stay eligible. Coaches made sure they scheduled classes that did not interfere with practices. Ultimately, the researchers realized that academic detachment was encouraged by the peer culture, and because of their social status (e.g., big man on campus), it became difficult for them to focus on academics.

Coakley (8) reported that not all of the athletes in the Adler & Adler (1) study experienced academic detachment. Those who entered college well-prepared with appropriate high school courses, strong parental support and an ability to develop relationships outside of sport were able to succeed in the classroom. It’s important to note that too many minority athletes from low socioeconomic environments struggle in academics – an issue that is often perpetuated by the coaches. For instance, Robert Smith, former running back for Minnesota Vikings and pre-med student while at Ohio State, needed two afternoon labs in the same semester. Since the labs conflicted with practice, coaches suggested that he drop them because of the commitment he made to play football. Against the wishes of the coaching staff, Smith took the classes but was forced to sit out the season as red shirt athlete; a further example of the plantation effect.

Benson (3) noted that one perspective was missing from the literature included a full expression from the black athletes point of view. Benson conducted a qualitative interview study of 12 African American students at a DI football program where the graduation rate was 31-40% for black football players compared to 60-70% of white football players. The results in this instance cannot be generalized due to the small sample size (N=12), but it does provide a snapshot of the thoughts regarding education and athletics of this group. Further, they reflect the results obtained by Adler & Adler (1).

Another major finding of the Benson (3) study was that the marginal academic performance was created by a series of interrelated practices engaged in by all significant members of the academic setting, including peers, coaches, advisors, teachers, and the student athletes themselves. It began in the recruitment, and continued through the first year. Black student athletes received the message that school was not important, and that as time passed, they had no real control over their destiny in the classroom. It was simply a matter of survival to keep the grade point average (GPA) to a point to be eligible. They all felt like the coaches did not “walk the talk” in terms of academics. They would just talk the academic game in public but then in reality they would have “fits” if classes ever interfered with the program. Simply put, student athletes learned it was a matter of survival and a basic expectation to maintain a GPA just high enough to remain eligible to compete (3).

“The Black Dumb Jock”. Harry Edwards (13) discussed the creation of the “black dumb jock” image prior to studies completed by Alder and Alder (1), Benson (3), and Coakley (8). He (i.e., Edwards) theorized that they were not born, but rather systematically created. The previous mentioned studies serve as evidence to support his statement (1, 3, 8). The exploitation of athletes is not solely an NCAA issue but a societal one. For example, Fred Butler was passed on through elementary, middle, and high school because he was a good football player. He graduated from high school reading at a second grade level and went to El Camino Junior College. There he took a number of physical activity classes while hoping to be drafted into the NFL. When no offer came, he played at California State University-Los Angeles for a year and a half. When again no offer came and his eligibility expired, he failed out of school within months with no degree, no offers to play pro ball, and no skills to use for employment. And he still could not read! (18). Similarly, Former NFL player Dexter Manley testified before a Senate Committee that he played four years at Oklahoma State University, only to leave the school illiterate. And the sad feature is that academic detachment from the university athletic department perspective doesn’t seem to be an issue because there are always more impoverished (and usually minority) kids waiting to come in and play.

Thus, student athletes in many cases cannot take advantage of the many extras offered by a college education. Why do athletes accept a diluted academic experience or the corruption of doctored transcripts, phantom courses, surrogate test takers, and tutors writing papers? Perhaps it is because they are disenfranchised under the current system, and will lose scholarships, starting roles, and eligibility if they complain. George Will argued that “College football and basketball are, for many players, vocations, not avocations, and academics are unsubstantiated rumors” (12, p.5). So do full scholarship athletes get a chance to take advantage of all the extras of the university experience? More than likely it is not the case especially when they can’t even hope for a meaningful degree.

NCAA as a Cartel. Kahn (16) examined the operation of the college football and basketball systems of the NCAA and offers lessons about the determinants and effects of supply and demand. Specifically he utilizes economic principles to calculate the value of college football player to a university. He notes that total ticket revenues for football and men’s basketball were $757 million in 1999, total value that exceeded the total ticket sales for all of professional baseball, football, and hockey that year. A figure indicating that the NCAA is a very successful business entity engaged in capitalism.

According to the cartel theory, the NCAA has “enforced collusive restrictions on payments for factors of production, including player compensation, recruiting expenses, and assistant coaches salaries; it has restricted output; and it has defeated potential rival groups (16, p. 211).” He notes, along with others (11, 15, 16, 30), that the NCAA can impose sanctions that range from scholarship reductions, elimination from post-season play to program death penalties (e.g., Southern Methodist football); and possibly even threaten a school’s academic accreditation. However, restriction of pay to players is the main way in which the organization acts to restrict competition.

Economists who have studied the NCAA “view it as a cartel that attempts to produce rents, both by limiting payments for inputs such as player compensation and by limiting output” (16, p.210). When looking at the rent values based on college football or men’s basketball players’ performances, they are paid below a competitive level of compensation based on estimates of marginal revenue product produced of these players (6). Their analysis considered the total revenue for a school and the number of players that were eventually drafted by a major professional league. Utilizing this framework they concluded that in 2005 dollars a draft-ready football player returned $495,000 to the university, while a draft-ready basketball player was worth $1.422 million for men’s basketball. And all of this compared to the approximately $40,000 paid in scholarship worth. This indicates that the NCAA does indeed use cartel power to pay top athletes less than the athlete’s market value.

Based on a workload of 1000 hours per year and an average scholarship value, economist Richard Sheehan (16) calculated the basic hourly wage of a college basketball player at $6.82 and a football player at $7.69. Coaches’ hourly wages, on the other hand, ranged from $250-$647 per hour (depending on salary). Again, using the Eitzen metaphor, the masters accumulate wealth at the slave’s expense, even though the athlete/slave’s health is jeopardized by participation (12).

Parent (23) notes the hypocrisy of the amateurism construct when looking at these capitalism issues. He notes that the former president of the University of Washington, William Gerberding, said, “As one contemplates the obvious fact that so many of the most gifted athletes are economically and educationally disadvantaged blacks, this becomes less and less defensible. I have become increasingly uncomfortable about having a largely white establishment maintaining an elaborate system of rules that deprives student-athletes, many of whom are non-white, of adequate financial support in the name of the ideals of amateurism” (p.236).

So, why do athletes tolerate this system? They do mainly because they are disenfranchised and fear losing their scholarships and eligibility if they complain. In essence, this pay-for-play discussion revolves around amateurism, as advertised by the NCAA, and its competing capitalistic drive for income. According to Tulsa Law School professor Ray Yasser, the best option for athletes to change the system for their benefit is to unite and “file an antitrust suit…against the NCAA and their universities, with the claim being that the NCAA and their universities are colluding to create a monopoly over the athlete’s ability to share in the profits generated from college athletics” (23, p.236).

While the points for maintaining the status quo were stated previously, there has been sufficient evidence presented in this section to stimulate discussion of paying players. The “play for a diploma” agreement is not happening in many cases, as the athlete failure rate indicates. Another example is national champion Connecticut men’s basketball program losing two scholarships for the upcoming season as a result of a poor Academic Performance Rating (APR) from the NCAA (11). Thus, the following pay for play proposals are being submitted for consideration.

Pay Proposals

It would appear that NCAA should get out of the commercial business of football and basketball and follow the Ivy League example of providing an environment that is truly amateur where student athletes actually are students first. That move would certainly place the student first in the student athlete term. However, it doesn’t seem pragmatic that either the NCAA or any of the major universities are in any hurry to turn away millions of dollars per year in profits. Therefore, it is time to consider some pay-for-pay proposals. California and Nebraska have already passed state legislation that would enable colleges to compensate athletes; however they are blocked by the NCAA from doing so (23). Therefore, I submit five proposals that could possibly be implemented:

    1. Big Ten Plan and/or Work Study Proposal: At the very least, the NCAA should follow former NCAA President Miles Brand’s suggestion and allocate athletes include a $2,000-$3,000 cost of living increase to full scholarships. Since athletes are supposedly only allowed to spend 20 hours per week involved with sport-related activities, this might actually be paid as 20 hours of work study or as a monthly living stipend. This would provide the athletes with the needed income for clothes, laundry, sundries, travel, and other small item expenses.
      Officials from the Big Ten are currently discussing a similar proposal that would help their athletes meet expenses not covered in an athletic scholarship. Big Ten commissioner Jim Delany reports league athletic directors and university officials have seriously discussed using some of their growing TV revenue to pay athletes more. This proposal which would give athletes a $2,000-$5,000 per year living stipend also has the support of current NCAA president Mark Emmert (2).

 

    1. SEC Game Pay Proposal: The Southeastern Conference, another of the big time football conferences recently entered into the pay for play discussion. University of South Carolina coach Steve Spurrier put forth a proposal at the recent conference meetings to pay players $300 per game. The proposal was supported by several other coaches.
      This type of a proposal could pay athletes anywhere from $300-$1000 per game based on time played per game. Since most players do not play more than 30 minutes a game, a player could be paid on a per-minute of competition basis. At a rate of $20 per minute a player could net $600 for a game and approximately $6000-$7,000 per season.

 

    1. Professional League Proposal: Ron Woods (27) puts forth a proposal submitted by Peter Plagensa, visiting professor at Middlebury College, regarding the pay-for-play issue. He appears to agree with the likes of Stanley Eitzen that the current practice of colleges and the NCAA do in fact “amount to a little more than a plantation system” (27, p. 67). He suggests that the big time college football and basketball maintain the million-dollar industry by making them an age 23 and under professional league. This proposal would allow universities to hire players as college staff (much like the cafeteria or groundskeepers) at moderate salaries plus room and board. Universities could also grant the athletes free academic classes until they earn a degree (even after playing days are over).

 

    1. Revenue Sharing Proposal from TV/NCAA Proceeds:

      “College basketball players watch the coach roaming the sidelines in his $1,500 custom-make suit. They read about his $500.000 salary and $250,000 perk from a sneaker deal. They watch the schools sell jerseys (and T-shirts) with the player’s numbers on them. They see the athletic director and NCAA officials getting rich and you wonder why they might ask; hey where’s my share? What am I, a pack mule” (17, p.46)

      Tim Tebow related on the Daily Show (26) that he joked with his college coach prior to a national championship game about getting a cut of his bonus money to ensure a victory. This brings another revenue sharing possibility to the surface: coaches sharing their bonuses and other performance incentives with the players.
      Most coaches in big time programs are paid huge bonuses based on team record and ranking, all a result of player performance. For instance, according to 2009 IRS income tax reports, Mike Krzyewski received $2,222,543 in bonuses and incentives (4). Coaches under this proposal would be required to share 25-50% of their bonuses with the players. Isn’t it reasonable to expect the athletes to get a cut of the bonus money? After all, they (i.e., the players) are the ones who put the coaches in a position to earn those bonuses.

 

My colleague has argued in point #2 that paying athletes raise a myriad of other issues, such as how much should they receive, what happens if an athlete gets hurt, and so on. That is a discussion for another time. First, we must agree that it is fair to compensate NCAA Division I football and basketball athletes beyond that of an athletic scholarship; then and only then may payout details be chronicled. Note: a reminder that we are only discussing compensation for the NCAA Division I-A football and basketball players; not the athletes in the AAU, Little League or other truly amateur venues of organized sport.

Summary

Throughout the history of the NCAA, college athletes have routinely received compensation beyond that of a full college scholarship (e.g., room and board, tuition, books). While such compensation is illegal, athletes like Reggie Bush and others receive under-the-table benefits as evidenced in the Slack survey (25).

Additionally, many athletes in “big time” programs do not receive a degree for their efforts in the athletic arena. Universities routinely admit students based on their athletic skills that are academically ill-prepared for success. As seen in the research (1, 3), many athletes that aspire to be academically successful soon lose hope with the over-scheduling and pressures of sport preparation. As a result, many college athletes, a majority of which are minorities, fail out of school once coaches have utilized their eligibility.

The NCAA functions like a cartel, keeping cost down while increasing profits. Rents for a draft-ready athlete earn the university somewhere between $500,000 for football and $1.422 million for men’s basketball (16), leading to a pseudo-plantation system where the coaches oversee the athletes demanding work and controlling their schedules on and off the field. This unbalanced system allows athletes to earn the equivalent of $6.80-$7.69 an hour (12) while coaches like Nick Saban of Alabama or Mack Brown of Texas earn over five million dollars a year (4).

If the NCAA continues as a corporate entity and acting in a cartel-like fashion making millions of dollars a year, implementing a plan to pay student athletes for playing must be considered. Otherwise, America’s institutions of higher learning should follow the Ivy League schools’ example and eliminate athletic scholarships, get out of the big time sport business, and get on with providing students with a complete educational experience.

Applications in Sport

Few discussions within sport are more common or controversial than the debate to pay college athletes. Some arguments are well thought and articulated, while others lack insight and are simply driven by passion. The purpose of this article is to provide the reader with a new perspective and some historical insight – all supported by the literature – regardless of their stance on this issue. Moreover, readers who may actually be heard by the NCAA may offer a position that has yet to be considered. The concession here is that despite any decision by the NCAA in the near future, we can be assured that college administrators, coaches, and athletes will continue this debate. However, their arguments may now be seen as relevant and more reasoned.

POSTSCRIPT: According to Michelle B. Hosick at the NCAA.org, the NCAA board of directors has moved on two issues discussed in this article since its submission. In April (2012), the board moved to implement a $2,000 allowance to an athlete’s full scholarship. They also voted to grant multi-year scholarships. However, both measures have been put on hold with the threat of an override vote by member institutions. On January 14, 2012 at the NCAA convention the board delayed implementation of the $2,000 supplement and sent it back to committee for revision at its April meeting. The multi-year scholarship issue will continue to be implemented on a conference-by-conference basis. And so the pay-for-play discussion continues.

References

  1. Adler, P. A., & Adler, P. (1999). College athletes in high-profile media sports: The consequences of glory. In Inside sports (pp. 162–70), edited by J. Coakley and P. Donnelly. London: Routledge.
  2. Bennett, B. (May 19, 2011). Big Ten considers pay research proposal. ESPN College Football. Retrieved from http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=6564134.
  3. Benson, K. F. (2000) Constructing academic inadequacy: African American athletes’ stories of schooling. Journal of Higher Education, 71, 223- 46.
  4. Berkowitz, S., & Gardiner, A. (2011, May 17). Coach K made $4.7M in 2009. USA Today, 2C.
  5. Bronson, A. G. (1958). Clark W. Hetherington-Scientist and philosopher. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.
  6. Brown, R. W., & Jewell, T. R. (2006). The marginal revenue product of a women’s college basketball player. Industrial Relations, 45 (1), 96-101.
  7. Cheesman-Day, J., & Newberger, E. (2002). The big pay-off educational attainment and synthetic estimates of work-life earnings. Retrieved from www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs.
  8. Coakley, J. (2007). Sports in society: Issues and controversies. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
  9. Crowley, W. H. (1999). Athletics in American colleges. Journal of Higher Education, 70, 494-502.
  10. Cozzillio, M. J. (1989). The athletic scholarship and the college national letter of intent: A contract by any other name. Wayne Law Review, 35, 1275-1379.
  11. Eaton-Robb, P. (2011, May 20). UConn loses 2 men’s basketball scholarships. Norwich Bulletin. Retrieved from http://www.norwichbulletin.com/newsnow/x31866796/UConn-mens-hoops-loses-2-scholarships#axzz1NCVV1385.
  12. Eitzen, S. D. (2000, September). Slaves of big-time college sports: College athletes. USA Today (Society for the Advancement of Education), 125.
  13. Edwards, H. (1984). The black dumb jock: An American sports tragedy. College Board Review, 131, 8-13.
  14. Emmert, M. (2011). How it all adds up. NCAA Champion Magazine, 4 (2), 5.
  15. Fleisher, A. A., Goff, G. L., & Tollison, R. D. (1992). The National Collegiate Athletic Association: A study in cartel behavior. Chicago, IL: University Of Chicago Press.
  16. Kahn, L. M. (2007). Markets: Cartel behavior and amateurism in college sports. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21, 209-226.
  17. Kornheiser, T. (1999, December 13). Six billion? Where’s mine? ESPN The Magazine, 46.
  18. Lapchick, R. (1989). Pass to play: student athletes and academics. National Education Association of the United States.
  19. Madesen, R. (2001). The role of the NCAA and the need for reform in big-time college sports. Academic Exchange – EXTRA. Retrieved from http:/www.unco.edu/AE-Extra/2001/3/NCAA.html.
  20. National Collegiate Athletic Association (2011). Why student-athletes are not paid to play. Retrieved from www.ncaa.org.
  21. National Collegiate Athletic Association (2010). 2009-10 guide for college bound student athlete: Where academics and athletic success is your goal. Indianapolis, IN: NCAA.
  22. Olterddorf, C. (1999). But what is the NCAA? What is the real purpose? And is it achieving it? Texas Alcalde, 28, 3-5.
  23. Parent, C. M. (2004, spring). Forward progress? An analysis of whether student-athletes should be paid? Virginia Sports & Entertainment Law Journal, 226-244.
  24. Rosner, S., & Shropshire, K. (2004). The business of sports. (pp.527-531). Ontario, Canada: Jones and Bartlett.
  25. Slack, A. (1991).The underground economy of college football. Sociology of Sport Journal, 8 (1), 1-15.
  26. Stewart, J., & Albanese, R. (2011, June 2). The Daily Show with Jon Stewart. [Television broadcast] New York: The Comedy Channel (MTV Networks Entertainment Group).
  27. Woods, R. B. (2007). Social issues in sport. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.
  28. Yost, M. (2008, March 19). A cultural conversation with Nathan Tublitz: Has serious academic reform of college athletics arrived? The Wall Street Journal, D10.
  29. U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics. (2010). Digest of education statistics, 2009 (NCES 2010-013).
  30. Zimbalist, A. (1999). Unpaid professionals: Commercialism and conflict in big-time college sports. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
2015-01-31T01:14:13-06:00June 15th, 2012|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Coaching, Sports Facilities, Sports Management|Comments Off on Point/Counterpoint: Paying College Athletes

Risk Management Plans: Existence and Enforcement at NIAAA Member High School Athletic Departments

Abstract

The purpose of this study was to explore the current scenario of interscholastic athletics in terms of the existence and enforcement of risk management plans within high school athletic departments. Another purpose was to identify the common practices related to risk management currently utilized. The present study had a response rate of 16.7%. The results showed that 76.2 % of the respondents (N=816) conduct interscholastic activities with the support of risk management plans, but there are still 23.8% of those interscholastic athletic departments where risk management plans are nonexistent. In addition, from those who indicated having a risk management plan, 28% do not enforce it. A majority of respondents seem to be employing risk management best practices consistently, but there is an indication of a less than desired level of adoption of some practices (i.e., informed consent forms, pre-season sport specific meetings, ADA compliance, coach evaluation and written criteria, safety training, accessibility of AED’s, and warning signs). The results of our study showed a statistically significant relationship between the athletic directors’ years of experience and the adoption of certain risk management practices (i.e. coach evaluation, evaluation criteria, risk management enforcement, and hazard abatement), but (surprisingly) not to the adoption of other similarly important practices. This study provides high school athletic administrators and principals with relevant information that can be used to support their decision to adopt and enforce risk management plans for interscholastic athletic activities.

Key words: Risk Management Practices, Risk Management Plan, Interscholastic Athletics, Athletic Directors.

Introduction

In college athletics, risk management plans exist in order to reduce medical costs, prevent liability and to help schools afford insurance (Anderson, 2006). What about high school? Today, suing the schools, their coaches and officials for any reason is very common. Thus, high schools have to be prepared to defend themselves against legal claims, especially those related to interscholastic sports. Millions of teenagers participate in organized school-sponsored interscholastic sports programs each year. Competitive sports are an integral part of the lives of high school students and have the potential to offer them many benefits. Increased participation and rapid body changes make the risk of injuries for high school students engaging in interscholastic athletics a real threat (Ballard, 1996). In addition to the well-known mental, physical, economic, and spectator benefits provided by high school sports, the possible costs or hazards of interscholastic athletic participation are always present (Lipsey, 2006). Supporting that idea, an epidemiologic study commissioned by the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System showed that 55.5% of American high school students participated on at least one sports team, and 21.9% of those students reported seeking medical treatment as a result of their activities (Eaton, Kann, Kinchen, et al., 2007). These data justify the need for increased efforts in developing and implementing strategies to identify and treat potential risks related to interscholastic participation. With that in mind, it is important for interscholastic athletic administrators to become familiar with commonly utilized best practices related to risk management in high school sports.

Gray (1995) studied risk management at physical education and athletic programs at the high school level in the state of Iowa. He investigated high school principals’ perceptions of a 20 item list of best practices related to risk management and principals’ supervision of programs. The author found that these administrators perform most of the risk management behaviors within the survey in a consistent basis. He also found that the size of the school had little influence on the behavior among the surveyed principals.

A similar study conducted by Bezdicek (2009), examined 463 high school athletic directors in Minnesota. The study was conducted to determine to what extent do athletic directors develop, implement, and manage a risk management plan for their athletic department, and the levels of familiarity that athletic directors have with risk management standards. The study revealed that the majority (56%) of athletic directors in Minnesota did not have a written risk management plan. In addition, the reasons for not having a risk management plan, as expressed by the respondents, were: lack of time (26.3%), lack of expertise (20.8%), and no need for a plan (19.7%).

Mulrooney and Green (1997) determined that the following characteristics must be present for a risk management plan to be considered bonafide and functioning: (1) a staff member is the risk manager, (2) a written risk management plan should outline policies and procedures in detail (including audit checklists), (3) periodic risk audits are conducted by staff, (4) periodic staff training programs related to risk management should be in place, and (5) the risk management plan is created with legal counsel.

Doleschal (2006) points out that: “ongoing risk management programs, the preparation of written material to be disseminated to coaches, participants, and parents or guardians, signed informed consent forms, inspection of equipment, etc., are examples of proactive steps that can be taken by school districts and their athletic programs” (p.295). He argues that unfortunately “many schools either do not have/use a risk management plan or do not follow good risk management practices” (p. 295). To assist interscholastic athletic departments in developing efficient risk management plans, Doleschal (2006) recommends 14 duties of care (proper planning, proper supervision, eligibility assessment, safe playing conditions, equipment maintenance, proper instruction, proper matching of athletes, proper conditioning, risk warning, proper insurance, emergency care and response plan, safe transportation, and proper selection, training and supervision of coaches) which schools should incorporate in their plans as preventive steps to minimize possible liability for the school or coaches.

Due to the nature of interscholastic athletic activities, coaches and schools constantly deal with the risk of litigation. Thus, it is important that they understand following the steps laid out in a risk management plan is instrumental to minimizing risks and reducing loss. The choice of either not having or not enforcing a risk management plan puts schools and their staff at risk of experiencing the anguish and pain involved in the time consuming process of defending a lawsuit (Doleschal, 2006). A good risk management plan is not an absolute guarantee that litigation will be avoided. However, good risk management practices can be effective aids in developing not only safer programs, but also act as an effective defense, should litigation occur (Doleschal, 2006).

With a good risk management plan in place, the identification and treatment of risks becomes much more effective. According to Stier et al. (2008), “risk management implies the assessment of risks associated with one or more activities or events and planning for the worst-case scenario”. (p. 32). Cotton (1993) points out that there are four essential elements to any risk management plan: identification of real and potential risks, assessment of the identified risks in terms of their causes, determination of appropriate courses of action to take in dealing with these risks if they occur, and establishment of effective and efficient risk prevention measures.

Finally, it is important to emphasize the athletic administrators’ role in the implementation and management of a risk management plan. A significant number of lawsuits are negligence claims taking place after the accident and the initial injury of an individual. Thus, the administrators’ ultimate goals must be to provide the safest environment possible for everyone involved, and to be prepared to deal with accidents and injuries if and when they do occur (Stier et al, 2008). Despite the fact that “no plan can be completely effective in preventing all injuries or accidents” (p.32), administrators are still responsible for enforcing and maintaining a meaningful risk management plan (Stier et al, 2008).

For high school athletic administrators, the challenge becomes providing sport programs which take safety seriously. In other words, the task is to effectively manage the many risks to which students-athletes are exposed. To do so, schools should rely on risk management plans and best practices to ensure that all school employees involved with athletics are fully prepared to prevent losses and to deal with losses when they occur (Appenzeller, 2005). However, is that really the case? Do high schools across the country actually have a risk management plan and truly enforce it? What are the most common practices related to risk management currently utilized by athletic departments at the high school level?

The purpose of this study was to explore the current scenario of interscholastic athletics in terms of the existence and enforcement of risk management plans within high school athletic departments. Another purpose was to identify the common practices related to risk management currently utilized. This study provides high school athletic administrators and principals with relevant information that can be used to support their decision to adopt and enforce risk management plans applied to interscholastic athletic activities.

To achieve such purposes, the following questions must be answered:

  1. How frequently high schools have and enforce risk management plans which are tailored to their athletic programs?
  2. What are the best practices used by high school athletic departments to address the inherent risks to the athletic activities they provide?
  3. Is there any relationship between athletic directors’ years of experience and existence/enforcement of specific risk management plan practices?

Methods

An online survey instrument was developed and distributed to high school athletic administrators for the purposes of examining risk management practices for high school athletics.

Subjects

The subjects were high school athletic directors belonging to the National Interscholastic Athletic Administrators Association (NIAAA). The NIAAA granted permission to the researchers to conduct the study. At the time of the survey, the NIAAA membership totaled 5,758 (while there were few email delivery failures, the amount was negligible). The first page of the online survey presented the participants information about the study and an informed consent form. Continuing to take the survey served as the respondents’ consent. The survey was available to the participants for six consecutive weeks, starting late Fall 2010.

Instrument

The survey instrument consisted of twenty-four questions related to risk management policy and practices as well as eight demographic questions. Questions were broken down into three categories: policy and procedure, supervision and personnel evaluation, and safety. The policy and procedure category consisted of questions related to Title IX, athletic association rules, insurance, informed consent, preseason meetings and ADA compliance. The supervision and personnel evaluation category consisted of questions related to coach certification and evaluation, supervision of events, and policy enforcement. Lastly, the safety category focused on emergency training, equipment and procedures, hazard inspection, game equipment, venue signage, and security and team transportation. The questions were a combination of Likert-type and open-ended. Directions for the survey were imbedded within the survey itself. Directions were placed for each section and coincided with any question format changes. Content for the questions was developed using previous literature related to risk management policies and procedures. Content validity was established using a panel of individuals chosen for their expertise and experience in risk management policy and procedures. The instrument was also tested for issues of readability using student focus groups.

Data Collection and Analysis

Using a modified Dillman (2007) method, the final version of the survey was sent to the NIAAA membership which totaled 5,758 at the time of the survey. The instrument was sent by email with a letter explaining the purpose of the study and informing them that participation was voluntary. Participants were assured of their anonymity as respondents, and also were given electronically generated respondent ID numbers by the survey program. There were 5,758 surveys sent out with 962 surveys returned for a 16 .7% response rate. Of the 962 surveys returned there were 816 fully completed and useable surveys. The researchers agree that 16% response rate seems low. However, it is important to point out that this is an exploratory study reaching out to a very large population. The group of respondents represents diverse geographic regions and a variety of school sizes. In addition, the complex and high-demand nature of the job performed by those athletic directors is a very reasonable justification for their low response rate.

Descriptive analysis was used to explore demographic information related to the administrators, and the frequency of legal action related to injuries and adoption of risk management best practices. Chi-square tests were performed to investigate the existence of relationships between the risk management practices and administrators experience.

Results

The athletic administrators surveyed represented schools ranging in size from 41 students to over 8,000. The mean enrollment of schools represented in the survey was 1,182. These schools fielded an average of 18 different athletic programs.

The administrators themselves were a majority male (83.9%). From all responding administrators, 2.6% held a doctorate, 74.6% held a master’s degree, 18.2 % held a bachelor degree, and 2 % represented other levels of education (associate or high school degree). These administrators had an average of 11.7 years of total experience with an average of 8.0 years being employed at their current school.

Policy Provision and Injury

In terms of injuries and risk, these schools have seen very little legal action related to injury (less than 1%), with (on average) three catastrophic injuries over the last five years requiring hospitalization. In light of this finding it is important to note that during this time, approximately one quarter of the sample either did not have a risk management policy (17.3%) or didn’t know if one existed at their school (6.5%). Of the schools possessing a risk management policy, 28 % said the policies were not enforced.

Risk Management Practices

To examine risk management practices, a series of questions were asked related to standard practices involving risk minimization for athletic program participation. In all categories (policy and procedure, supervision and personnel evaluation, and safety) 78% or more of respondents answered that they engaged in the practice often or always, with the exception of the item inquiring about the presence of visible risk warning signs at venues (46.9%) (Table 1). In the policy and procedure category, 10.5% of the respondents rarely, if ever, required consent forms for athletic participation. Also, only 86.4% conducted sport-specific pre-season meetings for athletes and parents. Lastly, 11.3% indicated that ADA guidelines were seldom met.

Within the supervision and personnel evaluation category, the results showed that less than 83% of the respondents evaluate their coaches on a regular basis. To compound this issue, only 85% had written criteria with which to evaluate those coaches. In addition, only 81.9% respondents indicated that their athletic department had someone responsible for enforcing the risk management plan.

The safety category results presented the largest concerns: 20.6% of the respondents indicated that emergency safety training is not provided to coaches and staff on a regular basis, and only 78.6% have AEDs within easy access at athletic activities. Having proper signage at sport venues with visible risk warning signs was also lacking, with less than half (46.9%) of administrators indicating adequate signage.

Risk Management Practices and Administrators’ Experience

A series of chi-square tests were performed to look at relationships between the risk management practices and administrators’ experience (Table 2). For the purposes of this analysis, administrators were categorized into two groups: those with fewer than eleven years of experience and those with eleven or more years. Significant associations were found between experience and the risk management practice variables of coach evaluation, evaluation criteria, risk management enforcement, and hazard abatement.

There was a significant (χ2 (1) = 12.75, p<.001) albeit weak (Phi = .126, p<.001) association between the level of administrator experience and whether the coaches were evaluated on a regular basis. Based on the odds ratio, the odds of administrators with 11 or more years of experience evaluating coaches on a regular basis was twice that of administrators with ten years or less experience.

The association between level of administrator experience and written evaluation criteria was also significant (χ2 (1) = 5.37, p<.05) and weak (Phi = .08, p<.05). The calculation of the odds ratio indicated the odds of administrators with 11 or more years of experience having written evaluation criteria were 1.6 times that of administrators with ten years or less experience.

Administrator experience and whether the athletic department had someone responsible for enforcing a risk management plan showed a significant (χ2 (1) = 5.30, p<.05) and weak (Phi = .08, p<.05) association. The odds ratio indicated the odds of administrators with 11 or more years of experience having a dedicated person responsible for risk management plan enforcement was 1.5 that of administrators with ten years or less experience.

Lastly, there was a significant (χ2 (1) = 5.15, p<.05) and weak (Phi = .08, p<.05) association between the level of administrator experience and whether identified hazards were repaired correctly and timely. Based on the odds ratio, the odds of administrators with 11 or more years of experience repairing hazards timely and correctly was twice that of administrators with ten years or less experience.

Discussion

The first goal of this study was to determine the frequency with which high schools in America have and enforce risk management plans applied to their athletic programs. Regarding the existence of a risk management plan, the results showed that 23.8% of the respondents either did not have a risk management policy or didn’t know if one existed at their school. In addition, among the schools possessing a risk management plan, 28 % said the plan policies were not enforced.

These figures are unexpected and very concerning. The concern is based on interscholastic athletic stakeholders’ expectation that schools and programs to be fully committed to the safety of athletes and fans, through the presence and enforcement of a solid risk management plan as the utmost symbol of that commitment. As such, it would be only reasonable to expect a much higher percentage of existence and enforcement of risk management plans. However, despite the increase in participation and the litigious character of our society, it seems that a significant number of interscholastic athletic administrators (or, in some cases, the local school board) choose to put their students and their schools at constant risk of major loss and liability (Bezdicek, 2009; Eaton et al., 2007; Gray, 1995; Lipsey, 2006; Stier et al, 2008). It is also surprising that, despite so many interscholastic athletic departments reporting absence of either a risk management plan or the enforcement of one, less than 1% of the respondents had legal action related to injury requiring hospitalization over the last five years. Perhaps, this could be a possible explanation for the less than desired level of adoption and enforcement of risk management plans among the respondents.

The administrators who have and enforce risk management plans will continue to reap the benefits of loss prevention and reduction (Bezdicek, 2009; Eaton et al., 2007; Gray, 1995; Lipsey, 2006; Stier et al, 2008). The same cannot be said for to the administrators who either do not have or do not enforce risk management plans. One can only hope that, by becoming acquainted with the information provided here, they may adopt practices that will certainly lead them to risk and liability reduction (Appenzeller, 2005; Bezdicek; Cotton & Wolohan, 2007; Eaton et al.; Gray; Lipsey; Stier et al).

The second goal of this study was to identify the best and most frequently used practices to address the inherent risks to interscholastic athletic activities. As expected, the survey results showed that most administrators followed these standards of risk management the vast majority of the time. However, the results presented a few points of concern, which could be another possible explanation for the low percentage of schools with risk management plans.

Initially, the fact that 10.5% of the respondents rarely required informed consent forms may place these schools in a defenseless position if facing negligence claims related to injuries occurring during participation in schools’ interscholastic activities (Appenzeller, 2005; Cotton, 1993; Doleschal, 2006). Dealing with the same liability category, 13.6% do not conduct sport specific pre-season meetings for athletes and parents. According to Doleschal (2006), “parents/guardians and athletes have a right to information regarding the possibility of injury, paralysis, and death that is inherent in all sports” (p.318).The provision of such information is a duty the institutions legally owe to the families. The lack of signed informed consent and sport specific pre-season meetings prevent participants (and their families) from being fully educated on the risks involved in the specific sport in which they desire to participate, and make the defense against a negligence claim very difficult (Appenzeller; Cotton & Wolohan, 2007; Doleschal).

ADA compliance at interscholastic venues is also an issue. 11.3% of the respondents indicated that ADA guidelines were seldom met. This lack of compliance not only prevents the access and participation of people with disabilities at those venues, but also provides strong legal claims to those affected by such lack of compliance to the law (Appenzeller, 2005; Cotton & Wolohan, 2007). One can only hope that such lack of compliance is due to the fact that those venues were built before ADA legislation was enacted (Appenzeller, 2005; Cotton & Wolohan, 2007). Despite being able to receive tax breaks for making the necessary corrections to be compliant with the law (Appenzeller; Cotton & Wolohan, 2007), it appears that the schools choose to hide behind the age of their venues rather than to take action and become compliant with the law.

Other concerning issues identified were the lack of written criteria with which to evaluate coaches (17.2%) and actual evaluation of those educators (15%). Combined, these two issues expose high schools to potential negligence and contract liability (Appenzeller, 2005; Cotton & Wolohan, 2007; Doleschal, 2006). On one hand, coaches’ various negligent actions may cause major injury and loss to all stakeholders. Such losses can be prevented if coaches’ evaluation and training are truly executed and based on written criteria (Doleschal, 2006). On another hand, the lack of written coaches’ evaluation criteria and an evaluation process following such standards may also place schools in violation of contract laws, specifically when coaches’ have to be disciplined or terminated (Appenzeller, 2005; Cotton & Wolohan, 2007; Doleschal, 2006).

Safety training, AED accessibility, and warning signs were also identified as concerning issues. Lack of safety training for coaches and staff on a regular basis (20.6% of the respondents) may expose students and spectators to a wide range of risks of injury and loss (ranging from failure to warn and equipment malfunction, to poor response to catastrophic injuries) that could be easily prevented with appropriate training (Doleschal, 2006). The absence of easily accessible AED equipment (reported by 21.4% of the respondents) adds to the major liability claims that certainly will come as a consequence of poor response to catastrophic injuries (Appenzeller, 2005). Lack of proper signage (reported by more than 50% of the respondents) may also expose students and fans to unnecessary risks and generate costly lawsuits against the schools. It is the schools’ duty to warn spectators and participants of potential risks involved in the activity through all means possible (i.e., verbal warnings, signage, and public announcement system) (Blumenthal, 2009; Girvan & Girvan, 1993; Lee, Farley & Kwon, 2010). Under any of these circumstances above, schools may be held liable.

The third goal of this study was to identify if there is any relationship between athletic directors’ experience and existence/enforcement of risk management plan practices. No significant relationship was found between experience and the existence of risk management plans. Such a result was expected, considering that the existence of a risk management is too important in preventing injury and loss at any institution to depend on the athletic director’s experience (Appenzeller, 2005; Cotton & Wolohan, 2007; Doleschal, 2006). However, significant associations were found between experience and the adoption of risk management practice variables. More experienced administrators (11 or more years) had higher odds of conducting coach evaluations, having evaluation criteria, risk management enforcement, and hazard abatement among their adopted risk management practices than administrators with less experience. The existence of such associations is not surprising. It is reasonable to expect that the experiences acquired through years on the job would lead administrators to the adoption of these best practices.

The use of written evaluation criteria and coaches’ evaluations may be a result of years of experience dealing with (either by themselves or by learning from others’ struggles) injuries, property loss, and financial loss suffered due to the lack of written evaluation criteria, and coaches’ evaluations. The existence of an enforced risk management plan and timely hazard abatement seem to be related to experience as well. By assigning the enforcement of the plan to a staff member, the administrator not only promotes injury and loss reduction, but also ensures that the plan is updated as venues and policies related to the athletic department change (Appenzeller, 2005). Regarding hazard abatement, experienced administrators know their facilities very well, including their maintenance history. Such knowledge should allow those administrators to treat hazards even before they appear, contingent to budget availability (Appenzeller, 2005).

As mentioned above, the fact that significant associations were found between experience and four of the risk management practice variables (coach evaluation, evaluation criteria, risk management enforcement, and hazard abatement) is not surprising. Intriguing is the fact that the other risk management practices did not present a similar relationship. One possible explanation is perhaps experience is less of a factor in adopting the practices that did not show a significant relationship. Another possible explanation is less experienced administrators may feel either uncomfortable or unprepared to conduct coaches’ evaluations, develop evaluation criteria, enforce a risk management, and/or deal with hazard abatement.

Recommendations for Future Research

The results of this study revealed that a significant percentage of high school athletic departments surveyed either do not have or do not enforce a risk management plan. It would be interesting to conduct a qualitative study among various state high school associations to learn their perspective on the situation and their perceived reasons for such lack of risk management plan existence and enforcement. To complement the study, athletic directors could be surveyed on their perceptions of the reasons suggested by the state high school associations’ leadership. After comparing the results from both groups, a list of potential actions to help increase risk management development, implementation and enforcement could be composed.

Conclusions

The present study demonstrated that interscholastic activities could be conducted with the support of risk management plans in a larger number of high schools. There is a significant amount of interscholastic athletic departments where risk management plans are either nonexistent or unenforced. A large majority of respondents seem to be employing risk management best practices consistently, but there is an indication of a less than desired level of adoption of some practices (i.e., informed consent forms, pre-season sport specific meetings, ADA compliance, coach evaluation and written criteria, safety training, AED’s accessibility, and warning signs). It also appears that the athletic directors’ years of experience plays a role in the adoption of certain risk management practices (coach evaluation, evaluation criteria, risk management enforcement, and hazard abatement), but (surprisingly) not to the adoption of other similarly important practices. It is the researchers’ hope that the evidence presented here opens the athletic directors’ minds to the importance of the adoption of a risk management plan as possibly the only reliable way to minimize loss to athletes, spectators, and institutions.

Applications in Sport

The results presented in this study are valuable to those in leadership positions at any high school in the United States. High school principals and athletic directors armed with this information would be able to (1) adopt and enforce a risk management plan, if they do not have/enforce one; and (2) review their policies and practices related to risk management and adjust them to industry standards. Other benefits to institutional leaders include the ability to provide athletes and spectators with a safer experience, and to reduce the risk of athletes’ injuries. These benefits will consequently help minimizing legal claims against high schools and their officials.

Tables with Captions

Table 1

Percent of Administrators Engaging in Risk Management Practices on a Regular Basis

Category Practice Percentage
Policy and Procedure Title IX Requirements are met 95.70%
State HS Athletic Assoc. rules are followed 99.00%
Athletic Activities are fully covered 93.30%
Participants sign sport-specific consents 89.50%
ADA requirements are met at venues 88.70%
Pre-season sport-specific meetings with parents 86.40%
Supervision and Evaluation Evaluate coaches on regular basis 82.80%
Written evaluation criteria to evaluate coaches 85.00%
AD attends home athletic contests 96.80%
Coaches are certified/qualified in sport they coach 91.10%
Dedicated person responsible for risk plan enforcement 81.90%
Safety Medical emergency procedures exist 97.50%
Emergency safety training provided to coaches and staff 79.60%
AEDs are easily accessible at athletic events 78.60%
Identified hazards are repaired properly and timely 93.80%
Adequate equipment is provided for athletic activities 98.60%
Venues and equipment are inspected regularly 93.50%
Adequate game security is provided 93.90%
Safe transportation is provided for away contests 97.00%
Venues have visible risk warning signs 46.90%

Table 2

Chi-square analysis of Administrator Experience (>11 years vs. 11 or more years) and Risk Management Practices

Category Practice χ2 value p value
Policy and Procedure Title IX Requirements are met .199 .726
State HS Athletic Assoc. rules are followed 2.905 .088
Athletic Activities are fully covered 1.008 .315
Participants sign sport-specific consents 2.216 .137
ADA requirements are met at venues .956 .328
Pre-season sport-specific meetings with parents 2.733 .098
Supervision and Evaluation Evaluate coaches on regular basis 12.75 <.001*
Written evaluation criteria to evaluate coaches 5.37 <.05*
AD attends home athletic contests .139 .710
Athletic activities are supervised .034 .854
Coaches are certified/qualified in sport they coach .001 .970
Dedicated person responsible for plan enforcement 5.30 <.05*
Safety Medical emergency procedures exist 3.116 .078
Emergency safety training provided 2.430 .119
AEDs are easily accessible at athletic events .011 .916
Identified hazards are repaired properly and timely 5.15 <.05*
Adequate equipment is provided for activities 1.619 .203
Venues and equipment are inspected regularly 2.261 .133
Adequate game security is provided 1.908 .167
Safe transportation is provided for away contests .485 .133
Venues have visible risk warning signs .203 .652

* Significant relationship

References

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Corresponding Author

Mauro Palmero Ph.D.
Sport Management Graduate Coordinator
East Tennessee State University
Department of Kinesiology Leisure and Sport Sciences
P.O. Box 70654
Johnson City, TN 37614
palmero@etsu.edu
423-439-4382

2017-08-03T10:47:34-05:00June 14th, 2012|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Coaching, Sports Facilities, Sports Management|Comments Off on Risk Management Plans: Existence and Enforcement at NIAAA Member High School Athletic Departments

As Goes The Spoils, So Go The Victories: Exploring Major League Baseball’s Playoff Bonus System

### Abstract

This paper explores the playoff bonus system used by Major League Baseball. The unique incentive structure used is positively related to organizational success, and is studied using a Grounded Theory methodology. Exploration and analyses found that World Series winning teams prospectively distributed ten percent (10%) more shares than losing teams and repeat winners distributed still more. By developing an incentive structure as an intermediate step in the performance environment and linking the bonus’s value to future performance, decision makers may be able to positively impact organizational outcomes – particularly over repeated periods.

**Key words:** Major League Baseball, bonus system, payment, incentives

### Introduction

In October of 2007, the Colorado Rockies baseball team made the news for two reasons. First, they won 20 games in the last month of the season to wipe out a six game deficit and make the playoffs. The team became media favorites as announcers told and retold the story of how a franchise with one of the lowest payrolls in the game eventually became World Series champions. Moreover, reporters lauded the fact that success came not through the actions of one or two superstars, but by working together. This second reason for the media’s attention was the Rockies players’ decision to award a full playoff share to the family of Mike Coolbaugh.

Mike Coolbaugh was a minor league coach in the Rockies organization whose tragic and untimely death occurred on July 22, 2007 when he was struck by a foul ball during a Tulsa Drillers baseball game. At the time, he was working as a first base coach for the Drillers: a Double-A affiliate of the Colorado Rockies. The value of the playoff share eventually grew to $233,505.18 and earned the team a ‘Sportsman of the Year Award’ nomination from Sports Illustrated (38).

The purpose of this paper is to explore and explain the historical dynamics of the Major League Baseball’s (MLB’s) playoff bonus distribution system. That high performing teams’ members would be willing to sacrifice some of their own potential earnings to support their organizations’ staff members is, on the face of it, contrary to the ‘self-interests explanations’ (SIE; 14) commonly used in management, economic, and sociology theories’ literatures. Instead, it is more akin to a transformational leadership style commensurate with higher levels of organizational identification (30).

A Grounded Theory approach is used and a three-phase of the research methodology outlined by Schollhammer (43) – a relationship between share distribution and outcomes were hypothesized, an assessment of available data in the historic record was conducted, and the outcomes were evaluated based on current theories – are described. Both working managers and academic researchers can use the approach used herein to study the organizational phenomenon that commonly arise in Sport.

#### New Contribution

The paper makes two contributions managers can use to study and improve their organization’s performance. First, we present the MLB system as a case for exploring alternative frameworks for financial incentive structures. In particular, the roles of players’ decisions, rather than managers’ contributions (44), in influencing organizational success. Second, we analyze historic data, testing hypotheses developed using the grounded theory approach, to assess how patterns in share distribution practices are related to organizational performance outcomes.

For management researchers, MLB has offered a fertile empirical test bed. With the availability of data sets sometimes spanning over 100 years, baseball provides a natural experiment through which organizational behavior can be studied. In this case, we analyze the bonus system framework that can be explored in relationship to other more widely used approaches using controlled experimental designs that rely on the availability of data (44). Once completed, such research can provide decision-makers the ability to engage in a strategic process of setting appropriate performance indicators similar to those used in the “Moneyball” approach to player selection (49).

The background presented here follows an inductive/deductive processes used to study phenomenon where event timing is a critical element in the outcomes of interest. First, a brief description of the analytic strategy is given. Second, the historical context of MLB’s playoff bonus system is described. Next, data drawn from the MLB’s records is analyzed. Third, a theory is generated to explain the bonus system employed in baseball. Finally, we discuss the implications of timing in the development of incentive systems.

#### Background

Suddaby (48) both defined and outlined the use of Grounded Theory. Grounded Theory is as an approach positions phenomena as embedded in context that provides meaning that is often missing in traditional research. In other words, in the traditional model a researcher builds a hypothesis, constructs or identifies sources of data to test that hypothesis, and then tests that data to either support or reject the proposition developed. Suddaby argued that to do so ignores the perspective of the “actors” whose behaviors the data presupposes to study. Without exploring the intent of the actors, findings may be misrepresentations of the data. Further, to ignore the perspective of the actors is to ignore potential new theoretical lines of inquiry that emerge from their explanations.

The use of Grounded Theory in any context should then be defended as appropriate. Grounded Theory is most suited to efforts to understand interdependent processes, one where actors engage in an inter-subjective experience (48). The methodology is more effective when it considers extended time periods and when the relationships observed in the initial instance of the phenomenon are found to exist in other times or settings (16). Finally, the use of Grounded Theory is focused on how subjective experiences can be abstracted into theoretical statements about causal relations between actors.

Finally, it should be noted that individuals engaged in Grounded Theory research have an especial duty to explain the qualitative motivations in the research. As Grounded Theory should begin with a discussion of the data and then move to an exploration of the qualitative factors that directed inquiry, such an approach is often subjugated to the needs for traditional presentation forms for the sake of clarity – involving the presentation of a theoretical overview. In this paper, a three-step approach to exploring the phenomenon’s key elements and their relationships is employed, based on the strategies for sensemaking proposed by Langley (29). Collectively, the three phases of research used to understand the observed phenomenon – Describe, Analyze and Theorize – are referred to as the ‘DAT’ methodology. This method is particularly useful when data is temporally embedded in events rather than simple variables.

In the first phase, Define, a common narrative is developed from the process data based on unique instances of the phenomenon. The Define phase seeks to outline the context in sufficient detail from the actors’ perspective. Such an approach is requisite to assist in the narrowing of the theoretical frame for the study. Put another way, while many explanations are possible, they can be further limited by the context of the actors in situ.

The second phase, Analyze, focuses on the construction and execution of an analytic approach through which data on the dynamics identified in the Define phase are both gathered and processed in a manner that allows for simultaneous classification, to reduce complexity, and hypothesis driven statistical examination. These first two approaches are used to envelop and specify the phenomenon’s characteristics from both ends of the inductive research spectrum.

The final phase provides for the opportunity for Theory building based on an understanding of context and an assessment of data on the phenomenon being studied. Here, an alternative approach to sensemaking is used where different theoretical perspectives are applied in a deductive manner to determine how the phenomenon is best explained. The remainder of the paper follows the DAT format for investigating the incentive system used by MLB.

#### Phase 1: Describing the Phenomenon with Narrative

Groves argues that team dynamics are at play when “the decision makers base their decision choices on different information, yet are motivated by a common goal (19).” Further, Groves also notes that employee behavior may be more accurately analyzed in terms of the compensation they receive from the organizations for their participation in it. There are three features of the MLB Playoff bonus system that depart from most incentive and reward programs used by professional firms – the process of valuation, control and criteria.

Valuation addresses the resources set aside for the purposes of creating an incentive structure. In the broader business context, valuation is often a function of organizational history. The amount of resources set aside for the purpose of incentive distribution is not uniform as organizations specify the parameters on a case-by-case basis. Valuation can be understood not only in terms of how much, but also in terms of when the establishment of the specific value takes place. Further, valuation speaks not only to the pool of available resources for such incentives, but whether that pools is absolute or relative to firm performance.

For instance, an organization may have developed a practice of setting aside 10 percent of pre-tax profits for the purpose of distribution by management. For instance, an organization may decide that it sets aside 25 percent of any profit for distribution whereas another might only set aside that 25 percent if the organization exceeds last year’s profit levels. Additionally, organizations may simply allocate a fixed sum once a specific objective or subjective threshold is accomplished, for example, when the organization’s profits exceed 10 million dollars, one million is put into the profit sharing pool.

The second feature of bonus financial incentive systems is control. In this context, control speaks to the authority that allocates the bonus dollars. In most cases it is facilitated through the management structure. Control may be facilitated both directly and indirectly. Direct control is exercised when management evaluates individual performance to determine the degree to which an individual should be rewarded using the incentive pool. Indirect control is exercised when the organization codifies in contracts that specify the conditions under which an individual has a right to access the pool. For the most part, this process is considered a management responsibility.

Finally, the issue of criteria addresses the constraints and rules associated with participation in the pool. Organizations may, for instance, develop a pool for the sales staff. Such a pool is often aligned with compensation schemes to recognize high performers and represent constraints on the criteria for participation. Other organizations may create committees whose task it is to determine which employees meet the criteria for inclusion in the pool.

##### The Players’ Bonus in MLB

The bonus incentive model in MLB has an unusual scheme in that the system of valuation and control are far from the norm. Additionally, the criteria for distribution diverge from many bonus systems. To understand the formalization of this incentive structure, it is necessary to describe how the value of a share is calculated. We shall do so here in the order in which events happen so as to make specific points about the nature of what is both known and unknown at that point in the process.

##### Identifying the phenomenon’s key constructs

In 1903 the National Agreement united the American and National Leagues. This agreement created the World Series and stipulated that a portion of the playoff series gate receipts go directly to the participating teams’ players. At the time, prior to major radio or television contracts, the gate represented a significant portion of most teams’ total revenue. Therefore, the bonus system was a major revenue sharing scheme well ahead of its time (40). Further, the bonus system’s design and longevity are both rarities in the modern industrial era.

MLB has a playoff reward program and players on winning teams can earn substantial bonuses. Under the MLB playoff structure implemented in 1995 (the current system allows for three divisional champions and one ‘wild-card’ in each league), the players pool (P*) is comprised of 60 percent of the gate receipts from the first three rounds of the Division Series and 60 percent of the gate receipts from the first four rounds from the League Championship Series and World Series across the entire playoff contest. By only using the gate from the initial games, the formula presented in equation 1 does not incentivize the extension of the series. These receipts are divided as team shares among 12 clubs using a performance multiplier (MT) that escalates as the team progresses further in the playoffs, described in Table 1. The team share (PT) is then the fraction of the players’ pool that is available to divide among players.

**equation goes here**

This dynamic represents the first divergence from traditional bonus models. In MLB, the valuation process is prescribed but disjointed. Specifically, equation 1 specifies the value of the MLB players’ pool (P*), making it clear which teams are eligible for participation at the front, and allowing teams to estimate, based on historic trends the value associated with different performance outcomes. Individual team’s payouts escalate as they progress further in the playoffs with the World Series Champion getting the largest sum as prescribed by both Table 1 and equation 2. In 2006, the Players’ pool was $55.06 million and the St. Louis Cardinals took the lion’s share of $20.2 million (36 percent) by winning the World Series. That equates to $300,000 per player on the World Series winning team.5 (See Table 1)

At this point, a second divergence occurs from traditional models along the issue of control. In most cases the control of bonus dollars resides in management, however in the case of MLB, only players may allocate a portion of the players pool and they may do so in any manner they wish. This dynamic is significant in two ways. First, management has no ability to control the distribution of shares. Second, the distribution of shares occurs before the beginning of play in the post season. In other words, the employees create a system to allocate future performance-based earnings using a fractional system based on the concept of a “share” (Vs) as described in equation 3.

_Sporting News_ writer Todd Jones, a former MLB pitcher, notes that only players who have been on the roster the entire season are given a say in the allocation of shares. Players taken off the rosters for an extended period of time are generally not eligible to vote, and all players eligible to vote are all given a single share. The meeting then does not focus on the shares allocated to those in the room, rather it focuses on the shares to be allocated to those not in the room, and several players note that these meetings can become quite heated. Players often create “fractional shares” or simple “cash awards” (A) to recognize the work of auxiliary personnel. Because the allocation allotted to the team is fixed, every additional share authorized reduces the relative value of each player’s share. Additional discussion about the meaning of shares will be addressed in the next section. (See Table 2)

In summary, the MLB system of playoff shares provides a unique perspective into a system with a long history that is framed in such a way that empowers plays by giving them both control and allowing the players to determine the criteria. These decisions have an effect on valuation that is related to both performance and the share distribution decisions of the organization’s players. Each additional share distributed by the players reduces the value of the share each rostered player receives.

##### The meaning of a share

The authors were unable to secure interviews through the Major League Baseball Players Association. As a result, the need to explore what these shares meant to the players was critical to our DAT approach. Using Lexus-Nexus, the authors retrieved all news stories available on the service since 1980 using the search terms “playoff shares” and “baseball.” These 691 articles were then reviewed for the purpose of identifying what a share meant to the players. From those articles, duplicates were removed and articles outside of scope, as in the case of stories focusing solely on the value of the share as determined after the World Series or commentary provided by the writer. The remaining data was further segmented into direct quotes and evidence-based commentary whose origin was the players and their share deliberations.

Clearly players would forgo the value of a playoff share for the World Series title, but the underlying message was that the bonus is considered to be very significant and given in recognition of time served on the roster rather than performance of a specific player. For instance Astros General Manager Tim Purpura was quoted as saying, “The players that are on the roster as of June 1 typically get a full share… any players who were (on the roster) part of the season, they get voted on (by the players) (32).” A similar sentiment was made by the players of the Boston Red Sox who gave partial shares or cash rewards to anyone who wore the uniform, as well as a number of front office staff (24).

However, because the players make the decision according to their own preferences, time is no guarantee of a share. The players of the Toronto Blue Jays awarded former Chiefs outfielder Rob Ducey a small fraction of a share (16%), which was far less than others like Tom Lawless (59%), Rob MacDonald (25%), Mike Flanagan (20%) and Tom Quinlan (17%) even though Ducey was on the team longer than the other players (33).

Players have seen the exercise of their rights over the control of the playoff shares as a form of power. In 2002 the hitters in the San Diego Padres were so impressed by the work of one of the minor league coaches that they were able to “finagle” him onto the major league roster. He quit his job as a minor league coach but replaced it not only with a six-figure salary but a full playoff share after the Padres reached the World Series (7). Additionally, in 1996 the playoff shares were at times withheld from those crossed the picket lines. Mike Busch failed to receive a playoff share from the rostered players, despite a direct plea by then manager Tommy LaSorda. “What matters is the name on the front of your shirts, not the name on the back,” (17).

The dynamics inside these team meetings were noted as potentially contentious. Baltimore manager Johnny Oates, a former player, commented that he never liked team meetings but he did enjoy splitting up the playoff shares at the end of the year (22). A day after clinching the American League Western Division title, California Angels’s Rod Carew stormed out of a Sunday meeting in which the Angels decided how to divide playoff shares and World Series money among themselves. Carew would say only, “Money does strange things to people.” Carew, a native of Panama, apparently interpreted the decision to offer two Latino pitchers a half-share as discriminatory and angrily left the meeting. Reggie Jackson and Doug DeCinces were reported to have tried to restore the peace, but were unsuccessful (45).

Interestingly, the 1991 story of Dave Pavlas, Matt Howard and Dale Polley stood out in that it was the single instance where management, in this case George Steinbrenner of the New York Yankees, gave individuals each a check for $25,000 and a 1996 World Series ring, when the players voted to give them nothing. Steinbrenner also traded the primary force behind the decision to withhold the share, Jim Leyritz, the following day (4, 42).

Another ongoing commentary by the players is the financial value of a share for younger players. A few players identified the impact of a share on people who worked to create a winning team. In 1991 Norm Charlton of the Cincinnati Reds said, “You get two things for winning the World Series – a ring and our playoff shares.” He pointed out that for many of the younger players, the value of a share was the only recognition they received for winning a division or league championship. Further, he argued that the amount given was substantial relative to the salaries earned by some rookies (6).

Additionally, in organizations that traded players midseason, the players used shares to recognize these individuals’ contributions, even after having left to work for another competing organization. In 2004, the Boston Red Sox voted Nomar Garciaparra to receive a full share even though he was traded to the Chicago Cubs (18). When infielder Jeff Cirillo was released from the Minnesota Twins to the Arizona Diamondbacks, his final message was, “Good luck, and don’t forget about the old guy in the playoff share meeting” (34). This was again the case when the Florida Marlins players voted to give Pat Rapp of the San Francisco Giants a full playoff share for his contribution to the team before his trade (1).

In 2009, Major League Baseball (MLB) reported that the players for the Milwaukee Brewers offered former manager, Ned Yost, one of the Brewers 48 full postseason shares. The firing of Ned Yost marked the first time in major-league history — except the strike-split 1981 season — that a manager was fired in August or later with his team in playoff position. In their press release, MLB quoted an unnamed player who said “There are unwritten rules about how to do things, and it was the right thing to do. If you’re there more than 50 percent of the season, you’re pretty much getting a full share.” That same year, Nick Adenhart was killed in a car accident hours after starting as a pitcher for the Angels franchise. The Angels players voted to provide the late pitcher’s family a full share.

In summary, we found that players expressed a clear understanding of the diminishing return of the effect of the issuance of additional shares, that issues of equity, fairness and a sense of team spirit was a consistent theme, and that shares were also an expression of power by the players that could be exercised to make individuals feel either included or excluded. The series of events and decisions made by the Colorado Rockies described at the paper’s outset served as the impetus for the study at hand. However, it is clear that players use shares to recognize efforts of non-players as well as remediate perceived slights by management. While other teams have engaged in similar behaviors, none received the widespread coverage that the Rockies’ gesture did, in no small part because of their successful run to the World Series. The authors speculated that differences in share distribution patterns between teams might predict playoff series’ outcomes.

##### Shares and their relationship to outcomes

Emergent in this discussion is the idea that playoff shares can serve as an incentive for teams. Further, the structure involves an intricate timing that alters the manner in which the share itself is perceived. Table 1 speaks to the steps associated with the valuation, control and criteria used in share calculations. An initial component of evaluation is assigned in the securing of a place in the playoffs. At that point, team members know they are eligible for a share, however the specific value of that share remains unknown as it is based on future team performance. Rather than making the decision after the fact, the meeting that sets the criteria occurs place before any of the playoff series are played. This means that eligibility for a share is established before the value of that share in absolute terms is known. What is known is the value in relative terms.

The baseball system creates certainty around a payout whose value is unknown. While this may be a small point, it is a significant one. The implication of increased information provides short-term certainty other recognition systems often fail to provide. In 2008, 21 percent of all MLB players were paid less than $400,000, and the median payroll for a player was $1 million dollars. A playoff share will constitute a significant bonus for most of MLB players. For non-uniformed players, a share can triple or quadruple an annual salary.

The playoff shares system is distributed based on a criterion of past performance, where the control resides at the professional level to recognize peer performance, and creates a value that is based on future performance. Therefore, the major hypotheses are designed to explore share distribution and winning the World Series.

Hypothesis 1: Winners of the World Series will distribute significantly more playoff shares than teams that lose the World Series.

The expansion of the playoffs in 1995 provides a second period with potentially greater variability in the share distribution–playoff outcome relationship. With more teams in the playoffs over more rounds, the inference that distributing more shares is related to performance can be tested more rigorously. Therefore, the additional hypothesis is:

Hypothesis 2: Since 1995, Winners of the World Series will distribute significantly more shares than teams that lose the World Series.

It is posited that winning teams will distribute more shares. It stands to reason that players across the league will either implicitly or explicitly internalize this information. As a result, the number of shares distributed on average should increase over time. Therefore, another hypothesis arises:

Hypothesis 3: Baseball teams making the playoffs will distribute more shares over time.

It is possible to further explore the learning phenomenon by focusing on the teams that repeatedly make the playoffs. Having the firsthand experience assessing the playoff bonus – performance outcome relationship, teams that have won previously will seek to ensure their competitive advantage by increasing their distribution disproportionately. Therefore, the following hypothesis is made:

Hypothesis 4: World Series winning teams will distribute disproportionately more shares over time.

Based on this series of hypotheses, the Analytic Phase of the DAT process was undertaken.

### Methods

Baseball has been the subject of many empirical studies. One reason for the large number of studies is the availability of reliable and valid data on player demographics, performance outcomes, pay rates and incentives. Rottenberg (41) explored the market factors of the baseball labor market . A second reason for the interest in baseball’s statistics is the stability of the sport over time allowing players from various eras to be compared with some fidelity – the ‘dead ball’ and ‘steroid’ eras not withstanding.

With respect to compensation, Kahn (26) explored the relationship between managerial quality and salary. However, most of the studies to date have generally focused on baseball as a market phenomenon (5, 12, 13, 28, 35, 39). There have, to date, been few, if any, studies that have looked at the playoff shares incentive structure as described herein.

Using data publicly available on the number and value of World Series shares issued going back to 1903, the researchers tested the hypothesis that teams that were more egalitarian in the distribution of shares to non-uniformed players would be more successful. Because, within a year the size of teams should be relatively comparable, a simple different t-test was employed on the number of shares winning teams distributed prior to the start of the playoffs and the number of shares that the losing teams distributed. As only World Series shares were available from MLB, this hypothesis could only focus on winners and losers of the final series, and not on any of the championship and pennant races that allowed a team to compete in the final series. Based on the meaning behind shares, we argue that the differences within a single season can be attributed to shares allocated to players that played an incomplete season and auxiliary staff.

A second data gathering exercise focused on the playoffs that occurred after the introduction of the wild card in 1995. Wild card teams are ineligible for shares unless they win their division. Because this change to the system created new dynamics, we focused on the almost 30 years of data that emerged since that time. Again, data on shares were gathered from publically available data sources, including but not limited to MLB, _U.S. News and World Report_, and the Associated Press.

Analysis of the data was conducted using SPSS 17. Hypotheses 1-4 were tested using a t-test. This research involved the exclusive use of secondary data and as such was exempt research study per university institutional research board regulations.

### Results And Discussion

Phase 2: Analyses of the Available Data

Analyses of the relationship between World Series performance and playoff share distribution supports the assertion that winning teams are more egalitarian in their distribution of shares, authorizing more than their losing competition. Further, the dynamics of share distribution have been altered as the rules of the game have changed, most significantly with the initiation of free agency and the alteration to the playoff series’ format following expansions (23). Table 2 outlines the pattern of share distribution by franchise. (See Table 3)

Winning teams have historically been more generous (Hypotheses 1 is supported)

Over the 102 years of the World Series through 2006, we first calculated the difference in shares offered between winning and losing teams. Over that time period, winners distributed 88.93 more shares than losers, resulting in an average differential distribution of 0.872 shares for winning teams over losing teams (s = 3.65). The data supports the proposition that, within each year, winning teams offered more shares than losing teams (t = 2.407, p < 0.001). (See Figure 1)

Another way to look at the problem is to study the winner’s premium and compare it with the winner’s counter-premium. The winner’s premium is the number of shares issued by the winning team above what the losing team offered. For instance, when the winning and losing teams both issue 10 shares, an identical number of shares, neither is offered a premium. However, when the winning team issues 15 shares and the losing team issues 10 shares, the winner’s premium is said to be 5. The converse, the winner’s counter-premium exists when the winning team offers less shares that the losing team. The use of the term premium identifies the magnitude of the difference between winning teams that more distributive and those that are less relative to their competition. Figure 1 presents the winner’s premium/counter-premium in the form of a control chart where the y-axis is keyed to the standard deviation. Most statisticians would argue that the process only moves out of control in recent years, interestingly enough in a manner that coincides with the inauguration of the wild card rules of 1995. There is an additional anomaly that coincides with the expansion of MLB in 1965. (See Figure 2)

In the historic case, the winners’ premium has been 3.26 shares, based on 195.8 shares over 60 instances where the winner of the World Series is the team that has offered more shares. The winner’s counter premium has been 2.89, based on 102.2 shares over 38 instances where the winner of the World Series is the team that has offered more shares. Further, winners were 1.6 times likelier to have offered more shares than losers. When more generous teams won, they generally authorized 3.26 shares more than their losing competition. When the less generous team won, the difference between the winners and losers was actually smaller (2.7 shares).

Additionally, it should be noted that repeated appearance in the playoffs is related to salary. An analysis of shares authorized correlates to the payroll of the team (r2 = 0.26). However, it should be noted that making it to the playoffs multiple times does not necessarily correlate with higher salaries. A similar analysis was conducted by adding the frequency the team appeared in the playoffs for that same time period. In that case, the quality of the correlation dropped (r2adj=0.22).

Therefore, a minimum share distribution spread may exist before differential performance is realized. Therefore, we find that Hypothesis 1 is supported in both analyses.

Additionally, we focused on the distribution parameters since the baseball playoff series was restructured in 1995 through the most recent data available in 2008. The results in this case were not significant. Over that time period, winners distributed 0.74 more shares than losers, resulting in a negligible differential distribution of 0.05 shares for winning teams over losing teams (s = 5.53). In those same years, the winning team offered more shares as often as the losing team – six of twelve times the World Series were won by the organization offering the winner’s premium. However, further analysis of the data shows that the winner’s premium of these years was 6.05 and the winner’s counter-premium was 4.33. This provides some evidence that effect is relatively weak and that limiting the time to twelve years may have undermined the power of the analysis. Therefore, while Hypothesis 2 is not supported, there is counter evidence that may need further study.

Overall, in the historical model, winners were 1.6 times likelier to have offered more shares than losers. Further, when more generous teams won, they generally authorized 3.26 shares more than their losing competition. When the less generous team won, the difference between the winners and losers was actually smaller (2.7 shares). Therefore, a minimum share distribution spread may exist before differential performance is realized. This analysis limited to the World Series between the years of 1995 to 2008 found winners were as likely to have offered more shares than losers. Further, when more generous teams won, they generally authorized 6.05 shares more than their losing competition. When the less generous team won, the difference between the winners and losers was actually smaller (4.33 shares).

Teams have become more generous over time (Hypothesis 3 is supported). There has been a general trend to increase the number of playoff shares. On an annual basis, teams in the World Series have increased the average number of shares distributed annually by 0.31 (r2 = 0.78). Since 1995, the average number of shares authorized by teams in the World Series has increased 1.03 shares annually, with an Adjusted R-squared of 0.330. When that analysis is expanded to include the divisional champions for both the American and National League, the distributional structure does not change (1.10 v. 1.03 shares annually), but the explanatory factor is increased significantly (Adjusted R-squared = 0.61), suggesting that the increase is foundational and the diminished explanatory power can be attributed to the relatively small data set in the subset analysis. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is supported in both the full sample and the period from 1995 to 2008.

Repeat winners are still more generous (Hypothesis 4 is supported). Among World Series winning teams, there has been a consistent increase in the number of shares distributed on average. For every additional World Series a team has won in the past 1995 to 2008 period, teams offered an additional half-share (r2 = 0.32). Winning teams have developed a winning formula with respect to share distribution. Further, that players learn to forgo the initial temptation for engaging in SIE behaviors at the outset is important, but not predicted in most of the theories employed by management, economic and sociology researchers. Therefore, it would be beneficial to have a set of guiding principles prior to implementing such an incentive system; hence, the need for a theoretic exploration of MLB’s bonus system.

#### Phase 3: Theoretic Assessment of MLB’s Bonus System

The narrative and empirical evidence offer a new opportunity to explore the theoretic paradigms used to explain and create bonus systems that promote organizational missions. Issues of power, equity and pro-social behavior, and performance forecasting characterize playoff share distribution decisions and their positive impact on organizational outcomes. They also constitute decision-making in an environment where the motivation can range from purely self-serving (e.g., Self-Interested Economics (SIE) explanations) to completely egalitarian. With respect to SIE motivations, Principal-Agency is the most widely used model for exploring compensation issues in organizations – Principal-Agency Theory (8). At the other end of the spectrum is Equity Theory that predicts the remuneration system will distribute shares across all participants at equal levels. The range of theories is explored from most self-interested to most egalitarian.

##### Alternative theory one – principal-agent theory

Bonus systems are often used as an extension of governance policies to promote congruence between principals’ and agents’ goals. Therefore, the topic of incentive-reward systems often arises in the economics’ literature as a search of Google Scholar using the term “bonus system theory” reveals. In particular, economics views such systems through the lens of contractual arrangements where an agent’s rationale behavior is to maximize their utility by fulfilling the contract and doing nothing more (50).

The limits and boundaries of agency theory lie in its model of human motivation. In the case of baseball, economic models based on the ‘rational’ or ‘economic man’ would suggest that the optimum distribution for the individuals (agents) acting on their own behalf would be to distribute a maximum of 40 full shares (47). Given that few if any teams go a full season without roster changes, the number of full share equivalents distributed should be less than 40 with only fractions given to individuals who have been on the roster for partial period.

The near-term financial incentives are for the empowered players to act in their own interest without consideration for non-uniformed stakeholders or players no longer on the roster. The reality is far from this. In 2006, players on each of the teams in the playoffs authorized the creation of 52.86 shares, on average. Therefore, the prima fascia evidence indicates that one of Agency Theory’s main tenets is violated by the bonus system used by MLB. Beyond the shortcomings of economic theories identified herein, other researchers have suggested that other organizational theories may have greater explanatory power (2, 50). In particular, they point to Stewardship Theory for addressing the egalitarian features of the bonus system used by MLB instead of Agency Theory (9, 10, 15, 50).

##### Alternative theory two – stewardship theory

Stewardship Theory describes a phenomenon where an agent’s goals are subordinated to a broader organizational or societal aims. Stewardship Theory assumes an individual’s decision model is ordered such that pro-organizational, collectivistic behaviors have higher utility functions than individualistic, self-serving behaviors. A steward protects and maximizes the organization’s collective wealth through superior firm performance, because, by so doing, the steward’s utility functions are maximized. Alternatively, the steward may calculate that working toward organizational, collective ends is the best trade-off between personal needs and organizational objectives. Hence, the utility gained from pro-organizational behavior is higher than the utility that can be gained through individualistic, self-serving behavior.

The main problem with Stewardship Theory, as it applies to MLB’s bonus system, is that incentive pay is antithetical to the primary model of behavior anticipated. From a Stewardship Theory perspective, how bonuses are used or distributed within organizations would have little influence on employees’ individual motivations to work hard toward organizational goals. Given players are earning a living wage, which is assured with the minimum pay agreed to through the Collective Bargaining Agreement, no other motivation than those intrinsic to the organization’s aims should be needed.

There is also objective evidence that Stewardship Theory is not applicable to MLB. In addition to the 1919 Black Sox scandal, a reference to game fixing by the Chicago White Sox, the widespread use of steroids more recently provide both specific and general examples that players are not fully vested stewards protecting the integrity of the game’s values and traditions. With respect to the latter, steroid use, not only have players cheated and skewed the on-field records, they have also lied repeatedly to cover their misdeeds, and have engaged in this behavior in what seems to be a collective mind rather than individual exception (37). The players were able to engage in this behavior for an extended period of time under the protection of their union’s collective bargaining agreement (46). While steroid use was widespread, and alleged to have been endemic to some teams, the difference between individual versus collective decisions may be explained using another pair of theories.

##### Alternative theory three – expectancy and equity theories

Psychological paradigms such as Expectancy and Equity Theories have been applied to organizational compensation questions and baseball in particular. These theories explore the positive versus negative aspects of individuals’ behaviors under pay-for-performance situations. There has been significant work in the area of equity and expectancy theories in baseball. Lord and Hohenfeld (31), Duchon and Jago (11), Hauenstein and Lord (21), and Harder (20) studied the performance of baseball players who were either free agents or had been through salary arbitration. This line of research has looked at the pay-for-performance question based on salaries, not collectively distributed bonuses. Further, a major reason for implementing a bonus system is to avoid the managerial transaction costs of micro-managing employees’ individual expectations and trying to equitably fulfill them. Indeed this is a major benefit of creating an incentive system controlled directly by the employees.

The teams’ distributions of playoff shares and performance outcomes allow for some inferences to be made with respect to Expectancy and Equity. In particular, the distribution of more shares could be equated to greater perceived equity, which in turn leads to improved performance. However, the distribution of more shares could be defined as egalitarian without any regard to merit with equal veracity. Therefore, expectancy and equity theory are problematic under the given circumstance for a manager wishing to take advantage of a program with a proven record of success in promoting organizational goals.

There are other theories that can be applied to MLB’s bonus system and other potential propositions arise from the results herein. Institutional Theory could be used to explain the increasing amount of shares being created as teams engage in a mimetic process based on the winners’ behaviors. Alternatively, human resources researchers might propose that there will be greater player retention among more egalitarian squads. Both of these lines of inquiry will require additional information that is best gained by going directly into the process.

### Conclusion

MLB’s playoff bonus system exhibits many desirable characteristics, but it does not conform to the most commonly used found in the design of such systems. It is important to reiterate the unusual features of the system. Shares have nominal value at the point they are issued, and gain in value as a team progresses through the playoff series by performing competitively. Allocations generally include some aspect of retrospective acknowledgement – shares are allocated to the people that the core players believe have worked hard to get their team to the playoffs, paid against a value defined by future performance. These people can be players, support staff, or managers. As a result, beneficiaries of shares have full information about the distribution of shares without knowledge of the value of those shares. However, because these shares are allocated prospectively, share recipients can alter behaviors in ways that maximize the value of those shares. In this respect, the system constitutes an incentive structure on a pay-for-performance basis.

The link between performance and reward distribution is one mechanism that management scholars have long advocated as an important motivational or demotivational tool (25). In particular, the use of group incentive plans are recommended when the group is small, team members are engaged in the same kind of work, the payment is clearly linked to the performance, the output depends on the workers, the operational cycle is fairly short, the bonus is substantial relative to standard pay, and there is an atmosphere of mutual trust between management and workers (3, 36). The MLB playoff bonus system is such an incentive plan and has been in existence since 1903. Further, it has an unusual feature in that the players determine playoff bonus share distribution, not only amongst themselves, but also to managers, trainers and other staff members in the organization.

The data from this analysis supports a bonus system that creates incentives for individuals that linked performance to outcomes in ways determined by the principal actors, but not actively managed by owners may support performance in substantive ways. Further, to the extent that such efforts are seen as egalitarian and recognizes the broader contributions of individuals on the margin, such distributions seem to support overall organizational success. Additionally, and maybe more significantly, this system defines the reward structures prospectively. While most players would consider winning the World Series the ideal outcome, this system creates process incentives in addition to outcome incentives. This represents a significantly different method for incentivizing outcomes. Most bonus systems are designed and allocated after the fact with little to no information given to the recipients of the reward.

MLB players have elected to distribute progressively more playoff bonus shares as time progresses. Therefore, there is some form of institutional knowledge accruing. Further, that teams with more experience distribute still more shares than their competitors is an indication that the feedback mechanism functions in a positive manner (27). Collectively, the hypotheses demonstrate the efficacy of MLB’s bonus system.

### Applications In Sport

The distribution of annual bonuses by professionals to themselves and other organizational members is a common feature of law practices, investment banking firms, consulting practices and some other closely held businesses. Bass suggests that group incentive plans are recommended under specific instances. In practice, these distributions are typically allocated retrospectively when the bonus pool’s amount is known using performance standards determined ex post facto. Generally, the professionals (e.g., partners) determining the distribution are the firm’s management.

Studying the distribution of World Series playoff shares provides a unique glimpse into an incentive scheme. The MLB Playoff Shares system uses a valuation system where non-managerial professionals determined share allocation a priori and the bonus amount is not assured, and the performance measure – winning the World Series – is absolute. The baseball model is a system where a bonus is structurally defined, controlled by the agents of the organization with the greatest direct ability to impact outcomes, and is retrospectively allocated but prospectively incentivizing. The incentive structure created is therefore both prospective and retrospective, and moreover, the timeline presents a short horizon to gain, addressing the common pool resource problem of long-term versus short-term feedback. Therefore, if the incentive scheme is an efficacious one, it may warrant broader adoption amongst other professionally led organizations seeking to improve their performance.

### Tables

#### Table 1
Performance Multiplier

Title Number Performance Multiplier
World Series Champion 1 0.36
League Champion (World Series Loser) 1 0.24
League Champion Series Runners Up 2 0.12
Division Series Runners Up 4 0.03
Second Place Finishers (Non-Wild Card Clubs) 4 0.01

#### Table 2
MLB’s Bonus System’s Design

Construct Definition
Between Team Pool Determination Formula-driven and invariant from year-to-year. System rewards teams, not individuals. Team’s payout varies based on how they finish in the playoffs.
Allocation Timing Share distribution is determined prior to share valuation.
Within Team (Work Group) Control Front-line employees – players – determine their own and staff members’ shares in an informal process designed to incentivize team aims.
Allocation Criteria Measurement models unknown. Only players that were on the roster the entire season have control of the bonus allocation. Rosters are expanded for the post season; therefore, some aspect of tenure likely plays a role. In addition, the large wage disparity between ‘star’ players and other organizational members may result in a premium on altruistic distribution schemes.
Valuation A share’s realized value is not known until the team’s season ends. Teams that perform better vis-à-vis other units receive progressively greater rewards.

#### Table 3
Share distribution by winning franchise, sorted by Average Share Premium (1903 to 2008)

World Series Championship Franchise Number of Wins Average Share Premium
Chicago White Sox 3 -5.83
Florida Marlins 2 -5.55
Minnesota Twins 2 -2.00
Atlanta/Milwaukee/Boston Braves 3 -1.87
Cleveland Indians 2 -1.20
Toronto Blue Jays 2 -1.10
St. Louis Cardinals 10 -0.88
Washington Nationals 1 -0.80
SF/NY Giants 5 -0.44
LA/Brooklyn Dodgers 6 0.37
Detroit Tigers 4 0.70
Oakland/Philadelphia Athletics 9 0.76
Anaheim Angels 1 1.20
Chicago Cubs 2 1.20
Cincinnati Reds 5 1.40
Pittsburgh Pirates 5 1.50
Baltimore Orioles 3 1.53
Boston Red Sox 5 1.95
Kansas City Royals 1 2.70
New York Yankees 26 2.73
Arizona Diamondbacks 1 3.00
Boston Americans 1 4.00
Philadelphia Phillies 1 4.45
New York Mets 2 6.20

### Figures

#### Figure 1
Premium/Counter-premium Control Chart (World Series: 1903 – 2008, y-units are 1)
![Figure 1](//thesportjournal.org/files/volume-15/459/figure-1.png “Premium/Counter-premium Control Chart (World Series: 1903 – 2008, y-units are 1)”)

#### Figure 2
Share distribution of Playoff Teams by Frequency of Participation (1995 through 2008)
![Figure 2](//thesportjournal.org/files/volume-15/459/figure-2.png “Share distribution of Playoff Teams by Frequency of Participation (1995 through 2008)”)

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### Corresponding Author

Eric W. Ford, MPH, Ph.D.
Forsyth Medical Center Distinguished Professor of Management
The University of North Carolina Greensboro
PO Box 26165
Greensboro, NC 27402
<ewford@uncg.edu>
Phone: 806-787-3267
Fax: 336-334-5580

2015-01-31T01:09:26-06:00April 9th, 2012|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Coaching, Sports Management, Sports Studies and Sports Psychology|Comments Off on As Goes The Spoils, So Go The Victories: Exploring Major League Baseball’s Playoff Bonus System

Throwing Techniques for Ultimate Frisbee

### Abstract

The goal of this study was to determine if certain throwing techniques for the sport of Ultimate Frisbee were advantageous relative to other techniques. The defense can attempt to force a thrower to utilize a specific throw; knowing the advantages of different throws can influence a defender’s decision to force the thrower to use a certain throw.

Motion capture was used to monitor the flight of a disc (Discraft Ultrastar 175g) for three throwing techniques. The two main groups of throws were backhand (BH) and forehand (FH) throws, with the forehand throws divided into a closed forehand grip (CF) and a split forehand grip (SF). Sixteen participants were recruited with experience ranging from 3 years to 8 years based on survey. Throws were analyzed with regards to linear velocity, angular velocity, precession, and accuracy. Players threw a total of 45 throws: five throws for all combinations of the three throwing techniques combined with three objectives: accuracy, maximum spin, and maximum velocity. The order of the nine throwing groups was randomized.

Throws were analyzed for linear velocity, angular velocity, precession, and accuracy. Linear velocity was calculated by measuring the distance traveled in the first 0.02 seconds of flight, and angular velocity was measured by calculating the time required for four unique points on the disc to complete one rotation. Precession was measured by calculating the average angular deviation from the average normal plane of the disc, and accuracy was measured by the distance between the center of the disc and the target at closest approach using a quadratic fit to the known flight path.

There was a very strong linear correlation between linear velocity and angular velocity. There was no difference in linear velocity between backhand and forehand throws, although the closed grip forehand had a higher linear velocity than the split grip forehand. Backhand throws had higher angular velocities than forehand throws for a given speed; there was no difference in angular velocity between closed grip and split grip forehand throws. Backhand throws had less precession than forehand throws, and there was no difference in precession between closed grip and split grip forehand throws. There were no statistically significant differences in accuracy between any of the throws.

These results show that backhand throws tend to have more spin and wobble less making the backhand a superior throw. Throws with less spin have greater instability; as a defender, forcing the thrower to utilize a forehand throw would result in a throw with less stability than a backhand throw. Forehand throws did not perform better than backhand throws for any category tested.

Additionally, new players are often taught that the split-grip forehand is a bad throw, and that the closed-grip forehand should be used instead. The results show that the split-grip forehand performs on par with the closed-grip forehand with the exception of maximum velocity. New players should not be discouraged from using a split-grip forehand while learning the mechanics of the forehand, as the only disadvantage is a slight decrease in maximum velocity.

**Key Words:** Forehand, Backhand, Flick, Frisbee

### Introduction

In the sport of Ultimate Frisbee, players use two primary throws: backhand and forehand. My hypothesis, from personal experience, is that backhand throws will wobble less, have less spin, be more accurate, and travel faster than forehand throws. The aim of this study was to determine if one throw had a comparative advantage with respect to linear velocity, angular velocity, precession, and accuracy. Also, the split-grip forehand is often thought of as an inferior throw relative to the closed-grip forehand. The closed-grip forehand is expected to outperform the split grip forehand.

Players must be able to utilize both throws as the defenders can force players to throw one way or the other by positioning their bodies on a certain side of the thrower. As a defender, knowing advantages and disadvantages of each throw can factor into defensive strategies to increase the chances of a disc being thrown with sub-optimal flight characteristics as a result of differing throwing techniques. This may cause a higher incidence of turnovers due to incomplete passes.

Previous research has shown that a disc thrown with less angular velocity will result in a throw with less stability (1). Therefore, whichever throw has higher angular velocities will be the more stable throw and will be more likely to reduce turnovers. The angular velocity of a disc in flight does not have a significant effect on lift and drag coefficients (2).

### Methods

#### Participants

Participants were recruited by open invitation to the St. Louis Ultimate Association and both the Washington University in St. Louis men’s and women’s club ultimate teams. Participants completed a questionnaire to determine experience and skill level. The skill level was a ten point scale with 1=Beginner, 4=Recreational, 7=Competitive college, and 10=Elite. Of the participants, 5 were placed in the ‘elite’ category and 11 were placed in the ‘non-elite’ category. Experience was divided into seven categories: 0-1 years, 1-2 years, 2-4 years, 4-5 years, 5-8 years, 8-15 years, and 15+ years (see Table 1). No participants were excluded from the study and all participants performed the same number of each test.

Testing occurred at the Washington University School of Medicine Human Performance Lab after the participant signed the IRB-approved informed consent form. No financial compensation was provided for participating in the study.

#### Data Collection

Data were collected using a Motion Analysis system consisting of six high-speed Eagle Digital Cameras at 250 Hz and Cortex software. Three cameras were located above and behind the thrower (relative to the direction of the throw) with one camera directly behind the thrower, and the other two cameras located a couple meters to either side. These cameras were focused on the latter portion of the throw. The other three cameras were located in the same arrangement, but above the target, and focused on the volume around the thrower. This set up provided the largest capture volume so the throw would be in view of at least two cameras at all times. Seven reflective markers were used. One marker was placed on the thumbnail of the throwing hand with one marker in the center of the disc and three markers placed approximately five inches from the center marker in a triangular formation. Additionally, one marker was placed adjacent to one of the perimeter markers to provide an asymmetric model. The final marker was placed on a target, used to evaluate accuracy. Participants stood approximately 2.5 meters from the target and net. Participants threw 45 total throws consisting of nine categories: Backhand Accuracy (BH_A), Backhand Spin (BH_S), Backhand Velocity (BH_V), Closed Forehand Accuracy (CF_A), Closed Forehand Spin (CF_S), Closed Forehand Velocity (CF_V), Split Forehand Accuracy (SF_A), Split Forehand Spin (SF_S), and Split Forehand Velocity (SF_V). The order was randomized for each participant prior to data collection. For each category, participants had two practice throws followed by three throws, which were used for analysis.

#### Variables

The following variables were calculated: linear velocity, angular velocity, precession, and accuracy. For each throw, data processing began when the marker on the disc closest to the thumb marker was 0.3 meters away from the thumb marker indicating the disc had left the thrower’s hand. Linear velocity was calculated by computing the distance traveled over the first 0.02 seconds (5 frames). Angular velocity was calculated by tracking the time required for five different pairs of markers to complete one cycle. A cycle began when one marker’s y-coordinate crossed the other marker’s y-coordinate. The cycle ends after the first marker’s y-coordinate crosses the second marker’s y-coordinate twice. The angular velocity was calculated by averaging the times for each of the five pairs. Precession was calculated by calculating the average angular deviation from the average plane of the disc. The angles were calculated by taking the cross product of two vectors defined by two of the perimeter markers and the center marker. Accuracy was calculated by measuring the closest approach of the projected flight path to the center of the target. The flight path projection was calculated using a quadratic fit to the known flight path.

#### Statistical Analysis

The data were analyzed using SPSS Statistics® and Microsoft Excel®. Two sample paired t-tests were used to compare different throws and two sample t-tests (assuming equal variance) were used to compare elite vs. non-elite players. The significant threshold employed was p < 0.05. Regression analysis was used to determine whether correlations existed between linear velocity and both angular velocity and precession. Since angular velocity varied by linear velocity, the ratio of angular velocity to linear velocity was used to determine which throw achieved the highest angular velocities.

### Results

#### Elite vs. Non-Elite

The only difference found between elite and non-elite players was the maximum speed of throws: elite players had higher maximum velocities than non-elite players. There was no difference in accuracy, precession, or angular velocity to linear velocity ratios. With the exception of maximum velocity, no differences were found between elite and non-elite players; as a result, throw comparisons included both elite and non-elite players (see Table 2).

#### Throw Comparison

No significant differences were found between backhand and closed grip forehand or backhand and split grip forehand velocities. Closed grip forehands were found to have higher maximum velocities than split grip forehands. Backhand throws had an average maximum velocity of 20.1 m/s, closed grip forehand throws had an average maximum velocity of 20.6 m/s, and split grip forehands had an average maximum velocity of 19.2 m/s.

Backhand throws were found to have a higher angular velocity / linear velocity ratio than both closed grip and split grip forehands by more than 4 RPM per meter per second. No differences were found in the angular velocity / linear velocity ratio for closed grip forehands vs. split grip forehands (see Figure 1).

When participants were instructed to throw for maximum spin, throws were found to have higher angular velocity to linear velocity ratios than throws for accuracy and velocity; differences of greater than 5.5 RPM per meter per second were found for all three grips (see Table 3).

No correlation was found between velocity and precession.

No differences were found in accuracy for backhand, closed grip forehand, or split grip forehand throws, with average distances varying by less than 0.03 meters (1.25 inches). Backhand throws were found to have less precession than both closed grip forehands and split grip forehands by more than 35%. No differences were found between closed grip forehands and split grip forehands (see Figure 2)

Strong linear correlations were found between angular velocity and linear velocity when considering throws for maximum velocity and accuracy. values of greater than 0.9 were found for all three categories.

### Discussion

This study has limits that should be taken into consideration. First of all, several of the subjects have learned their throwing techniques from the same group of players, so certain efficiencies or inefficiencies in technique may affect results. Secondly, all participants use a closed-grip forehand; closed-grip forehand throws have been practiced by the participants, whereas split-grip forehand throws have not been practiced. Additionally, participants were throwing in a room with expensive equipment; participants may have altered their throws to ensure they hit the net. Accuracy data may have been inconclusive because the target was located 2-3 meters from the thrower. Also, certain throws may be more accurate for shorter distances and less accurate for longer distances. Limitations of being in a confined space may have prevented any significant results related to accuracy. The cameras also had a difficult time of tracking the higher velocity throws (18+ m/s). As a result, flight paths had to be reconstructed from partial data.

Backhand throws appear to be superior to forehand throws due to the higher angular velocity (see Figure 1) and less precession (see Figure 2) than forehand throws. Morrison found that angular velocity increases the stability of the disc (1) as the angular momentum provides gyroscopic stability, so backhand throws should be more stable than forehand throws. There were no differences in maximum linear velocity or accuracy between backhand and forehand throws. The only difference between the two forehand throws was that closed-grip forehands were thrown faster than split-grip forehands (see Table 3). There were no differences in the angular velocity to linear velocity ratio, precession, or accuracy for split-grip and closed-grip forehands.

Angular velocity can be predicted accurately by knowing linear velocity and intent of throw (maximum linear velocity, angular velocity, or accuracy). No predictors of precession were found in the study.

No previous studies have compared flight characteristics of forehand and backhand throws.

### Conclusion

Based on the results obtained, it would be advantageous to force the opposing team to throw forehand throws. Doing so results in throws with less stability as a result of less angular momentum, and more precession. It is possible that lower angular velocity and higher precession could lead to a decrease in distance traveled and stability. Additionally, higher precession values could expose the disc to more drag, causing the wind to affect the throw more.

Based on the results for forehand throws, the only advantage to throwing with a closed grip is the maximum attainable velocity. By using a closed grip, participants did not show any improvement in angular velocity or precession. Thus, the only instance where a closed-grip forehand is advantageous relative to a split-grip forehand is when a player is trying to throw for distance.

The hypothesis that backhand throws would wobble less was shown to be true and that backhand throws would have less spin was shown to be false. The hypotheses that backhand throws would be more accurate and travel faster were not supported by any results.

Overall, it appears that it would be advantageous to force the offense to throw more forehand throws than backhand throws and new players should not be discouraged from learning to throw a split-grip forehand while learning throwing mechanics.

### Applications In Sport

From a strategic standpoint, teams can change defensive strategies to force the opposition to use an inferior throw. Additionally, new players can be taught advantages and disadvantages of different grips. New players are often taught that the split-grip forehand is inferior to the closed-grip forehand, although the only disadvantage of the split-grip forehand is the maximum speed of the throw. For new players, if the split-grip is more comfortable than the closed grip, they will achieve the same angular velocity and precession as a closed-grip throw.

### Acknowledgements

I would like to sincerely thank Dr. Jack Engsberg for making this research possible. He welcomed my research proposal with open arms, having nothing to gain from the study. Jack has a true passion for helping others and I am extremely fortunate to be one of the many persons he has helped. He has guided me through every step of the research process offering invaluable advice along the way. Jack, thank you for being an amazing mentor and great friend.

### REFERENCES

1. Morrison, V.R. (2005). The Physics of Frisbees. Mount Allison University Physics Department.
2. Hummel, Sarah Ann (2003). Frisbee Flight Simulation and Throw Biomechanics. Office of Graduated Studies of the University of California Davis.

### TABLES

#### Table 1
Participant Survey

Age Years Played Skill Level
22 4.6 8.1
(1.9) (2.5) (1.2)

**Note:** Standard Deviations appear in parentheses below the means.

#### Table 2
Comparison of Elite and Non-Elite Players

BH FH
Elite Non-Elite Elite Non-Elite
Maximum Velocity (m/s) 21.2 (3.0)** 17.7 (2.4) 20.7 (2.7)** 18.3 (1.5)
Accuracy (m) 0.24 (0.13) 0.33 (0.15) 0.25 (0.20) 0.32 (0.19)
Precession (degrees) 2.3 (1.5) 2.6 (1.1) 3.8 (2.0) 3.7 (1.8)
Angular Velocity to Linear Velocity Ratio (RPM per m/s) 44.1 (9.7) 48.0 (6.9) 38.9 (6.5) 38.1 (6.2)

**Note:** BH is backhand, FH is forehand.

** Denotes significantly different from non-elite (p < 0.05)

#### Table 3
Throw Comparison

BH CF SF
A V S A V S A V S
Maximum Velocity (m/s) 20.1 (3.2) 20.6 (2.6)^ 19.2 (2.5)**
Accuracy (m) 0.30 (0.14) 0.28 (0.18) 0.27 (0.21)
Precession (degrees) 2.4 (1.3)**^ 3.7 (1.7) 3.8 (2.2)
Angular Velocity to Linear Velocity Ratio (RPM per m/s) 40.2 (3.4)‡ 40.4 (2.9)‡ 47.8 (11.5)‡ 36.5 (3.1)†‡ 34.8 (2.1)‡ 43.8 (11.3)† 37.3 (2.8)†‡ 36.0 (2.5)‡ 42.9 (7.7)†
42.8 (7.9)**^ 38.4 (7.8) 38.7 (5.7)

**Note:** BH is backhand, CF is closed grip forehand, and SF is split grip forehand. A is accuracy, V is velocity, and S is spin.

** Denotes significantly different from CF (p<0.05), ^ Denotes significantly different from SF (p<0.05)

† Denotes significantly different from V (p<0.05)

‡ Denotes significantly different from S (p<0.05)

### Figures

#### Figure 1
Graph of Angular Velocity vs. Linear Velocity

![Figure 1](/files/volume-15/453/figure-1.jpg)

#### Figure 2
Graph of Precession vs. Linear Velocity

![Figure 2](/files/volume-15/453/figure-2.jpg)

### Corresponding Author

Jack R. Engsberg, PhD
Washington University School of Medicine: Human Performance Laboratory
4444 Forest Park, Campus Box 8505
St. Louis, MO 63108
<engsbergj@wustl.edu>
314 – 286 – 1632

### Main Author

Evan Winograd
Washington University School of Engineering and Applied Science
6985 Snow Way Drive Box 6861
St. Louis, MO 63130
<ewinograd@go.wustl.edu>
713-805-8609

### Author Bios

#### Evan Winograd
Evan Winograd is an undergraduate student studying Mechanical Engineering at the Washington University in St. Louis School of Engineering and Applied Science.

#### Jack Engsberg
Jack Engsberg is a Professor of Occupational Therapy and Neurosurgery at Washington University School of Medicine in St. Louis. His work in the Human Performance Laboratory focuses on rehabilitation for persons with disabilities including cerebral palsy, stroke, scoliosis, spinal deformity, spinal cord injuries, and amputations using high-speed motion capture systems, force plates, electromyography, and an isokinetic dynamometer.

2013-11-22T22:54:13-06:00January 5th, 2012|Sports Coaching|Comments Off on Throwing Techniques for Ultimate Frisbee

Acute Effects of Combined Elastic and Free-weight Tension on Power in the Bench Press Lift

### Abstract

The present study investigated the acute effects on power following the bench press exercise with a combination of elastic band and free-weights vs. free weight only. Eight college-aged males and females participated in this study. All 8 subjects were college track and field athletes that participated in throwing events. The participants performed two bench press training sessions that consisted of three sets of five repetitions. One session used a combination of elastic band (15% of total resistance) and free-weight exercise (85% of total resistance), while the other session consisted only of a free-weight exercise (100%). Power was measured twice at 50% of their one repetition maximum (1 RM) at the conclusion of each lifting session. Analysis via repeated measures Ancova (Treatment by Time covaried for gender) revealed a significant effect for Time (F= 5.951, p=0.05) and a significant two way interaction for Treatment*Time (F=54.093, p<0.001). The present investigation demonstrated an initial power measurement that was greater for the combined group rather than the free-weight only group. This information is potentially beneficial for many different groups of trainee’s.

**Key Words:** Elastic tension, Strength Training, Acute Training Effect

### Introduction

Recently, there have been a number of investigations that have assessed the impact of combined elastic band and free-weight exercise. These bands have been shown to provide predictable variable resistance when applied to free weight exercises such as the back squat and bench press (5,7). Exercise professionals are continually trying to discover novel ways to increase strength and power gains. Wallace et al. (12) demonstrated that power was acutely increased in the back squat exercise with the addition of elastic tension. It was suggested from this research that an 80% free-weight/20% elastic tension ratio might be optimal. Stevenson et al. (10) also found that the combination of elastic band and free-weight exercise during the back squat can significantly increase rate of force development. Experienced power lifters and strength and conditioning professionals have claimed elastic band resistance combined with traditional training produces strength gains for several years (4,8,9). Anderson et al. (1) demonstrated an increase in the bench press and squat exercise strength after training with the addition of elastic tension for an athletic population. In this study, the back squat 1-RM improvement was nearly three times higher for the combined group. In addition, the bench press increase was doubled for the combined group. Furthermore, the combined group’s lower body average power increase was nearly three times better than the free-weight only group. Anderson et al. (2008) used the 80/20 ratio that was suggested by earlier studies. Anderson’s study demonstrated that combined elastic band and free-weight exercise was a viable option to use to train experienced lifters. That study also demonstrated that the group using the combination exercise experienced slightly less resistance at the bottom of the movement when the joints may be under maximal stress in free-weight training. Thus, band training may also provide reduced risk in back squat and bench press exercises.

Triber et al. (11) concluded that the combination of elastic and free-weight exercise provided beneficial effects on strength and functional performance in college-level tennis players. The experimental group experienced significant gains in both internal and external rotation torque. That same study concluded that an elastic band training program strengthened the rotator cuff muscles of collegiate baseball pitchers (11). Band training has the unique ability to target specific muscles, which can be beneficial for numerous sports teams. Using a combination of elastic band and free-weight exercise can also mimic the strength curve of most muscles better. A muscle’s strength curve denotes the alteration in strength of that muscle during the entire range of motion in a certain movement (13). Along these lines, it has been reported that combined elastic and free-weight exercises provided greater force during the first 25 percent of the eccentric phase and last ten percent of the concentric phase of a lift as compared to free-weights alone (3).

Elastic tension has also been reported to impact the neuromuscular performance. Page and Ellenbecker (6) claim that elastic band exercise imparts a higher neuromuscular control resulting in improved balance, gait and mobility. As stated, the gains resulting from the combination of elastic band and free-weight exercise are abundant and the use of this treatment is growing among professionals; though the acute effects on power have yet to be documented. Therefore, the purpose of the present investigation was to determine how if at all, combined elastic tension applied to a normal bench press training session affects power.

### Methods

The present investigation was approved by the local institutional review board and employed a within subjects design, with random assignment. The participants gave informed consent prior to participating and included: four male (age: 20.5±2.1yrs, height:1.82±0.07m, weight: 112.68±15.03kg) and four female (age: 19.9±1.7yrs, height: 1.76±0.05m, weight: 100.78±28.47kg) college track and field athletes involved in the throwing events (shot put, discus, hammer). The participants performed in a counterbalanced within-subjects design, two bench press training sessions that consisted of 3 sets of 5 repetitions at 85% of their 1-RM. The athletes had recently undergone a 1-RM assessment as part of practice; which was supervised by the research team and the weight selected for the treatment was based on this assessment.

One session consisted solely of resistance provided by a standard Olympic barbell with plates, which equated to 85% of the athletes previously determined one repetition maximum, the second session consisted of combined resistance where 85% of 1 RM was derived from 85% tension provided by an Olympic barbell with plates and 15% provided by Elastic Bands (Jump Stretch Inc., Youngstown, OH.). The 85% free weight and 15% elastic tension treatment was based upon previous research performed in our laboratory that suggested that this was an appropriate split for effective training between the isotonic tension provided via free weight and variable resistance by the elastic bands (2).

Immediately after the training sessions, the participants were asked to bench press 50% of 1RM at maximum velocity, in order to generate the greatest amount of watts possible. The participants performed two lifts at 50% of 1RM after each treatment, separated by a rest period of 90 seconds. The two sessions were separated by a 72 hour wash out period as to avoid undo fatigue affecting the results. The order of treatment was randomized so that half the participants lifting under the combined elastic band and free weight condition went first, with the other half lifting in the free weight only condition went first. During the second visit the participants lifted under the other treatment.

Instruments

Power was measured twice, with a minimum of 90 sec rest between measurements at 50% of 1-RM, following the conclusion of both lifting sessions, using a Max Factor tether type potentiometer (Max Rack Inc, Columbus, OH.). This instrument demonstrated reliability in pilot testing with Intraclass correlations of greater than 0.99 on repeated measures testing.

Statistical Analysis

Results of the present investigation were analyzed via a treatment (Combined free-weight and elastic tension vs. free weight only) by time (attempts 1,2) repeated measures Ancova (covaried for gender). The inclusion of the covariate was necessary based upon the natural differences in strength that existed between the male and female athletes in the present investigation. All statistical tests were performed with the use of a modern statistical software package (SPSS ver 17.0 for Macintosh). The criteria for statistical significance was set a priori at alpha <0.05.

### Results

Intraclass correlation analysis suggested good reliability on all measures for the present investigation (>0.99). Analysis performed via repeated measures Ancova (Treatment by Time covaried for gender) revealed a significant main effect for Time (F= 5.951, p=0.05) and a significant two way interaction for Treatment*Time (F=54.093, p<0.001).

The subjects initial measurements of power immediately following the training session was higher in the combined elastic treatment (437.5+34.89 watts) as compared to the free-weight only condition (391.88+41.01 watts). (see Table 2)

### Discussion

The current study extended previous studies by using both male and female participants that were college track and field athletes. All 8 subjects were involved in throwing events and therefore trained regularly with resistance exercises such as a bench press with the involvement of both elastic and free-weight training. The present investigation revealed a differential response in power following training sessions that utilized combined elastic and free weight tension as compared to free weight only.

Affects have been seen with a combination of elastic band and free-weight tension in the past. Bellar et al. (2011) reported around a 5lbs increase in 1RM bench strength after only 3wks of training with a combination of elastic bands and free weights. Anderson et al. (2008) reported changes in power production with athletes who utilized a combination of elastic and free-weight tension. The current study builds upon these findings and notions by experts in the field (Mannie 2005, Simmons, 2007) who suggest adding elastic tension can have acute effects. Based upon these data, during the course of an upper body lifting session it appears that athletes are able to maintain more power when training with a combination of elastic tension and free-weights.

The recorded power was notably different between the sessions that used a combination of an Olympic barbell and an elastic band and those that only used an Olympic barbell. The difference between the two separate 50% 1-RM power assessments for the combination group was only 1 watt, while the difference between the free-weight only group was close to 46 watts. This finding is notable as the attempts post combined training were essentially identical, whereas the first attempt under the free weight only treatment was lower than the second by 46 watts. This suggests that the free weight only treatment may have acutely resulted in a reduction in power production capability that was washed out by the second attempt. The first power output between the two treatments differed by almost 35 watts. After the 90 second rest, the second power output of each group was extremely close, differing by 10 watts. The initial measurement of power following the training was higher for the group that performed the bench press with the combination of the elastic band and the free-weight, but the two different groups seemed to retain the same amount of power at the end. The overall results of the study suggest that in the immediate period following bench press training, athletes who use combined elastic and free weight tension will be better suited to activities that rely on greater power production, such as throwing a shot put. This finding is important as coaches often pair activities in complex training schemes.

### Conclusions

The present investigation has shed light onto the acute affects of combining elastic tension with free-weight exercise on power production in athletes. Further research should continue to explore the effects of power, strength, rate of force development, velocity, eccentric activity and neuromuscular stimuli when performing combination activities with both elastic band and free-weight exercises. It is plausible that given the data from the present investigation, chronic adaptations to training with elastic resistance in combination with free-weights may have been caused by lesser reductions in power during acute training sessions. If this acute effect does manifest in this fashion, then it would have ramifications as to the training volumes athletes utilize with this modality to gain maximum adaptations. The current research on the topic of combining elastic and free weight training is very limited and mostly focused on the back squat and bench press. Hence, investigations and applications on diverse exercises should be considered in forthcoming research.

### Applications In Sport

Based upon the present investigation, it would immediately appear at the conclusion of a training session that athletes retain more power production post combined elastic and free-weight training as compared to free-weight training alone. This information is potentially beneficial to professionals who work with athletes, as complex training is often incorporated into the program design. This form of training often involves the performance of a skill related activity post-resistance training bout.

### Tables

#### Table 1
Participant characteristics given in Means ± SD.

Gender Age (yrs) Height (m) Weight (kg)
Male (n=4) 20.5 ± 2.1 1.82 ± 0.07 112.68 ± 15.03
Female (n=4) 19.9 ± 1.7 1.76 ± 0.05 100.78 ± 28.47

#### Table 2
Watts Produced by Treatment and Attempt given in Means ± SD.

Treatment Attempt 1 (Watts) Attempt 2 (Watts)
Combined Elastic and Free-weight 426.5 ± 257.0 427.5 ± 229.2
Free-weight Only 391.9 ± 206.3 437.5 ± 242.6

### References

1. Anderson, C.E., Sforza, G.A., Sigg, J.A. (2008) The effects of combining elastic and free weight resistance on strength and power in athletes. Journal of Strength and Conditioning Research, 22(2), 567-574.
2. Bellar, D., Muller, M., Ryan, E.J., Bliss, M.V., Kim, C-H, Ida, K Barkley, J.E., Glickman, E.L. (2011) The Effects of Combined Elastic and Free Weight Tension vs Free Weight Tension on 1 RM Strength in the Bench Press. Journal of Strength and Conditioning Research, 25(2), 459-463.
3. Israetel, M.A., McBride, J.M., Nuzzo, J.L., Skinner, J.W., Dayne, A.M. (2010) Kinetic and kinematic differences between squats performed with and without elastic bands. Journal of Strength and Conditioning Research, 24(1): 190-194.
4. Mannie K. Strike up the band training, the benefits of variable resistance. (2005) Coach Athletic Director, 75, 8-13.
5. Neelly, K., Carter, S.A., Terry, J.G. (2010) A study of the resistive forces provided by elastic supplemental band resistance during the back squat exercise: a case report. Journal of Strength and Conditioning Research, in press. Epub ahead of print retrieved June 20, 2011, from <http://journals.lww.com/nscajscr/Abstract/2010/01001/A_Study_Of_The_Resistive_Forces_Provided_By.119.aspx>
6. Page, P., & Ellenbecker, T. S. (2005). Strength Band Training. In Strength Training with Elastic Resistance [Excerpt]. Retrieved from Farnsworth Group website: <http://www.champaign411.com/sports_fitness/excerpts/strength_training_with_elastic_resistance>
7. Shoepe, T.C., Ramirez, D.A., Almstedt, H.C. (2010) Elastic band prediction equations for combined free-weight and elastic band bench presses and squats. Journal of Strength and Conditioning Research, 24(1), 195-200.
8. Simmons, L. (2007, March 5). Advanced programs for beginners. In Elite Fitness Systems [Article]. Retrieved March 22, 2011, from Elite Fitness Systems website: <http://totalphysiqueonline.com/2007/03/05/advanced-program-for-beginners/>
9. Simmons, L. (2009, July 15). Training athletes vs. full meet powerlifters [Web log post]. Retrieved from <http://www.wannabebig.com/training/powerlifting-and-functional-strength-for-athletics/q-a-with-westside-barbells-louie-simmons/>
10. Stevenson, M. W., Warpeha, J. M., Dietz, C. C., Giveans, R. M., & Erdman, A. G. (2010). Acute effects of elastic bands during the free-weight barbell squat exercise on velocity, power, and force production. Journal of Strength and Conditioning Research, 24(11), 2944-54.
11. Treiber, F. A., Lott, J., Duncan, J., Slavens, G., & Davis, H. (1998, July). Effects of theraband and lightweight dumbbell training on shoulder rotation torque and serve performance in college tennis players. Am J Sports Med, 26(4), 510-15.
12. Wallace, B.J., Winchester, J.B., McGuigan, M.R. (2006) Effects of elastic bands on force and power characteristics during the back squat exercise. J. Strength Cond. Res., 20(2), 268-27.
13. Woodrup, J. (2008). Band Training for Explosive Vertical Gains. In Vertical jumping [Article]. Retrieved March 22, 2011, from Vertical Jumping website: <http://www.verticaljumping.com/band_training.html>

### Corresponding Author

David Bellar
225 Cajundome Blvd
Department of Kinesiology
University of Louisiana Lafayette
<dmb1527@louisiana.edu>

### Author Bios

#### Sara Prejean

Sarah Prejean is an undergraduate student studying exercise science in the department of kinesiology at the University of Louisiana at Lafayette

#### Lawrence Judge

Lawrence Judge is an associate professor and coordinator of the graduate coaching program at Ball State University. Dr. Judge has a long-established background in coaching track and field athletes and an extensive research background in coaching behavior, moral issues, and competitiveness versus participation in athletics, specifically in youth sports.

#### Tiffany Patrick

Tiffany Patrick is an undergraduate student studying exercise science in the department of kinesiology at the University of Louisiana at Lafayette

#### David Bellar

David Bellar is an assistant professor and director of the human performance lab in the department of kinesiology at the University of Louisiana at Lafayette. Dr. Bellar has a background in coaching track and field athletes, and researching performance attributes within this population.

2013-11-22T22:55:06-06:00January 4th, 2012|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Coaching, Sports Facilities, Sports Management|Comments Off on Acute Effects of Combined Elastic and Free-weight Tension on Power in the Bench Press Lift
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