ISSN: 1543-9518|Vol. 24

Marketing the Triathlete

Submitted by: Adam Epstein, South College

This article will explore the triathlon world and address issues that should increase the likelihood of securing product and financial sponsorship for the triathlete. Throw out the textbooks. Forget about product, price, place, promotion for now. The only way you will be successful in marketing an elite triathlete is to have as your client an exceptional triathlete who can win races (or consistently finish in the top three) and give exposure to companies’ products and logos. This is especially true in a bear financial market in which corporate budgets are tight. (There is debate in the triathlon community as to whether to use the world “elite” or “professional” to describe exceptional athletes; triathletes are not generally paid a salary.)

Assuming you do have a truly talented, exceptional triathlete as a client, how do you maximize your client’s sponsorship potential in order to generate the revenue he or she needs to remain in the sport? Unlike other professional athletes, triathletes are not normally part of any team. There are no players’ associations (unions), no collective-bargaining agreements, and no salaries per se in the sport of triathlon. Dollars are generated in two ways: money earned at the races themselves (of which agents usually do not take a percentage) and money generated by sponsorship contracts (that’s where the money is made).

The sports marketer’s goal must be to find sponsors who will reward the triathlete for performance and exposure. Fortunately, triathlon involves swimming, biking, and running (in that order). Such diverse categories allow the sports marketer to seek sponsorship from many companies. Such a wide net of potential sponsors is found in very few sports.

Ironman vs. Olympic Triathlons

The sports marketer must understand that the triathlon world is divided into two major (and very different) categories: the Ironman1 triathlon and the Olympic-distance triathlon. Only a handful (at best) of the world’s triathletes can excel in both categories. Expect that your client will focus on only one of them. Some sponsors are concerned only with efforts in one category or the other.

The Ironman distance triathlon is truly a grueling race: a swim of 2.4 mi, a bike race of 112 mi, and then a marathon run of 26.2 mi. The Ironman distance races are often finished in the 8-to-10-hr range (you are reading that correctly), by the best competitors. Sponsors are likely to think of the Ironman triathlon when first presented with the opportunity to sponsor a triathlete.

Currently, the Ironman Triathlon World Championship—sometimes called simply Ironman Hawaii—is held in Kona, Hawaii. Another 24 Ironman events constitute the Ironman Triathlon series and are held throughout the world2 ; some involve the full race distances, and some are half-Ironman distances. Unless they are among a select few competitors who earn “lottery” slots, triathletes must qualify to compete in the Ironman Triathlon World Championship, based upon their elite or amateur status.

Much of the reason for the Ironman triathlon’s success is that NBC television broadcasts the Ironman Triathlon World Championship every year. Outside this event, virtually no other triathlon is broadcast on a major network, except during the Olympic Games.

The Olympic-distance triathlon differs markedly from the Ironman triathlon. The Olympic version comprises a 1.5-k swim (.9-mi), a 40-k bike ride (24.8-mi), then a 10-k run (6.2-mi). This sport of sprint triathlon made its Olympic debut in 2000 at the Sydney Olympics. Unlike the Ironman distance, this distance is truly a swim, bike, and run sprint. The Olympic distance, also called ITU distance (for International Triathlon Union, the international federation for the sport of triathlon), is often filled with loops on the bike and is designed to be spectator friendly. Such races are often completed in the 2-hr range by the best competitors. Triathletes earn points based upon a formula that weighs the size of the triathlon and the rankings of other participating competitors. World rankings are established under the ITU point system. Networks such as the Outdoor Life Network, ESPN, and ESPN2 broadcast Olympic-distance triathlon events, but often at off-peak hours of the day or night.

Important Triathlon Organizations and Other Resources

USA Triathlon (www.usatriathlon.org) is the national governing body for the sport of triathlon in the United States and is one of many national governing bodies under the purview of the United States Olympic Committee. The International Triathlon Union is another leading triathlon organization and maintains a website (www.triathlon.org). Visiting the two groups’ websites will allow the novice sports marketer to learn which sponsors already participate in the sport. Contacting these sponsors is a good first step. Recognize, however, that the ITU has very clear guidelines about the size and number of logos that may appear on a competitor’s jersey (Ironman triathlons do not have such limitations).

Beyond the websites, the novice sports marketer’s research might start with subscriptions to Triathlete magazine (www.triathlete.com) and Inside Triathlon (www.insidetri.com). Additionally, Katherine Williams’s Triathlon Sourcebook provides the names and e-mail addresses of athletes, coaches, companies, and events. The book is published every other year (1997, 1999, 2001); the next one is due in January 2003. It usually sells for around $30, a worthwhile investment for an agent, and you can contact the author directly at kwilliams@triathloncentral.com. Finally, visiting sponsors’ websites can give you an idea of how serious they are about participating in the sport of triathlon. Fortunately, communicating via e-mail controls up-front costs in terms of promotion of the triathlete.

Company Sponsorship and Contracts

Clearly, a sports marketer’s best first step toward securing sponsorship for an elite triathlete is to find sponsors who are already involved in the sport. Table 1 lists various product areas in which there are manufacturers who have sponsored elite triathletes.

Table 1: Triathlete sponsors and their product categories

Product Category

Examples of Sponsors
Saucony / Speedo / TYR / Adidas / Nike
bikes Javelin / Trek / Elite / Cannondale
aero bars Profile
wheels and components Spinergy / HED / Zipp
tires Continental
shoes and pedals Speedplay / Carnac / Time
helmets Rudy Project / Giro
wetsuits Speedo / Orca
glasses Rudy Project / Oakley
nutrition Twinlab / Met-Rx / Powerbar / Clifbar
hydration Gatorade / Endurox / Push / Fuel Belt
bike case Tri-All Sports
other/out-of-sport products Timex / financial services company

If you are lucky, you will find a few sponsors who are not involved in the sport of triathlon and wish to sponsor a triathlete. However, almost all sponsors expect some sort of return on their advertising investment. In seeking sponsors outside the triathlon sport, expect to receive a lot of “no thank-yous” and letters or e-mails of rejection (unless your triathlete—at either distance—is a world champion or national champion). The most likely time to find an out-of-sport sponsor is just prior to the Olympics and shortly afterward, if the triathlete wins a medal. Once a sponsor is interested, a contract may be written. In general, sports contracts focus on salary and on performance and exposure bonuses. Some companies provide only product; others frown on salary unless the triathlete is an experienced, elite professional. Use caution if you are considering a multi-year contract, especially if your client’s performance (and exposure) is anticipated to increase over time.

Publicizing an Elite Triathlete Client

Vital to your success in serving the elite triathlete client is exploring the designs of competitors’ websites. Typically, sponsors’ logos are posted and offer links to the sponsors’ websites (in turn, expect a sponsor’s site to offer links to the athlete’s site). Visiting www.usatriathlon.org will help you locate elite triathletes’ websites; the ITU website also provides links to some nice websites. Do not reinvent the wheel when working to promote a triathlete via a website; do realize that building a website costs money, and ensure that both you and your client know who will pay costs associated with the site, including the hosting fees and charges for updates and structural changes. (Updating the website in a timely manner is important.)

Attending triathlon events is always a plus for the marketer. Meeting personally with sponsors is vital to business relations and your own exposure. Often, an expo takes place in conjunction with larger triathlon events; it can be a prime time to meet with sponsors maintaining booths for promoting their products and services. Since the agent assists in the coordination of publicity for the triathlete, contacting sponsors ahead of time at an expo is a plus; of course a cell phone is essential.

Conclusion

Remember, the agent is only as good as the triathlete. A client in the news—providing exposure for sponsors—is the client most able to obtain sponsorship. Nevertheless, representing your client responsibly by completing preliminary research and establishing and maintaining contacts increases the likelihood that your client will enjoy considering as many sponsorship opportunities as possible. To really appreciate the sport and those who compete in it, you might even try swimming, biking, and running on your own.

Making a living as a triathlete’s agent may not be possible. However, it is often just as rewarding to hear the cheers of fans at races and to know that you had a small something to do with the success of a triathlete. The satisfaction lasts even when the race is just a memory, and the race-results are only a link on the Internet.

Author Note

Adam Epstein, J.D., M.B.A., chairs the legal studies department at South College in Knoxville, Tennessee. Epstein also serves as an adjunct assistant professor of sport management at the University of Tennessee. He has taught undergraduate and graduate courses in legal studies, paralegal studies, sport management, and business management since 1994.

1Registered trademark of World Triathlon Corporation, Inc.
2See www.ironmanlive.com

2015-10-24T01:32:24-05:00April 16th, 2008|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Coaching, Sports Exercise Science|Comments Off on Marketing the Triathlete
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Sport Management Field Experiences: The Impact of the Federal Labor Standards Act on Internships

Submitted by: David Gargone, United States Sports Academy Doctoral Student

Abstract

This paper examines the importance of the internship experience in sport management curriculums and how field experiences are affected by the Federal Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The academic discipline of sport management relies heavily on internships to assist students with the application of classroom theory in professional environments, and these internships are unpaid. The FLSA does not speak specifically to unpaid internships. A review of court cases dealing with professional sport organizations suggests that adjustments need to be made to the FLSA or to sport management curriculums in order to protect student interns from unfair labor practices.

Sport Management Field Experiences: The Impact of the Federal Labor Standards Act on Internships

Business and education departments in colleges and universities across the globe have embraced the growing presence of professional and recreational sports and have implemented curriculums in the field of sport management. As the field of sport management continues to grow in the business world, the demand for qualified professionals continues to expand. According to Case (2007), over 200 graduate and undergraduate programs exist in the field of sport management, and the number of sport management programs has continued to grow at a rapid pace. In the past 2 years the number of bachelor’s, master’s, and doctoral degree programs in sport management has grown to a total of 309 (Scremin, 2007).

Although a key component of preparing sport management students for the real world is their progression through a sport management–specific curriculum, more research is beginning to focus on the importance of field experiences in the preparatory process (Cunningham & Sagas, 2004). A field experience can also be known as an internship, practicum, or mentorship, depending on the details of the experience and the preferences of the educational program. The field experience serves as an integral part of sport management programs (Ross & Beggs, 2007), providing an opportunity for learning that is not available in the classroom. Challenging internships that allow the student to play an active role in an organization enhance the educational value of the experience to the student (Cunningham, Sagas, Dixon, Kent, & Turner, 2005). Through them, students have the opportunity to acquire new skills while applying theories learned in the classroom. A student’s confidence will also grow when there is a sense of serving the organization in a positive manner.

While the field of sport management offers lucrative positions that may initially interest students in the industry, the reality is that they must start a sport management career at the ground level. Most of the industry positions for sport management interns are unpaid (Case, 2007). Although the primary objective of a field experience is for the student to apply theories learned in the classroom in a professional atmosphere, some educators feel that students are being taken advantage of in non-wage situations (Cunningham & Sagas, 2004). Some professional sport organizations have come under direct fire concerning their overreliance on unpaid interns. However, the labor laws in the United States do not have clear language dealing with unpaid internships.

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the importance of field experiences in the sport management curriculum by evaluating current curricular trends at leading universities within the sport management discipline. Additionally, labor laws associated with unpaid internships and specific court cases dealing with professional sport organizations and interns will be presented.

Sport Management Program Review Council

As the sport management discipline caught hold and the academic community recognized sport management as a viable area of study, education professionals decided that curricular guidelines were needed (SMPRC, 2000). In 1987, the National Association for Sport and Physical Education (NASPE) developed a set of guidelines for sport management programs. Less than 2 years later, NASPE organized a task force including members of both NASPE and the North American Society for Sport Management (NASSM) to continue to develop curricular guidelines. This task force is known as the Sport Management Curriculum Review Council (SMPRC). The SMPRC created a comprehensive set of guidelines that included required and recommended areas of content. Specific guidelines were made for baccalaureate, master’s, and doctoral sport management degree programs. Although the initial guidelines were accepted by the majority of schools offering sport management programs, revisions to the original guidelines were made in 1999. Each SMPRC requirement for degree programs is categorized under standard areas such as “Governance in Sport” or “Marketing” (SMPRC, 2000, pp. 6, 9). For a bachelor’s degree program, the final SMPRC standard is “Field Experience in Sport Management.” The SMPRC (2000) says of the field experience that

An undergraduate student will benefit from culminating in-depth practical experience(s) before entering the sport industry. These experiences help the student bridge the gap between classroom learning and practical application in sport settings. They allow students to explore career options, develop management skills, and gain a greater understanding of the total operation of sports organizations. (p. 9)

The SMPRC requires that sport management programs must have their undergraduate students engage in a field experience.

The SMPRC has similar requirements at both the master’s and doctoral levels (SMPRC, 2000). The premise for the master’s level changes slightly, taking into account that the graduate student may already have experience working in sport management. The required further experience should be geared toward enhancing the student’s network and increasing the likelihood of job placement upon degree completion, according to the SMPRC (2000). The focus changes again at the doctoral level. The SMPRC identifies two focus paths for student internships. One is for those doctoral students who plan to teach at the college level. The internship for such students should focus on gaining experience in an educational setting, with possible tasks including teaching lower level sport management classes, conducting research, or providing supervision to undergraduate interns. The second focus path is for doctoral students who plan on being practitioners of sport management. The internship for these students should include more independent work in the industry than is demanded during undergraduate or master’s degree internships.

Curriculum Approval and Internship Requirements

Even though sport management is a growing discipline in academia, there is still a fundamental inconsistency in the programs across the country. An ongoing debate exists concerning the placement of the sport management program within an academic department. Some sport management programs are found in business departments (Overton, 2004), while others are located in physical education departments. Wherever a sport management program may be housed, its approval by the SMPRC is solely based on whether it meets curricular standards (SMPRC, 2000). Currently, 85 programs are approved by the SMPRC (NASSM, 2007), comprising only 27.5% of sport management programs in the United States. According to a study done by Scremin (2007), 22% of undergraduate sport management programs have received approval (n = 41), 24% of master’s degree programs have received approval (n = 26), and 21 % of doctoral programs have received approval (n = 3). The difference between NASSM’s and Scremin’s results (85 approved, 70 approved) illustrates that 15 additional programs have been approved by the SMPRC since July 2007.

Although the number of approved programs is only a small portion of the total number of programs, this does not seem related to a lack of internships or field experiences within the programs. Nearly 77% of sport management programs at the bachelor’s, master’s, and doctoral levels have some type of internship requirement (Scremin, 2007). Scremin reported that 90% of programs at the bachelor’s level require an internship (n = 161), 65% of those at the master’s level require an internship (n = 70), and 43% at the doctoral level require an internship (n = 6). The high percentages at the bachelor’s and master’s levels represent a strong commitment to internships for both undergraduate and graduate students.

Labor Concerns and Federal Regulations

A widely debated aspect of the sport management field experience generally is compensation for student work (Foster & Moorman, 2001). Compensation is typically in the form either of academic credit or monetary wages. In academia, credit hours are usually awarded based on the number of hours required by the internship. The SMPRC requires internships to be at least 400 hours (SMPRC, 2000), for which the student usually receives at least 12 hours of academic credit. Financial compensation for field experiences is of growing concern to both universities and students, however. Most internships available in the sport industry do not offer monetary compensation to the student, although increasing debate surrounds this issue in the sport management field (Foster & Moorman, 2001). A number of professional organizations, specifically professional baseball franchises, rely on interns to be able to operate each season. The majority of these interns are unpaid, yet the franchises would not be able to operate without the interns. The question becomes not only whether such a practice is ethical, but also is it legal according to federal labor regulations?

In 1938, the federal government enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in order to establish a wage floor and protect the general public from the practice of cheap labor (FLSA Overview, 2007). At that time, the United States Congress felt that hourly workers had no protection or bargaining power vis-à-vis their employers. Without bargaining power, workers had no choice but to accept the substandard wages offered by employers, just to survive. The government felt the wages were so low that an acceptable way of living was not possible. Aside from implementing a minimum wage, the FLSA also addressed issues of overtime compensation, employee recordkeeping, and child labor.

The FLSA protects employees who work in both the public and private sectors (FLSA Overview, 2007). Currently, all companies that engage in interstate commerce and surpass $500,000 in annual sales must comply with the FLSA. (The FLSA also governs certain other companies regardless of annual revenue, including medical facilities, schools, colleges and universities, and all government agencies.) Thus most professional sport organizations and franchises are required to comply with the FLSA.

Federal Exemptions

Some sport organizations, however, have been successful in receiving exemptions from the FLSA. Under a provision of the FLSA, “seasonal and recreational establishments” can be granted an exemption upon approval (FLSA Exemption, 2007). In order to receive an exemption, the organization must satisfy half of a two-part test for seasonal or recreational character. The first part of the test requires the organization to demonstrate that it does not operate for more than 7 months in any calendar year. It is difficult for professional sport organizations to meet this requirement. The second part of the test, the seasonal receipts test, requires that an establishment illustrate that its average income for any 6 months of the previous year did not exceed one third of the average receipts for the other 6 months. This is also a difficult standard for any sport organization to meet.

FLSA Employment Classifications

Although some sport organizations do receive exemptions through the seasonal and recreational establishments clause, others who have not been exempted have found advantage in the FLSA’s lack of clarity about internships and other field experiences (FLSA Employment Status, 2007). Section 14(a) of the FLSA, for example, specifies several types of employees not protected under the act and allows lesser compensation in their cases; while interns are not among these specified employee groups, so-called learners, student-learners, and apprentices are specified in Section 14(a). The FLSA defines a learner as

[a] worker who is being trained for an occupation, which is not customarily recognized as an apprenticeable trade, for which skill, dexterity and judgment must be learned and who, when initially employed, produces little or nothing of value. Except in extraordinary circumstances, an employee cannot be considered a “learner” once he/she has acquired a total of 240 hours of job-related and/or vocational training with the same or other employer(s) or training facility(ies) during the past three years. An individual qualifying as a “learner” may only be trained in two qualifying occupations. (¶ 2)

The internship requirements of the SMPRC call for an experience of at least 400 hours (SMPRC, 2000), which exceeds the cutoff of 240 hours for learner status.

Although most sport management students would not fit the learner classification throughout a field experience, the student-learner category might seem potentially applicable (FLSA Employment Status, 2007). The FLSA defines a student-learner as

[a] student who is at least sixteen years of age, or at least eighteen years of age if employed in an occupation which the Secretary has declared to be particularly hazardous, who is receiving instruction in an accredited school, college or university and who is employed on a part-time basis, pursuant to a “bona fide vocational training program” as defined in subpart C of this part. (¶ 3)

However, the SMPRC guidelines (2000) define internships as a “full-time work experience in the sport industry (40 hours/week) that are [sic] offered for academic credit.” Therefore, if a sport management intern is enrolled in a program that has been approved by the SMPRC, that intern cannot be counted a student learner, either. The FLSA itself states that apprenticeships are not regulated by the provisions of the act (FLSA Employment Status, 2007). The FLSA defines an apprentice as

[a] worker, at least sixteen years of age unless a higher minimum age standard is otherwise fixed by law, who is employed to learn a skilled trade through a registered apprenticeship program. Training is provided through structured on-the-job training combined with supplemental related theoretical and technical instruction. This term excludes pre-apprentices, trainees, learners, and student-learners. (¶ 4)

Initially, this definition might seem to approximate the SMPRC’s description of the internship, especially if a program has received the council’s approved. Sport management students should receive on-the-job training that draws on classroom theories and provides technical experience. However, the FLSA goes on to limit apprenticeable occupations to those requiring a minimum of 2,000 hours of on-the-job experience. It is difficult to imagine that the sport management student in a 400-hour internship can legally be considered an apprentice for whom below-minimum wages are permitted—even should part of his or her compensation be academic credit.

Case Law Concerning Internships

While the FLSA does not identify the work arrangements typical of most sport management internships as the kind that can be unpaid or compensated below minimum wage, the courts nevertheless have sided with professional sport organizations in certain instances when such companies have sought exemptions. Professional baseball organizations have done particularly well in cases involving the seasonal or recreational establishment exemption.

The first court case involved the Sarasota White Sox, a minor league affiliate of the Chicago White Sox, and Ronald R. Jeffery, a groundskeeper employed by the team (Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 1995). Jeffery had worked for the Sarasota White Sox for a number of years and sought overtime wages for overtime work performed since the beginning of his employment. In light of the team’s schedule, he had put in more than 40 hours weekly on several occasions, receiving the same compensation for those weeks as for others. The team claimed that the FLSA’s seasonal or recreational establishment clause exempted it from overtime wage requirements, and the court ruled in its favor (Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 1995). The Sarasota White Sox passed both tests for the exemption. In the previous 5 seasons of its existence, the team made over 99% of its revenues during the 6-month period March through August. In addition, the club participated in a 6-month season only, surviving the 7-month test also posed by the clause. Therefore, the Sarasota White Sox received the exemption and were not required to pay overtime wages or adhere to any other stipulation of the FLSA.

Two additional cases involving Major League Baseball clubs also centered on the seasonal or recreational establishment exemption in the FLSA. The first case involved Adams, the plaintiff, and the Detroit Tigers, Inc., operating company of the Detroit Tigers. The plaintiff had been a bat boy for the team and was seeking compensation representing overtime pay for his work exceeding 40 hours per week (Adams v. Detroit Tigers, Inc., 1997). The Detroit Tigers responded as the Sarasota White Sox had, claiming exemption from the FLSA. The court recognized that the Detroit Tigers organization operated on a yearly basis, yet it also determined that Tiger Stadium operated on a 7-month schedule only, making the operation of the venue seasonal. The Tigers won the case and their exemption remained intact.

The second case in Major League Baseball was brought by maintenance workers. Robert Bridewell, Stanley McAlpin, Daisy Pearl, Melville Walker, and Eddie Rogers filed a suit seeking overtime compensation from their employer, the Cincinnati Reds, for the 1990–93 seasons (Bridewell et al. v. Cincinnati Reds, 1998). The plaintiffs claimed they were owed overtime wages by ruling of the FLSA. Unlike the Detroit Tigers (or the Sarasota White Sox), the Cincinnati Reds struggled to justify their perceived exemption from the FLSA. Initially, the district court found in favor of the team because its competitive season lasted only 7 months. An appellate court, however, found for the maintenance workers because the Cincinnati Reds employed at least 120 employees throughout each month of the year. According to the higher court, the Cincinnati Reds were not exempted from FLSA regulations; the maintenance workers received overtime wages for the 1990–93 seasons.

Conclusions

In terms of education, field experiences are essential to the preparation of sport management students for successful careers. As research has indicated, students who complete meaningful internship assignments have the opportunity to gain skills while applying the theories they have mastered within their academic curricula. In order to ensure that sport management students continue to enjoy this opportunity, internship supervisors and sport industry professionals need to establish specific guidelines governing field experiences. A possible solution would be for the SMPRC or other governing council to establish a set of regulations concerning student internships. Although some universities have already established guidelines for field experiences, having a set of universal standards may improve the experience for all of those involved.

The biggest problem affecting sport management internships has to be the increasingly high percentage of unpaid internships. Thousands of sport management students work tirelessly for professional sport organizations across the country. The business of sports is booming, but interns’ compensation does not reflect the boom. Since the Federal Labor Standards Act does not address this problem fully, modifications to the current legislation may be in order. Many sport organizations rely on interns to maintain the daily operations of the team. An example is the very common sport industry position of ticket seller. Teams cannot survive without ticket sales, but still today’s FLSA regulations—in particular its seasonal or recreational establishment clause—leaves interns without options. The federal government may want to reassess the tests used to justify the exemption of teams based on their seasonal nature.

The legal cases cited here did not involve sport management interns, but the general themes of the cases illustrate how the Federal Labor Standards Act affects student internships. Currently, most professional sport organizations operate with the exemption in hand, allowing the work of interns and some other employees to be under-compensated. Under the present conditions, then, sport management students need to familiarize themselves well with any position under consideration. They must also grasp the idea that they will very likely work for less than the minimum wage.

As the academic discipline of sport management continues to grow, improvements in curriculum design and field experience programs will certainly occur. In order to ensure that the ultimate goal, education, remains at the forefront of such improvements, students, professors, and sport industry professionals must continue to work together with a single mission. Ultimately, the field experiences required in most sport management programs have a largely positive impact on all of those involved. Changes in some current practices, along with some additions to the Fair Labor Standards Act, will assist the field of sport management as it moves forward.

References

Adams v. Detroit Tigers, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Mich. 1997).

Bridewell et al. v. Cincinnati Reds, 155 F.3d 828, 830 (6th Cir. 1998).

Case, R. (2007). Sport management internships can open the door to a student’s future. Virginia Journal, 29(1), 43–44.

Cunningham, G., & Sagas, M. (2004). Work experiences, occupational commitment, and intent to enter the sport management profession. Physical Educator, 61(3), 146–156.

Cunningham. G., Sagas, M., Dixon. M., Kent. A., & Turner, B. (2005). Anticipated career satisfaction, affective occupational commitment, and intention to enter the sport management profession. Journal of Sport Management, 19(1), 43–57.

FLSA Employment Status. Retrieved November 20, 2007, from http://www.dol.gov/dol/allcfr/ESA/Title_29/ Part_520/29CFR520.201.htm

FLSA Exemption. Retrieved November 20, 2007, from http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/compliance/ whd/whdfs18.htm

FLSA Overview. Retrieved November 20, 2007, from http://www.dol.gov/esa/whd/flsa/

Foster, S., & Moorman, A. (2001). Gross v. Family Services Inc.: The internship as a special relationship in creating negligence liability. Journal of Legal Aspects of Sport, 11, 245–267.

Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 594 (11th Cir. 1995).

NASSM sport management programs: United States. Retrieved November 20, 2007, from http://www.nassm.com/InfoAbout/SportMgmtPrograms/United_States

Overton, R. (2004). Hiring and supervising an athletic department intern. Coach & Athletic Director, 73(9), 76–79.

Ross, C., & Beggs, B. (2007). Campus recreational sports internships: A comparison of student and employer perspectives. Recreational Sports Journal, 31(1), 3–13.

Scremin, G. (2007). The secret shopper report. Unpublished manuscript, United States Sports Academy, Daphne, Alabama.

Sport Management Review Program Review Council. (2000). Sport management program standards and review protocol. Reston, VA: National Association for Sport and Physical Education.

2013-11-25T21:54:46-06:00April 2nd, 2008|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Facilities, Sports Management|Comments Off on Sport Management Field Experiences: The Impact of the Federal Labor Standards Act on Internships
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Relationship of Selected Pre–NBA Career Variables to NBA Players’ Career Longevity

Submitted by: William Abrams, East Lansing, Michigan,
John C. Barnes, University of New Mexico,
Annie Clement, Ph. D., J.D., Saint Leo University

Abstract

Given the change in the business nature of the National Basketball Association (NBA), the player evaluation process has become increasingly important. The methods discussed in this article can aid general managers and owners in the player acquisition process by providing a means of evaluating talent. The purpose of the study was to identify the relationship between pre–NBA career statistical variables and career longevity, measured as the number of seasons in the NBA. Data from the 1988–2002 collegiate basketball seasons were analyzed. Participants consisted of 329 NBA guards, forwards, and centers who entered the NBA in 1988 and ended their careers during or before the 2002 NBA season. The study included 11 independent variables: points, rebounds, assists, steals, blocks, fouls, turnovers, minutes played, free throw percentage, field goal percentage, and 3 point percentage. There was a single dependent variable, career longevity. Data analysis comprised multiple regression tests to determine the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable. The multiple regression tests revealed a relationship between pre-career statistical variables and career longevity for guards and forwards. However, no such relationship was found for centers.

Introduction

The National Basketball Association (NBA) is a multimillion-dollar professional sport business. The value of team franchises has grown dramatically since David Stern became NBA commissioner in 1984. That season, the average team value was around $15 million (Smith, 2003). The figure had risen to around $300 million by 2003 (Smith, 2003). The increased revenues in the game have led to higher player salaries, which mean more pressure on individual players to perform. The business nature of basketball has put a premium on the selection of players and on the process—an imprecise science—that goes into selection. Owners and general managers are desiring to operate their teams according to corporate models, by controlling escalating player salaries (Sandoval, 2003). Front-office executives want to reduce the risk of bad draft picks and overpaid free agents (Sandoval, 2003).

Given the financial structure and business nature of the game, how do general managers and owners measure and evaluate a player’s potential for success? Additionally, how do they make personnel decisions in a league in which the stakes are so high that one bad decision can make for disaster in the form of millions of dollars lost? One important aspect of building a championship NBA team is how the general manager constructs the team roster. It is expected that the general manager will attempt to acquire the most talented players when building a team (Staw & Hoang, 1995). How to accomplish this is the problem that owners and general managers continually face. Berri (1999) stated that, “[W]ithout an answer, one is unable to ascertain who should play, what free agents should be pursued, or what trades should be consummated” (p. 411).

In the current era of professional basketball, with the average player salary reaching over $5 million, owners want to operate their businesses more efficiently by controlling costs and risks (Sandoval, 2003). The goal is to reduce the number of bad draft picks and avoid signing the least productive players (Sandoval, 2003).

The evaluation of potential playing talent is a difficult task (Berri & Brook, 1999). In professional basketball, using selected statistical variables to measure a player’s prospective success is considered an important part of the player evaluation process (Berri & Brook, 1999). Assembling players who produce at statistically high levels may ultimately improve a team. Berri (1999) identified a link between player statistics and team wins. The NBA draft is one of the primary methods by which teams acquire talent. Staw & Hoang (1995) found that the order in which players were drafted correlated with their playing time and the length of their careers.

The NBA draft’s importance becomes even clearer when one considers how the draft inevitably represents a set of lost opportunities (Staw & Hoang, 1995). In selecting any one particular player, a team may be passing over the next all-star or superstar player (Staw & Hoang, 1995). The NBA draft is thus very risky (Amico, 2001). History has shown that the projection of player development is not a precise science, and that teams may be in need of effective evaluative methods when scouting talent (Amico, 2001). The risks of the draft were made widely known by the Portland Trail Blazers when, in 1984, that team anticipated greater benefits from signing Sam Bowie than from signing Michael Jordan. And in the same draft, Dallas selected Sam Perkins and Terrance Stansbury instead of Auburn University’s Charles Barkley and Gonzaga University’s John Stockton (Staw & Hoang, 1995). Selection of the right players through the NBA draft is important (Staw & Hoang, 1995).

The NBA draft used to require relatively little work or resources (Shouler, Ryan, Koppett, & Bellotti, 2004). Teams had small scouting staffs to evaluate college players, yet by the time the draft came around, every team knew who the best players were and which ones they wanted to draft (Shouler et al., 2004). As basketball became more of a business, general managers, owners, and team presidents had to change their approach. Even as the process changed, however, the goal stayed the same (Popper, 2004). It is to improve the team through selection of the best, most valuable player available at the time a team is making a selection (Popper, 2004).

Each NBA team has a player personnel staff that spends most of its time searching out less obvious candidates for the draft (Wolff, 2001). These scouts identify prospective players by attending games, analyzing game films, or both. When NBA scouts observe players in person, they typically use subjective evaluation based on detailed information they gain in eight areas of basketball: physical characteristics, mental characteristics, ball skills, offense, rebounding, defense, knowledge, strengths, and weaknesses (Wolff, 2001).

Currently, there is no known research that looks to pre-career statistical data to determine longevity of NBA play (although, again, NBA experts view potential career longevity as an important factor characterizing NBA draft prospects, according to Amico, 2001). Those studies that are available did not examine relationships between predictor variables and career longevity. According to Oliver (2005), the value of individual NBA players can be assessed using traditional statistical categories. Previous studies looked at the statistics for NBA players recorded during their play in the league; they sought to identify alternative methods of evaluating talent (Ballard, 2005). The success of the NBA players was measured using the traditional statistical categories (points, rebounds, field goals attempted, field goals made, etc.) (Ballard, 2005). Thus while most of these studies obtained traditional player statistics, they did not go on to look for relationships between those statistics and the players’ career longevity (i.e., number of seasons in the NBA). Some research, however, indicates that there is a positive relationship between traditional player statistics and the length of NBA players’ careers (Staw & Hoang, 1995).

Major League Baseball was the first league to experiment with statistical predictor models. Specifically, the Oakland Athletics’ general manager began to evaluate talent primarily by looking at player statistics, and he both drafted players and acquired free agents based on this nontraditional method (Lewis, 2003). This method of evaluation became known as the money ball theory, reflecting its capacity to identify productive players available at below-market value, whom traditional scouting methods would not view as commodities (Lewis, 2003). Money ball theory has proved a success for the Oakland Athletics and for another team that uses statistical methods to evaluate talent: the Boston Red Sox.

The reasoning underlying the use of player statistics in professional baseball is rooted in the idea that college players generate meaningful statistics (Lewis, 2003). College players play more games than high school players, and the level of competition is enhanced at the collegiate level as opposed to the high school level (Lewis, 2003). Collegiate statistics, then, reflect a sample size large enough to accurately picture the underlying reality (Lewis, 2003). Projecting the ongoing success of college players is thus easier than making such projections for high school players (Lewis, 2003).

The statistics that can be garnered from college play enable baseball executives and scouts to see past all kinds of visual scouting prejudices (Lewis, 2003). Indeed, it has been argued that what is most important about a baseball player is not the player’s character but the picture drawn by his statistics (Lewis, 2003).The belief of experts who employ predictor statistics in baseball is that a player “is” what he has already done, not what he looks like or might become (Lewis, 2003). It is a belief that runs counter to the thinking of the traditional baseball scout, to whom what matters is what the scout can envision the player doing (Lewis, 2003).

The concept of statistical analysis of talent in baseball was brought to bear on efforts to make the development of players more efficient. As Lewis (2003) stated, the statistics used to evaluate baseball players were probably far more accurate than anything used to measure the value of people who didn’t play baseball for a living. Adding a statistical model to traditional scouting and player evaluation methods can better inform owners and general managers about talent, permitting them to identify skill sets related to career longevity. In basketball, too, better gauging of players’ potential success may lead to a more efficient process of putting together an NBA team roster.

Method

The purpose of the study was to identify the relationship between selected pre–NBA career statistical variables and NBA players’ career longevity (measured as the number of seasons in the NBA). Specifically, the following two questions were addressed:

    1. Can 1 or more of the 11 traditional player statistics, recorded during the year preceding entry into the NBA, predict the career longevity of NBA guards, NBA forwards, and NBA centers?
    2. Can 1 or more of the 11 traditional player statistics, recorded during the 2 years preceding entry into the NBA, predict the career longevity of NBA guards, NBA forwards, and NBA centers?

The study questions were built around 1-year and 2-year collegiate statistics on the assumption that performance during these specific periods is the best indicator of NBA potential. This is assumed because, statistically speaking, it is during these periods that college players who subsequently entered the NBA played their best collegiate seasons.

Data Collection

For this study, the researcher measured collegiate statistics for the following 11 areas of basketball: points, rebounds, assists, steals, blocks, field goal percentage, free throw percentage, fouls, 3 point percentage, minutes played, and turnovers. In 9 areas, the totals were used; for field goal percentage, free throw percentage, and 3 point percentage, however, raw percentages were used rather than totals, since percentages provide better analysis of shooting accuracy. The study evaluated minutes played rather than games played, because use of the two is linearly correlated; added together, both supply no better information than is obtained by evaluating only minutes played. The decision to use these particular statistics in this study was informed by the history, within professional basketball, of the use of the statistics. Dating back to the 1949 merger of the Basketball Association of America and National Basketball League that formed the NBA, this set of player statistics has been the primary method of analyzing the game (Lahman, 2004).

The particular statistics chosen for the present study’s multiple regressions were based on the history of players’ statistical production at the position of guard, of forward, and of center. Historical statistical production by guards, forwards, and centers in the 11 basketball activities thus provided the basis for the present analysis. Over the history of basketball, the players occupying the three positions produced proficiently in those statistical areas which the present study has associated with each position, as follows: (a) guards—field goal percentage, 3 point percentage, free throw percentage, assists, steals, turnovers, points, personal fouls, and minutes played; (b) forwards—rebounds, 3 point percentage, points, free throw percentage, steals, blocks, field goal percentage, turnovers, personal fouls, assists, and minutes played; and (c) centers—rebounds, free throw percentage, field goal percentage, blocks, personal fouls, turnovers, points, and minutes played.

The statistics themselves were obtained from an unofficial professional and collegiate basketball website, Database Basketball (located at http://www.databasebasketball.com). Database Basketball is a primary Internet resource for gathering players’ statistical data at both levels. It houses information on all college players who played in the NBA and on those who were NBA draft picks. The website also provided for the study the total number of players playing in the NBA from 1987–88 to 2001–02. The study employed the collegiate statistics from the year immediately preceding a study participant’s entry into the NBA.

Participants

The present study included 329 players who entered the NBA during or after the 1987–88 and ended their playing careers with the 2001–02 season or earlier; the study excluded players who entered the NBA directly from high school, directly from junior college, or from an overseas league. The sample was furthermore limited to NBA athletes who had played at NCAA member institutions for at least two seasons. The time frame 1987–88 to 2001–02 was deemed recent enough to be relevant to the present; it also included enough time to obtain a representative number of players for study. Beyond the specified time frame and the exclusion of players lacking an NCAA collegiate record or transferring from overseas leagues, study participants had to have played in at least one NBA game. Those players who entered in the 1987–1988 season were the most relevant sample, because of changes marked that season in both the NBA style of play and its draft structure. The latter change led NBA general managers to try new and different draft strategies than in years past.

Design and Analysis

The data were analyzed using SPSS (Version 12.0). A multiple linear regression analysis was conducted involving the dependent variable, career longevity, and 2 or more of the 11 criterion variables. Multiple regression analysis was used in order to find the variable or combination of variables yielding the most accurate prediction of NBA career longevity (Thomas & Nelson, 2001). Multiple regression analysis made it possible to combine the variables from collegiate statistics to produce optimal assessment of their relationship with the independent variable, NBA career longevity (Allison, 1999). Alpha level for the analyses was set at p < 0.05.

Six multiple regressions were conducted to assess the relationship between pre–NBA career statistical variables and NBA career longevity. Each of the regressions conducted was based on player position, with guard, forward, and center positions being analyzed. In three regressions (one per position), the 2-year collegiate statistics (statistics for the two college seasons immediately prior to the player’s entering the NBA) constituted the independent variables; in the remaining three regressions (one per position), the 1-year collegiate statistics (statistics for the college season immediately preceding NBA entry) constituted the independent variables. Career longevity (i.e., number of seasons in the NBA) was the outcome variable in all of the regression analyses.

Results

Of the 329 NBA players included in this study, 133 were listed as guards, 142 were forwards, and 54 were centers. The average length of their NBA careers was 4.81 seasons (SD = 3.69).

1-Year Statistics

A significant (p < .05) overall regression was found for guards during analysis of the 1-year statistics (F = 3.218), with an R of .437. The individual statistics measuring assists, turnovers, and points had significant beta scores (Table 1).

Table 1

Summary of Regression Analysis for one-year statistics for guards prior to entry into the
NBA.

Variable B SE B β
(Constant) 4.106 4.266
FGP -.703 .935 .063
TPP 1.188 .018 .195
FTHP -6.033 5.113 -1.180
ASST 0.02151* .008 .362
STEAL 0.02025 .017 .124
TURN -0.03933* .019 -.237
POINT 0.009410* 003 ..386
PF -0.01436 .020 -.065
MIN -0.00006548 .000 -.015

*p <.05

A significant (p < .05) overall regression was also found for the NBA forwards during analysis of the 1-year statistics (F = 2.531), with an R of .449. Field goal percentage, free throw percentage, and assists had significant beta scores within the equation (Table 2). For the 1-year totals for the center position, neither overall significance nor significant beta scores were found.

Table 2

Summary of Regression Analysis for one-year statistics for forwards prior to entry into the NBA.

Variable B SE B β
(Constant) -12.424 4.971
REB 0.006540 .006 .130
TPP 1.954 1.347 .136
POINT -0.0004532 .001 -.069
FTHP 7.629* 4.227 .169
STEAL 0.03883 .025 .174
BLOCK 0.006794 .013 .050
FGP 20.291* 6.800 .300
TURN -0.01215 .020 -.073
PF -0.006445 .021 -0.33
ASST 0.03073* .014 .270
MIN -0.002766 .002 -.143

*p <.05.

2-Year Statistics

In the three multiple regressions run using the 2-year statistics (combined totals), a significant (p < .05) overall regression was found for guards (F = 3.706), with an R of .462. Assists, steals, turnovers, and points generated significant scores during the analysis (Table 3).

Table 3
Summary of Regression Analysis for two-year statistics for guards prior to entry into the NBA.

Coefficients Table

Variable B SE B β
(Constant) -3.726 5.370
FGP 10.914 6.844 .140
TPP 1.954 1.347 .136
FTHP -4.098 5.764 -.070
ASST 0.01140* .005 .340
STEAL 0.01725* .010 .193
TURN -0.02513* .012 -.255
POINT 0.004940* .002 .351
PF 0.001047 .011 .009
MIN 0.0001264 .000 .031

*p <.05.

Though no significant overall regression was found for the NBA forwards, out of all the independent variables, field goal percentage, free throw percentage, and assists showed a significant relationship with career longevity (Table 4).
Table 4
Summary of Regression Analysis for two-year statistics for forwards prior to entry into
the NBA.

Coefficients Table

Variable B SE B β
(Constant) 1.216 2.703
REB 0.007322* .004 .257
TPP 1.954 1.347 .136
POINT -0.0002758 .001 -.045
FTHP -0.03481 .109 -.028
STEAL 0.002473* ..014 .020
BLOCK 0.003627 .008 .044
FGP .795 2.140 .033
TURN -0.01922 .012 -.196
PF -0.002314 .012 -.020
ASST 21.13 .008 .346
MIN -0.001758 .002 -.015

*p <.05.

The statistical analysis of players at center position produced neither a significant overall regression score nor significant beta scores for the 2-year data.
Discussion

The purpose of this study was to identify the relationship between selected pre–NBA career statistical variables and the career longevity of players, measured as number of seasons in the NBA. The overall regression employing guards’ 1-year statistics revealed an R score of .437. The R² was .191, meaning 19.1% of the variation in career longevity is explained by the differences in points, assists, and turnovers. Among forwards, the overall regression score was .449, with an R² of .202, meaning 20.2% of the variation in career longevity is explained by the differences in field goal percentage, free throw percentage, and assists.

First Research Question
Guards

With respect to the first research question, the study found that, statistically, assists, points, and turnovers were significantly related to guards’ longevity in the NBA Similarly, field goal percentage, free throw percentage, and assists were found to be significantly related to forwards’ longevity in the NBA. These results tend to support the evaluation process currently used by NBA teams to select guards and forwards. Guards are players who control the tempo of the game, protect the basketball, and run a team’s offense. At the guard position, then, assists and turnovers are important factors, as the regression demonstrated. Scoring (i.e., points) was also shown to be important with former college guards going on to long careers in the NBA. Turnovers, too, are important at the guard position, because guards control the basketball on offense. Each turnover indicates lack of continuity during a game that can largely be attributed to those team members who control the basketball (Zak, Huang, & Sigfried, 1979). The data demonstrate that every possession is important in basketball, and guards are in control of the ball. Moreover, the significance of assists, also established by the data, can be attributed to the fact that, in running the offense, guards create scoring opportunities for teammates. Assists highlight aspects of ball handling and teamwork, as well as a positive contribution to output (Zak et al., 1979). Turnovers and assists were expected to be significant indicators of career longevity among guards; points were an additional statistical category that proved significant, for the reason that, on most NBA teams, shooting guards are called upon to be point scorers.

Forwards
For players at the position of forward, those basketball activities measured in the field goal percentage, free throw percentage, and number of assists proved statistically significant during the present study’s regression analyses. Such findings no doubt reflect the fact that some forwards, called power forwards, play with their backs to the basket, while others, known as small forwards, play more like guards. As demonstrated by the statistically significant data obtained here for field goal percentage, free throw percentage, and assists, basketball forwards must be very versatile players. They must shoot well, play aggressively enough to reach the free throw line thus placing the opponent in “foul trouble,” and pass just as effectively as guards in order to involve teammates in play. Forwards clearly, from a statistical standpoint, play an integral role in NBA contests.

High field goal percentages and free throw percentages are an important contribution to team output and have impact on the game (Zak et al., 1979). With other factors held equal, the better a team shoots the ball, the larger its output; field goal percentage suggests how efficiently a team shoots (Zak et al., 1979). The study data thus suggest a need for NBA forwards to be very efficient and accurate players. They are asked to do many things on the basketball court, at different times. In terms of their skill at assists, small forwards must be very versatile and must share some of the same skill sets as guards, becoming play makers on occasion. Assists—highlighting as they do aspects of ball handling and teamwork (Zak et al., 1979)—thus constitute a significant indicator of NBA career longevity.

Centers
Unlike the data for forwards and guards, the data for centers in the present study produced no significant results. This may be attributable to the number of subjects in the study. The number of centers playing in the NBA has decreased over the years, a fact reflected in the minimal number of centers in this study (N = 54). Both the guards and the forwards studied here numbered about twice the center subsample.

Second Research Question
Guards
With respect to the second research question, the findings of analyses of the 2-year data show NBA career longevity to be predicted by certain basketball activities to a statistically significant degree. A significant regression equation was found (R = .462, R² of .213) for players at the guard position: 21.3% of the variation in NBA career longevity among guards is explained by the differences in points, assists, turnovers, and steals. In analyzing steals recorded by guards, adding an additional year of collegiate statistics produced a significant result. A measure of a player’s defensive ability, steals represent a change in possession (Berri & Brook, 1999). Because guards play the passing lanes on defense and apply defensive pressure on the perimeter, this statistic should be significant among guards.

Forwards
For the 2-year data on the NBA forwards, the overall regression model did not prove significant; however, two variables, assists and rebounds, did prove significant. It is of special interest that the rebound statistic achieved significance with the 2-year totals but not with the 1-year data. Rebounding is important to scouts, because its impact is seen in each game, as well as on the individual player (Zak et al., 1979). When a team outperforms an opponent in terms of rebounding, its chance of victory increases (Zak et al., 1979). Each rebound a team obtains represents a gain of possession; defensive rebounding indicates how frequently an opponent fails to convert a possession (Berri & Brook, 1999). Assists, as has been discussed in terms of the first research question, highlight aspects of both ball handling and teamwork and make a positive contribution to output (Zak et al., 1979).

Centers
In the analysis of 2-year data from the position of center, no statistics reached the level of significance, nor was the overall regression model significant. As in the case of the first research question, this finding can be attributed to the size of the sample of NBA centers.

Position-Based Differences
It is believed that the three positions (guard, forward, center) generated very different analytical results because they serve very different purposes in the game. At the guard position, assists, steals, turnovers, and points were significant indicators of NBA career longevity, because the guard position most lends itself to the keeping of such statistics. Guards are quick, agile, versatile, athletic players with extremely high basketball IQs. In terms of statistics-keeping, they find themselves involved in many aspects of a basketball game. The nature of the position requires guards to be proficient in a number of categories, and their proficiency is easily witnessed by scouts, coaches, commentators, and fans. Guards’ impact on the game is readily quantified and measured by statistics.

The present study suggests that for forwards, in contrast, it would be difficult to predict NBA longevity using collegiate statistics. The position of forward is probably the most difficult from which to retrieve statistical data. For instance, in the NBA forwards are asked to play dual roles, with the position broken down into the small forward and the power forward. The small forward must be a fundamentally sound offensive and defensive player possessing some of the same skills that point guards and shooting guards possess. Small forwards must be able to pass the basketball, enabling teammates to score, as well as be able to score points themselves. Power forwards, on the other hand, are asked to play more like centers: They are the muscle of the team, playing strong inside, rebounding, and providing defense, though not relying on extreme quickness and athletic ability. While the results for forwards in this study are very difficult to assess, the results are understandable from a basketball standpoint.

Relative to guards and forwards, centers’ performance is less easily measured with statistics. The reason is that the tasks falling to centers are frequently among the intangibles of the game. At center, the player who can demand the attention of the opposing defense possesses a relatively great capacity to set up his teammates. This cannot always be measured with statistics, since the center can set up another player without having the basketball. In addition, centers who can face the opponent’s defense and play with their backs to the basket create numerous problems for the defense that cannot be measured statistically. Centers are usually proficient at blocked shots, rebounds, points, and field goal percentage. Good centers also drive a defense to “play honest,” preventing teams from overextending on the perimeter and forcing double teams. Furthermore, successful centers are physical and maintain good position while boxing out. Neither of these things can be measured with statistics, but both are essential to a team’s success. The intimidation factor of a 7-ft player may not show up in box scores either, but being able to tap that factor to alter opponents’ shots (if they cannot be blocked) is very important to success at the center position.

Between 1983 and 1987 a number of elite centers moved from the college ranks to the NBA, including Ralph Sampson, Hakeem Olajuwon, Patrick Ewing, Brad Daugherty, and David Robinson (Luft, 2001). These centers were drafted by the NBA in the 1980s. Since that decade, however, the only centers drafted during the top pick were Shaquille O’Neal, Michael Olowokandi, Yao Ming, and, most recently, Greg Oden (Luft, 2001). There appear to be far fewer true centers in the NBA lately, leading to statistics’ inability, in this study, to measure performance at the center position. The lack of traditional centers may be a result of the increasingly superior quality of basketball athletes. As they become quicker, more versatile, more athletic generally, those who might have become centers can instead play power forward. The center position is thus left to a small group of players who are relatively nonproductive, statistically speaking, and thus cannot be measured in the same way as forwards and guards (Luft, 2001).

Implications for General Managers
While the results of this study suggest that collegiate statistics offer little predictive power in terms of centers’ NBA career longevity, they also show that some statistical categories used by the NBA are predictors of the longevity of players at the guard and forward positions. The implication of the data analysis is thus that statistics, when used to augment scouts’ customary analysis of videotapes, should yield a sound assessment of a prospective player’s potential. Scouts typically prefer to observe an athlete in person to get a better feel for the athlete’s game and to note physical aspects of the athlete that may not appear on tape or in statistics. However, because it is a fact that players can go hot or cold on any given night, scouts should also acknowledge the extreme importance of statistical analysis. Statistics in basketball offers a powerful tool for avoiding bad player selections, although it is important always to remember that statistical analysis is one tool, not the ultimate word on player quality.

By gathering as much statistical information about a player as possible, a scout or general manager can make an informed decision supported by numbers, not reliant solely on emotion or other subjective criteria. Statistics may, furthermore, make it possible to identify undervalued skill sets offered by players at certain positions. In short, statistical analysis has a place in player evaluation strategies aimed at efficient use of draft choices and money.

Conclusions and Recommendations
A review of the literature shows the basketball scouting and player evaluation process leading to the NBA draft to be a difficult process and one that could benefit from more information in the form of statistical analysis. The data in the present study demonstrate that there is a relationship between collegiate play described statistically and career longevity in the NBA, as follows:

  • Assists, turnovers, and points recorded by guards over the year of college basketball play immediately preceding entrance into the NBA are related to NBA career longevity.
  • Assists, steals, turnovers, and points recorded by guards over 2 years of college basketball play immediately preceding entrance into the NBA are related to NBA career longevity.
  • Field goal percentage, free throw percentage, and assists recorded by forwards over the year of college basketball play immediately preceding entrance into the NBA are related to career longevity in the NBA.
  • Assists and rebounds recorded by forwards over 2 years of college basketball play immediately preceding entrance into the NBA are related to career longevity in the NBA.
  • The results of this study show a relationship between basketball’s statistics categories and NBA career longevity, but more work is needed to fully understand the predictive mechanism and provide general managers with more precise information. In addition, future studies should seek out data for the years prior to 1987–88 and following 2001–02, to begin to track historical trends in the relationship.

References

Amico, S. (2001). A basketball summer: The pro game as it’s played in the off-season. Norcross, GA: Protea.
Allison, P. (1999). Multiple regression: A primer. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge.
Ballard, C. (2005, October 18). Measure of success. Sports Illustrated, 103.
Berri, J. D. (1999). Who is most valuable?: Measuring the player’s production of wins in the national basketball association. Managerial and Decision Economics, 20, 411–427.
Berri, J. D., & Brook, S. L. (1999). Trading players in the National Basketball Association: For better or worse? In J. Fizel, E. Gustafson, & L. Hadley (Eds.), Sports economics: Current research (pp.135–151). Westport, CT: Praeger.
Lahman, S. (2004). History by the numbers. In Shouler, K. (Ed.), Total basketball: The ultimate basketball encyclopedia (p.753). Toronto, Ontario, Canada: Sports Media.
Lewis, M. (2003). Money ball: The art of winning an unfair game. New York: W. W. Norton.
Luft, J. (2001). Off-center: Traditional centers hard to find in today’s NBA. Retrieved November 6, 2005, from http://www.sportsillustrated.cnn.com/statitudes/news/ 2001/02/27/nba_centers/index.html
Oliver, D. (2005). Basketball on paper: Rules and tools for performance analysis. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s.
Popper, S. (2004, October). Draft strategy: How has it changed? In Athlon Sports Pro Basketball, 11, 19–21.
Sandoval, G. (2003, November 14). Young executives are coming of age. The Washington Post, p. D1.
Shouler, K. (Ed.). (2004). Total basketball: The ultimate basketball encyclopedia. Toronto, Ontario, Canada: Sports Media.
Smith, S. (2004). From peach baskets to world acclaim. In Shouler, K. (Ed.), Total basketball: The ultimate basketball encyclopedia (pp. xi–xvii). Toronto, Ontario, Canada: Sports Media.
Staw, M. B., & Hoang, H. (1995). Sunk costs in the NBA: Why draft order affects playing time and survival in professional basketball. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40, 474–494.
Thomas, J. R., & Nelson, J. K. (2001). Research methods in physical activity (4th ed.). Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.
Wolff, A. (2001, June 25). Your lyin’ eyes. Sports Illustrated, 94, 82-100.
Zak, A. T., Huang, J. C., & Sigfried, J. J. (1979). Production efficiency: The case of professional basketball. Journal of Business, 52, 379–392.

Author Note
William Abrams is an attorney who studied law at Boston College and received his undergraduate degree from Michigan State University. He can be reached at abramswi@yahoo.com.

2013-11-25T22:03:05-06:00April 2nd, 2008|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Management, Sports Studies and Sports Psychology|Comments Off on Relationship of Selected Pre–NBA Career Variables to NBA Players’ Career Longevity
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Service Learning in Sport Management: A Community Health Project

Submitted by: Vincent Mumford, Central Michigan University,
Joseph N. Inumgu, Central Michigan University,
James A. Johnson, Central Michigan University,
Scott J. Smith, Central Michigan University

Abstract

Service learning is increasingly popular in schools, colleges, and universities. Service learning is a form of experiential learning and is an ideal pedagogical strategy to teach students about sport management. Students engaged in service learning typically become involved in specific community-based projects that are a part of their class requirements. These projects usually meet a real community need and link classroom content with community projects and reflection. Students can benefit tremendously from an educational experience that combines service learning and sport management. They can reap benefits in the areas of academic learning, civic responsibility, personal and social development, and opportunities for career exploration. A well-planned and well-executed service learning project can expand the student’s sport management experience well beyond events, contests, and classroom lectures. It can bridge the gap between the school and the community by providing a way for students and community organizations to come together for a worthy cause, making learning more meaningful. The purpose of this article is to examine how sport management classes can be designed and implemented as service learning projects that address critical community health challenges. Specifically, this article addresses service learning design that could be applied to any community health problem. The example used here is fund raising for malaria mitigation projects distributing bed nets as a low-cost means of prevention. The article describes the actual service project and discusses ways to encourage students to deepen their civic engagement to meet critical community and global needs.

(more…)

2016-10-19T11:05:37-05:00April 2nd, 2008|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Coaching, Sports Management|Comments Off on Service Learning in Sport Management: A Community Health Project
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Show Me the Money! A Cross-Sport Comparative Study of Compensation for Independent Contractor Professional Athletes

Submitted by: Rod Hilpirt, Scott Wysong, Sheila Hartley, Mike Latino & Andrea Zabkar

Abstract:

Numerous pay equity studies have been conducted. Many have examined the compensation of professional athletes. However, few studies have compared athlete compensation across sports, which is the objective of this research. Focusing on independent contractor athletes, several analyses were performed to determine how one type of athlete’s (e.g., horse jockeys) earnings from competition (excluding sponsorships, appearance fees, etc.) compare to other types of contracted athletes, such as race car drivers, golfers, bull riders, tennis players, etc. Overall, this exploratory study sheds insight into how the different groups of athletes are paid, and, more importantly, provides a framework for future research that examines the compensation inputs (versus outputs) of each of these groups.

Introduction:

Salaries for professional athletes continue to escalate each year. From Alex Rodriguez’s record $252 million contract to David Beckham’s $50 million per year enticement to join the LA Galaxy soccer team, most sports fans believe that professional athletes, in general, are overpaid and not worth their salaries. Yet for the professional athlete, maximizing compensation is critical, given the short careers and health risks associated with professional sports. Thus, athletes and their agents often look to see what others within their sport are paid in an effort to negotiate for more money. Few, if any, have compared athlete compensation across sports. While a cross-sport comparison might not be necessary in team professional sports (e.g., MLB, NHL, NFL, NBA) given the strength of their collective bargaining agreements, independent contractor professional athletes (e.g., jockeys, bull riders, golfers, race car drivers) need this type of analysis. The purpose of this research is to compare independent contractor professional athlete salaries across sport using four perspectives: total payout to athletes per sport, percentage of winnings per sport, top individual earner by sport and mean earnings for the top 50 athletes in each sport. These perspectives will allow independent contractor professional athletes to better analyze the “fairness” or equity of compensation.

Background:

Ever since jockey Gary Birzer was paralyzed while racing in 2004, the jockeys’ guild and track owners have had an acrimonius relationship, to say the least. While much of the ongoing battle has centered on who should pay for the jockeys’ long-term disability coverage, the dispute has recently turned to jockey compensation. The jockeys believe they are underpaid, given the amount of overall purse money involved in the sport and the inherent health risks of racing horses. In contrast, the race tracks believe that the horse owners and trainers deserve the bulk of winnings, given their financial risk and knowledge. With the sides at a stalemate, Corey Johnsen, President of Lone Star Park at Grand Prairie and current President of the Thoroughbred Racing Associations (the trade organization for the tracks) commissioned this study. By collecting extensive data across a number of sports, Johnsen sought to provide a starting point for discussions between the tracks and the jockeys’ guild in an effort to resolve the dispute.

Review of Literature:

A number of management and economic researchers have investigated compensation equity or justice across many industries. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to cover all of this literature, this section highlights a few key citations.

Carrell and Dittrich (1978) were two of the first to provide a comprehensive look at pay equity. The authors looked at the components of pay equity, such as an individual’s perceived inputs and outputs. In addition, they examined how an individual adjusts performance when he or she perceives pay to be inequitable. Adding to the body of existing literature, Younts and Mueller (2001) measured the importance individuals place on compensation justice, in particular distributive justice (i.e., the outcomes or rewards received). Similarly, St-Onge (2000) extended the literature by evaluating the influence of several individual variables on pay-for-performance perceptions, specifically looking at actual pay-for-performance, trust in decision-makers, perceived procedural justice, outcome satisfaction and size. Using social equity theory, Sweeney and McFarlin (2005) found that an individual’s pay satisfaction was based on that individual’s wage comparisons with similar and dissimilar others.

Looking specifically at athlete compensation, the majority of previous studies have dealt with team sports, and, in particular, Major League Baseball, given its unique market structure and history (e.g., anti-trust exemption, owner collusion in the 1980s, etc.). For instance, Slottje, Hirschberg, Hayes, and Scully (1994) used Frontier estimation to measure wage differentials in Major League Baseball and discovered that free agency status significantly influenced wage inefficiency. Similarly, Scully (2004) examined the effects of free agency on compensation as a share of league revenue and the dispersion of compensation among players across the four major professional sports: MLB, NBA, NFL, and NHL. As expected, he concluded that both were higher when leagues permitted a free labor market. Looking more closely at one professional sport, NHL hockey, Idson and Kahane (2000) empirically investigated the effects of co-worker productivity by examining individual variables, such as height, weight, points scored, plus/minus ratios, star status, and team/coach variables, such as team revenues, coach’s tenure, and coach’s winning percentage in the league. They concluded that “estimates of the effects of individual attributes on compensation are upwardly biased when team effects are not taken into account in standard salary regressions” (p. 356). Lastly, Nero (2001) used multiple regression analysis to measure the salary effectiveness of independent contractor athletes in one sport: PGA tour golfers. In his study, he analyzed the impact of a pro golfer’s driving distance, fairways hit, putting average per green, and sand saves (i.e., the percentage of times a player uses at most two shots to score from a greenside sand trap) on earnings. He concluded that putting average had the greatest influence on a golfer’s earnings.

Analysis:

  1. To compare jockey compensation to other independent contractor professional athletes, eleven sports were chosen (see Table 1). Salary data was compiled using primary research, including telephone and face-to-face interviews with representatives from various sports and secondary research utilizing websites, sports journals, magazines, and newspapers.

Table 1: Independent Contractor Sports for Comparison

  1. Professional Rodeo Cowboys Association (PRCA)
  2. Professional Bull Riding (PBR)
  3. Women’s Professional Rodeo Association (WPRA)
  4. Professional Golfers’ Association of America (PGA)
  5. Ladies Professional Golf Association (LPGA)
  6. Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP)
  7. Women’s Tennis Association (WTA)
  8. National Association of Stock Car Racing (NASCAR)
  9. National Hot Rod Association (NHRA)
  10. Association of Volleyball Professionals (AVP)
  11. Union Cycliste International (UCI)

Results:

Total Payout per Sport

Table 2 reveals the total payouts (excluding additional income such as endorsements or appearance fees) for horse racing (NTRA: National Thoroughbred Racing Association) and the independent contractor athletes in eleven other sports in 2005 and 2004.

Table 2: Total Payout by Sport

Assn 2005 2004
NTRA $1,085,000,000 $1,092,100,000
PRCA $37,553,821 $18,881,001
PBR $5,615,563 $3,491,450
WPRA $5,000,000 $4,000,000
PGA $266,112,055 $256,740,000
LPGA $44,400,000 $42,075,000
ATP $90,287,231 $88,549,527
WTA $59,190,883 $56,614,168
UCI $85,050,000 $85,050,000
NASCAR $275,276,253 $264,210,961
NHRA $13,500,000 $12,600,000
AVP $3,500,000 $3,000,000
Totals $1,970,485,806 $1,927,312,107

As illustrated, the amount of money paid out (i.e., purse money) in horse racing far exceeds the other sports. In fact, the second and third ranked sports, NASCAR and PGA, have purses approximately 25% of those of the NTRA. However, when the payouts for jockeys-only (i.e., the percentage of the purse that is paid to the jockeys by the owners) is compared to the athletes in the eleven other sports, the amount is much less than the compensation paid to PGA golfers and NASCAR drivers (see Figure 1).

Figure 1
Figure 1
Percentage of Winnings Per Sport

Figure 2 provides another perspective of the data in Figure 1. When we analyzed the dollars paid to jockeys as a percentage of the total purses (payouts), we found that jockeys, on average, received 7.5% of the available purse. This is much lower than a number of the other sports. Figure 3 provides the breakdown of purse percentage for first, second, and third places. As shown, NTRA jockeys receive 6% of the available purse for winning a race and 1% and .55% for second and third places respectively. In contrast, PRCA and PBR athletes received at least 20% of the purse for a second place finish.

Figure 2
Figure 2

Figure 3
Figure 3
Note: NTRA represents just the jockey’s percentages

Top Individual Earner by Sport

While using one individual in each sport is not an accurate representation of all athletes within the sport, comparing the top earner provides a glimpse of the earning potential per sport. As Figure 4 reveals, the top jockey, John Velasquez did not earn as much as Tiger Woods (PGA), Roger Federer (ATP), Maria Sharapova (WTA), Annika Sorenstam (LPGA), or Tony Stewart (NASCAR). However, he still makes nearly $2 million per year in earnings.

Figure 4

Top 50 Earners by Sport

Given the drawbacks of looking at the top earner in each sport, the top 50 earners in each sport were compared (see Figure 5). As shown, the average salary of the top 50 jockeys ranks fifth and is approximately $500,000 per year.

Figure 5
Figure 5
Note: NTRA represents just the jockeys (excludes owners and trainers)

Conclusions, Limitations, and Future Research:

Although a very simplistic bivariate analysis was used, this research provides important information for both sides of the jockey compensation debate. From the perspective of the tracks, over $1 billion is paid out in purses each year, with millions going to the jockeys, making horse racing a very lucrative sport. In contrast, from the jockeys’ perspective, they only receive 6% of the purse earnings, if they win, and 7.5% overall. While both sides have their stance, this research should allow the two sides to come together and begin discussions on how to solve this labor dispute. For instance, there might be a way to re-distribute the earnings to allow the second and third place finishers to earn more.

As with any research, there are limitations to this study. For one, this analysis excludes additional monies that athletes receive outside of competing (e.g., appearance fees, endorsements, etc.). Secondly, this research was limited by the bivariate analysis.

In the future, researchers should comparatively examine the sponsorship/endorsement dollars that independent contractor professional athletes receive across the twelve sports. This would provide a more thorough comparison of the total compensation these athletes receive. In addition, more sophisticated statistical analyses are needed to compare athletes across sports via multiple regression analysis or related techniques. As Porter and Scully (1996) pointed out, an individual athlete’s performance is difficult to measure because it is “a serially repeated and rewarded event. Among the individuals competing in professional sports, the distribution of earnings is determined by the distribution of awards for performance, the distribution of talent (expected performance), and by work effort (the number of competitions undertaken)” (p. 149).

Hopefully, future researchers will be able to examine in more detail the pay equity of independent contractor professional athletes.

References:

Carrell, M. and J. Dittrich (1978). Equity theory: The recent literature, methodological considerations, and new directions, The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 3, 202.

Idson, T. and L. Kahane (2004). Teammate effects on pay, Applied Economics Letters, Vol. 11 (12), 731.

Nero, P. (2001). Relative salary efficiency of PGA tour golfers, American Economist, Vol.45 (2), 51.

Porter, P. and G. Scully (1996). The distribution of earnings and the rules of the game, Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 63 (1), 149.

Scully, G. (2004). Player salary share and the distribution of player earnings, Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 25 (2), 77.

Slottje, D., J. Hirschberg, K. Hayes and G. Scully (1994). A new method for detecting individual and group labor market discrimination, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 61 (1), 43.

St-Onge, S. (2000). Variables influencing the perceived relationship between performance and pay in a merit pay environment, Journal of Business and Psychology, Vol. 14 (3), 459.

Sweeney, P. and D. McFarlin (2005). Wage comparisons with similar and dissimilar others, Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, Vol. 78, 113.

Younts, C.W. and C. Mueller (2001). Justice processes: Specifying the mediating role of perceptions of distributive justice, American Sociological Review, Vol. 66 (1), 125.

2016-10-20T10:28:15-05:00March 14th, 2008|Contemporary Sports Issues, Sports Management, Sports Studies and Sports Psychology|Comments Off on Show Me the Money! A Cross-Sport Comparative Study of Compensation for Independent Contractor Professional Athletes
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